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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Scientific Motivation for Network Research
The topic of this dissertation “Networks in Economics” is special. Classical economic themes
in microeconomic as well as macroeconomics are either concerned with individuals interacting
through anonymous markets or with the results of the interaction. In recent decades as well as
centuries, given the lack of data and computing facilities this was a very rational and successful
approach. Often these classical models are implicitly solved by the introduction of an abstract
concept. The Walrasian auctioneer who clears the market by matching supply and demand is
certainly the most popular example. An abstract concept allows to focus on final outcomes such
as prices and quantities but turn a blind eye on social processes. Hence, we can regard these
models as benchmark cases. In some circumstances the benchmark describes actual outcomes
fairly well whereas in others more information is necessary to get a deeper understanding of
observed processes and outcomes.
Economists are aware of these shortcomings and have considered much more elaborate models
in recent years. For instance, the microfoundation of macroeconomics, agent-based models,
models taking into account the heterogeneity of agents, social interaction models, among others
broaden our view and may enhance our understanding. All modern researchers are always eager
to improve standard models through the incorporation of additional pieces of information. The
question comes up, when the process of more detailed models will come to a stop? Implicitly,
this question asks “What is at the centre of all economic research?” For many economists a
natural answer is that the atomistic subject of economics is either an individual, an institution
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or the interplay between both.1 Economic network analysis exactly investigates the relationship
of these atomistic subjects to each other and the importance of these relationships for economic
outcomes. Henceforth, economic network analysis may not be on the agenda of today’s economists
but might pave the way for a new way of thinking among economists.
1.2 Dissertation Progress
The interest in economic network analysis arose while I was writing my master’s thesis
“Development of Bubbles: Theory and a case study of the ‘Neuer Markt’ ”. Information on
future stock market developments often contains no information which is based on any form of
economic reasoning. Unfounded speculation can be self-perpetuating if naive investors or other
financial market participants react on each other, i.e. take long positions if a peer group of each
investor purchases shares. This processes can be very dynamic and, therefore, no reliable models
forecasting the burst of stock market bubbles exist.
The idea arises that a successful forecast model might catch the social networks of important
financial market participants. Hence, during the first years of working on my dissertation, I
planned to reveal and investigate the social networks of financial analysts. In the aftermath of the
burst of the bubble the disappointed small investors often adjudged them guilty. Beyond doubt,
their forecasts were overconfident, however, beforehand bearish financial analysts performed
poorly when the stock market indices continuously hit new all-time-highs. They lost their jobs
and overconfident analysts were encouraged to continue their misinterpretations of the market
situation.
At the outset of my dissertation, I contacted the ‘Society of Investment Professionals in Germany’2
an organisation representing “more than 1,100 individual members representing over 400
investment firms, banks, asset managers, consultants and counselling businesses”3 and proposed
to survey the behaviour and social networks of its members. In a first step, the research idea
was presented to the managing director who supported my research scheme. Unfortunately, the
DVFA-board of directors turned down the project. I continued this line of research by directly
contacting banks. However, the analysts always denied to answer questions on the structure of
their social networks. Consequently, the project was closed.
1In very recent years, economists have also started to explore the influence of neuroscientific processes on
decision-making. These researchers might probably define the atomistic subject of economics quite differently.
2‘Deutsche Vereinigung fu¨r Finanzanalyse und Asset Management’ (DVFA) located in Frankfurt am Main.
3http : //www.dvfa.de/home engl/dok/35307.php downloaded on May 25, 2007.
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Subsequently, the idea arose to survey groups for which the information gathering is less difficult.
I planned to evaluate social networks in school classes and their influence on marks or test scores.
Managing such a project needs a large amount of resources and administrative work. Pupils
as well as parents, teachers, and administrative staff have to be contacted to organize such a
project. Accordingly, this approach seemed not feasible due to the large workload. To reduce the
burden of work I was looking for existing data sets containing social network information. After
reading several journal articles which tackle school classes and are based on original surveys
I discovered an article in which pupils had been asked “who is your friend in class?”. This
information was used to investigate whether more intelligent pupils have more or less friends
than less intelligent pupils. I contacted the author of the article and asked him whether the data
is still available and whether it is possible to exploit the network information. Unfortunately,
the originally available network information was aggregated such that the network information
was lost and the project was not continued.
Last but not least, I tried to explore the characteristics of a game-theoretical model which
explains typical properties of empirical network data such as the small-world property and
power law distributions. Unfortunately, the model was complicated, or to put it in another
way, my capabilities as well as the available computational capacity were not strong enough to
find equilibria and efficient networks. To put it succinctly, the problem of this project was that
the analysis of a multiplicative utility function tremendously increases the number of solutions
such that a brief description seems difficult. However, the failure of this project induced me to
evaluate an alternative welfare measure on social network models. The results of this work are
shown in Chapter 2.
In 2006 and within a few weeks, two network data sets were available to me. First, the
Hoppenstedt corporation provides me with a large corporate governance data set containing
ownership structures of German companies. This unique data set is analysed in Chapter 3.
Second, the DFG-project “Metaanalysis of Empirical Studies on Deterrence” allowed a
scientometric network study on criminologists as shown in Chapter 5. The first data set was
processed by Patrick Tydecks who used it to write his diploma thesis. The second data set was
arranged by my colleague Thomas Rupp. Hence, both researchers are coauthors of mine whereas
the chapters are written by myself.
Finally, in 2007 Immanuel Pahlke and Florian Gattung established an additional network data
set which is analysed in Chapter 4. It contains information on the board of director network
among DAX corporations and examines the impact of the network structure on executive
remuneration. This chapter was written by myself together with both students and my supervisor
Prof. Horst Entorf. The dissertation concludes with a supplement in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Jefficiency vs. Efficiency in
Social Network Models
Author: Jochen Mo¨bert
2.1 Introduction
Measuring the welfare of a group of people or a society is at the heart of economics. There
are several measures of welfare in the literature. The standard concept among the welfarist
functions is a Benthamite welfare function which sums up the values of individual utility
functions (cf. Bentham 1789). The counterpart to Bentham’s concept is the minimax criterion
described by Rawls (1971), which implies under weak assumptions an egalitarian outcome. Both
are extreme positions of moral philosophy while more pragmatic concepts are less frequently
debated. Traditionally, the success of the utilitarian as well as the egalitarian welfare function
has not been emphasized by applied researchers, but ideologists and theorists used the concepts.
Authors in the former category have made consumer-orientated use of it, whilst the latter have
focused on academic research.
Until now, the standard measure in the social network literature has been the utilitarian
welfare function. This welfare function is defined such that the term efficiency and utilitarian
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concept are used synonymously. In social network papers it might be challenging to prove
which network structures are the efficient ones. For instance, in Bala and Goyal (2000) and
Calvo´-Armengol (2004) some difficulties are implicitly mentioned since the authors restrict some
of their results related to the efficiency criterion to specific functions and values and not to a
general solution.1 Additionally, the calculation of the efficient set might be constrained by slow
computer processors. However, the optimal utilitarian outcome is in many situations still one of
the less complicated concepts and this is generally true in many other fields of economics where
proofs and the computational task are less demanding. Hence, it can be argued that the use of
this concept in social network papers2 is motivated by mathematical simplicity.
The attractiveness of the utilitarian welfare function is closely related to the way utility functions
are specified. The first contributions to the social network literature have not derived their utility
functions from observing the behavior of humans but from the experience that fully-fledged
solutions are often obtained out of linearly specified utility functions, while the detection of
actually more realistic, but also more complicated, specifications of utility functions are much
more involved. Therefore, instead of having realistic but irresolvable models economists prefer
simple models conveying some simple messages.
Many researchers who use the utilitarian welfare concept often express their discomfort regarding
its social implications. However, they continue to use it since they claim it is better to appraise
the efficiency using the utilitarian concept than to completely disregard the welfare problem.
Rawls (1971), Sen (1979), among others pointing out that the utilitarian concept abstracts from
distributional issues.3 It only maximizes the sum of all utilities and allows for arbitrary utility
distributions across a set of players. Hence, this criterion can be inappropriate for advising
non-economists and it can be an important reason for the lack of communication between
theorists and applied researchers (cf. Slesnick 1998). Accordingly, proposals of policy advisors
based on the utilitarian criterion might be attacked by politicians and decision-makers. In this
contribution a different welfare criterion is proposed and results are compared with the utilitarian
concept. Thereby, it is shown that the mathematical ease is obtainable in social network models
if both welfare and utility functions are specified in a more realistic way.
Carayol, Roux, and Yildizoglu (2005) propose the use of an algorithm to approximate the set
of efficient networks. This idea might be a promising one. Of course, one shortcoming of
an approximation is the lack of beauty. While beauty has a value for itself, it also enhances
1In the case of the job-contact network model invented by Calvo´-Armengol (2004) it is not the deterministic
but the expected sum of utilities that is maximized.
2As well as in other subfields of economics.
3Note that given a utilitarian concept a uniform distribution of goods is welfare maximizing if each utility
function increases with consumption and is concave.
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our intuitive understanding for outcomes. Another shortcoming of an approximation is that
an algorithm might produce misleading results. Carayol, Roux, and Yildizoglu (2005) show
that for the co-author network formation model introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) the
algorithm used is exact at least for small networks. However, it is not able to catch the structure
of the symmetric connection model. Even worse, it seems that the degree of exactness depends
in a nonlinear way on the number of players. The algorithm fails sometimes for small and very
stylized network models such that for large and complex networks the precision of the algorithm
could be low. The findings of Carayol, Roux, and Yildizoglu (2005) imply that a lot of additional
research seems to be necessary for the application of the algorithm. The usage of algorithms
might be especially helpful if applications of social network methods to large networks or whole
economies are considered.
Welfare functions maximizing either the allocation efficiency or try to accomplish a uniform
distribution are less interesting from a pragmatic point of view than welfare measures which
take into account both properties. An example of such a welfare function is the product of
utilities proposed by Nash (1950), also called ‘Nash product’. This product is only one member
of the constant elasticity of substitution class where the inequality aversion parameter is positive
and finite. In this class of welfare criterions it is chosen because it exhibits favorable properties
discussed below. The Nash product is also called multiplicative social welfare function and is
maximized if the product of all utilities is maximal.4
4Game theorists working in the field of bargaining models are familiar with the Nash product, which is often
defined as the product of player’s utilities above their reservation utilities. Nash’s (1950) seminal contribution to
the bargaining literature demonstrated that the maximization of this product has decent properties in the context
of bargaining among agents.
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Researchers such as Kaneko and Nakamura (1979) as well as Hanany (2001) used the Nash
product as a mean of measuring social welfare and showed its normative implications. In this
paper I follow them and take the position of a social planner who uses the Nash product
to evaluate the welfare properties of social networks. In the social network literature Nash
is associated with some equilibrium concepts. The multiplicative welfare function is called
the “jefficiency” criterion to avoid confusion with, for instance, the Pairwise-Nash equilibrium
concept and where the j emphasizes that the Nash product takes into account some form of
justice. Accordingly, a network which maximizes this criterion is called “jefficient”. Having
introduced the notation in Chapter 2.2, in Chapter 2.3 some properties of the efficiency and the
jefficiency measure are compared. Moreover, some simple results of well-known social network
formation models are shown. In Chapter 2.4 the application and comparison of the efficiency and
jefficiency criterion and derive the jefficient networks of the original symmetric connection model
as well as the “simple multiplicative symmetric connection model” is continued. Chapter 2.5
concludes by illustrating that in many situations multiplicative utility functions have attractive
properties that are complementary to the jefficiency criterion.
2.2 Notation
Let N = {1, ..., N} be the finite set of players and the individual player is denoted by i. We
assume throughout the paper N ≥ 3. We denote the utilitarian welfare concept byW =∑Ni=1 ui
where ui ∈ R is the utility level for each player i. The utility of each player i is derived from
the position of i in a network g such that ui is a short form for ui(g). The jefficiency criterion
is defined by J =
∏N
i=1 ui where ui > 0 for all i.
5 Otherwise, J is not defined. This assumption
is necessary because without this assumption negative utility functions might be multiplied by
each other and yield positive outcomes. This contradicts the aim of a social planner.6 Given a
utility distribution the mean utility level is abbreviated by u. Utility vectors of dimension N
are denoted by u and v respectively. The link between player i and j is denoted by ij and a
set of links g = {ij, ik, . . . } describes a whole network structure. If ij is formed, then ji also
exists which implies that we consider undirected unweighted networks. Different networks are
distinguished by a subscript gc for c = 1, 2. Some considered network structures are the star gS
and the regular network of degree k gR,k. In a star formation one player, the center, has links to
every other player, while the other players, the peripheral players, have links to the star only. In
5Notice that taking the logarithm of J result in log(J) =
∑N
i=1 log(ui) which simplifies the comparison of both
concepts.
6An alternative specification might be to multiply positive utility functions and divide the absolute value of
negative utility levels, i.e. J =
(∏
i ui
)
/
(∏
j |uj |
)
where ui > 0 and uj < 0. However, this definition is not
applicable for zero utility levels.
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a regular network each player has the same number of links. An example for a regular network
is the complete network gR,N−1 also denoted by gN where each player i forms N −1 links. Also,
the empty network is a regular network. Another frequently debated network formation is the
line where gL = {i1i2, i2i3, . . . , iN iN−1}. Additional notation which is needed to describe the
results of other papers is introduced below.
2.3 Efficiency vs. Jefficiency
As is known, J and W are related to each other via the class of CES-functions.7 The general
form of these functions is
CES(ρ) =
{
1
1−ρ
∑N
i=1[ui]
1−ρ for ρ 6= 1∏N
i=1 ui for ρ = 1
(2.1)
where ρ indicates the aversion towards inequality. If ρ = 0, the Benthamite social welfare
function W is attained, and for ρ = 1 the CES-functions are completed by the Nash social
welfare function.8
Lemma 1 (Transferable Utility) Maximizing J in a transferable utility world requires the
maximization of W in a first step. Subsequently, utility is redistributed such that each player
obtains the same utility level.
Proof: To maximize J we want to produce the maximum amount of utility units among the set of
players. This implies maximizing W . Subsequently, each player gets the same utility level since
log(u¯) ≥ log(u) where log(u) = N−1 [log(u1) + log(u2) + · · ·+ log(uN )] where log is the natural
logarithm. 
In a transferable utility world the production of utilities is separated from the distribution
of utilities. Hence, a higher amount of total utility enables a Pareto improvement. After W is
maximized the maximization of J requires to distribute all utility units equally among the player
set. The reason for this is that
∏N
i=1 u >
∏N
i=1 ui if at least one individual utility level ui 6= u
where
∑N
i=1 ui = Nu and u indicates that all players have the same utility level. Generally, if
7CES is the abbreviation for “constant elasticity of substitution”.
8In general, the larger ρ is, the higher a social planner’s inequality aversion. To show that for ρ = 1 the
CES-class is completed by
∏N
i=1 ui can be shown by l’Hospital’s rule if ρ→ 1.
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a strictly concave function such as the logarithm is considered then the functional value of the
mean is always larger than the mean value of all functional values.
The more realistic and therefore more interesting case is the nontransferable utility world. In
such an economy, the maximization of J simultaneously takes also into account the allocation
and the distribution of utilities. Therefore, we face a trade-off between the production of utilities
and the degree of inequality in a society. Intuitively, multiplying all utility functions of the whole
player set implies that each player’s utility has not only a direct but also an indirect effect on
the social welfare function. These externalities are preserved if we rewrite J as
J = exp
(
N∑
i=1
log(ui)
)
(2.2)
It is readily seen that the maximization of J yields the same outcome as maximizing log(J) =∑N
i=1 log(ui). Here, it is not the utility sum which is maximized, but the sum of logarithmised
utilities. The concave log function scales down the welfare weight of high utility levels relative
to low levels. This implies that the indirect effects each player produces and which are initially
contained in J are transformed into the concavity of the logarithm function. Therefore, the
maximization of J weights both production efficiency and some form of equity. A Taylor
approximation of log(J) around the mean u enhances our understanding of the relationship
between both welfare issues. It also enhances the comparison of the jefficiency property and the
standard welfare property.
Proposition 1
log (J) = N
[
log(u¯) +
D=∞∑
d=2
N∑
i=1
(−1)d+1 1
dN
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d]
(2.3)
where we call 1N
∑N
i=1(
ui−u¯
u¯ )
d the u¯-standardized dth-moment.
Proof: Using the Taylor-series we can write log(ui) =
∑∞
d=0
log(d)(u¯)
d! (ui − u¯)d where log(d)(u¯) =
∂dlog(u¯)
∂ u¯d
, i.e. the dth derivation with respect to u¯. This can be rewritten as log(ui) = log(u¯) +
ui−u¯
u¯ +
∑∞
d=2
log(d)(u¯)
d! (ui − u¯)d. Let log(d)(u¯) = (−1)d+1 (d−1)!u¯d and summing over each player in
the player set yields the above formula in Equation 2.3. 
We call the double sum the D-series and say J is approximated up to order D ≤ ∞. If we also
rewrite W = Nu, then the first right-hand term of J can be compared to W . Maximizing Nu
yields the same economic outcome as the maximization of Nlog(u). Therefore, if the individual
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utilities are close to the mean, then the D-series is close to zero and the maximization of J and
W yields similar results. However, J also takes into account the distribution of the utilities.
Thus, if the utility levels of the players are spread across a larger range, then J yields different
results than W . Taking the exponential on both sides of Equation 2.3 might be helpful in
separating the jefficiency criterion into an allocation part and another part capturing the degree
of inequality.
J = u¯N + exp
[
D=∞∑
d=2
N∑
i=1
(−1)d+1 1
d
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d]
(2.4)
Let us call uN the allocation addend and J − u¯N the distributional addend. Then the fractions
u¯N
J and
J−u¯N
J characterize how important efficiency and inequality are in a specific situation.
As a matter of course, the Taylor approximation is valid for other values than u¯. If other values
are chosen, then the partition into an efficiency part and an inequality part varies. However,
the choice of u¯ seems attractive because given this choice the inequality part can be interpreted
as u¯-standardized dth-moment.
If we consider the Taylor approximation up to degree D = 4 then
log(J) ≈ N
[
log(u)− 1
2N
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)2
+
1
3N
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)3
− 1
4N
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)4]
(2.5)
follows. This equation shows that log(J) is decreased, ceteris paribus, if the u¯-standardized
variance and the u-standardized kurtosis of the utility distribution are increased. Furthermore,
log(J) is higher for right-skewed utility distributions than for left-skewed distributions, ceteris
paribus. We apply a simple example to illustrate the preference for right-skewed relative to
left-skewed utility distributions. Let us consider a three-player world and let us suppose that
in case α the utility levels are u1 = 2, u2 = 2, u3 = 5 and in case β the utility levels are
u1 = 1, u2 = 4, u3 = 4. Note, in both cases the average utility level u¯ equals three.9 Let the
skewness be Scase = 13
∑N
i=1
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)3 then Sα = 6 > −6 = Sβ. Therefore, we can conclude that
log(Jα) > log(Jβ). The message illustrated by the example holds for general D ≤ ∞. Thereby,
right-skewed utility distributions increase J and left-skewed utility distributions reduce J , ceteris
paribus. Formally, this is true because under the assumptions of a constant mean and a mirror-
inverted form of utilities all even d-terms are identical and all odd d-terms are positive in case
α and negative in case β.
It is important to note that the Taylor-Approximation is only reasonable if the double sum∑∞
d=2
∑N
i=1(−1)d+1 1d 1N
(
ui−u
u
)d
converges towards zero for large d. Otherwise, the alternating
elements of the sum diverge and the value of J might heavily depend on the order of the
approximation or, otherwise stated, the approximation introduced in Equation 2.3 is not
applicable.
9Furthermore, convergence is guaranteed since max[ui] < 2u¯ in both cases. See Remark 1.
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Remark 1 The approximation given in Equation 2.3 converges if and only if ui ≤ 2u¯ for each
player i.
Proof10: First, the sufficient condition implies that ui ≤ 2u¯ implies convergence. To prove this
statement split the D-series in Equation 2.3 into a double-sum containing only even d addends
(the Deven-part) and in another double-sum containing only odd d addends (the Dodd-part) . If
each double-sum converges then the D-series converges. The following inequality∣∣∣∣∣(−1)d+1 1d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣(−1)d+3 1d+ 2
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+2∣∣∣∣∣ (2.6)
holds for d even as well as for d odd.11 If d is odd then distinguish case (1) where
∑N
i=1
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)d
>
0 from case (2) where
∑N
i=1
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)d
< 0. Under case (2) the Dodd-part as well as the Deven-part
are smaller zero but both converge towards zero such that the D-series converges. Under case
(1) the Deven-part is smaller zero whereas the Dodd-part is greater zero whereas again both
converge towards zero and Leibnitz’s convergence criterion is applicable.12 Second, the necessary
condition implies that convergence induces ui < 2u¯. Given Inequality 2.6 then each individual
term
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)d must converge. Let m = {∣∣∣uj−u¯u¯ ∣∣∣ | ∣∣∣uj−u¯u¯ ∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣ui−u¯u¯ ∣∣ ∀i ∈ N}. Then, for player j
it must hold that
∣∣(−1)d+1 1dmd∣∣ > ∣∣∣(−1)d+3 1d+2md+2∣∣∣. This can be rewritten as √d+2d > m
and should hold for all d ≥ 2 such that 1 > m = uj−u¯u¯ implies uj < 2u¯ holds for player j and,
therefore, for each player i ∈ N . 
Another helpful remark simplifies some considerations regarding different network
characteristics.
Remark 2 The right term of log(J) in Proposition 1
D=∞∑
d=2
N∑
i=1
(−1)d+1 1
d
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
(2.7)
is not greater zero if the series converge.
10Notice throughout the whole paper I assumed that ui > 0 for all i such that u¯ > 0. Hence, multiplying an
inequality by u¯ cannot turn the greater-than sign into a smaller-than sign.
11The Appendix contains further details.
12The Leibnitz Theorem has the following content: Let
∑∞
n=1 an be an alternating series and let {|an|}∞n=1 be
a decreasing null sequence. Then, the series
∑∞
n=1 an converges.
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Proof: Independent of the order of D we find to every odd addend of order d+1 an even addend
of order d. Thus, it suffices to show that
−1
d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
+
1
d+ 1
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
≤ 0 (2.8)
holds. This inequality can be written as
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
≤ d+ 1
d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
(2.9)
The inequality is true because 1 < d+1d for each d and
∑N
i=1
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)d+1 ≤ ∑Ni=1 (ui−u¯u¯ )d holds
because
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)d+1 ≤ (ui−u¯u¯ )d for each player i which is true by the convergence of the series. 
Both welfare criteria J andW are also related to each other under specific circumstances. While
it is difficult to show fully-fledged results for the general model it is possible to discover some
structure under special circumstances which are discussed below.
Lemma 2 (Dominant Order) Suppose there are two networks gx for x = 1, 2. If ui(g1) >
ui(g2) for each player i then it holds that both W (g1) > W (g2) and J(g1) > J(g2).
The proof is straightforward and omitted.
Lemma 3 (Non-Dominant Order) Suppose there are two networks gx for x = 1, 2. Suppose
S1 and S2 is a partition of the player set N where N1 = |S1| and N2 = |S2|.13 Let ui(g1) > ui(g2)
for all i ∈ S1 and uj(g1) < uj(g2) for all j ∈ S2. Let Jm(gx) =
∏Nm
i=1 ui(gx) and Wm(gx) =∑Nm
i=1 ui(gx) for m = 1, 2. Then J(gx) = J1(gx)J2(gx) and W (gx) = W1(gx) + W2(gx) for
x = 1, 2. Furthermore, we assume W1(g1) − W1(g2) > W2(g2) − W2(g1) which implies that
network g1 is efficient because W (g1) > W (g2). However, it might hold that network g2 is
jefficient, i.e. J(g1) < J(g2).
Proof: Suppose a player j ∈ S2 exists such that uj(g1) = ε where ε > 0. This small value may
have only a small impact on W (g1) such that W (g1) > W (g2) holds but J(g1) can be arbitrarily
close to zero such that J(g2) > J(g1). 
13Notice, the bars stand for the cardinality of the partition.
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The proof of the last Remark illustrates how strong the utility level of a single player can
influence the social welfare. The last two remarks can also be applied to general models in
non-network models. The next two results take into account specific network formations.
Lemma 4 (Regular Networks) If players are homogenous, then (i) the efficient network
among the set of regular networks is also the jefficient network among the set of regular networks
and (ii) if an efficient network is regular then this network is also the jefficient network.
Proof: (i) If players are homogenous and all players have the same position in the network then
W =
∑N
i=1 ui(g) = Nui(g) and J =
∏N
i=1 ui(g) = [ui(g)]
N where ui(g) = u¯ for each player
i. This implies that for both criteria we look for that regular network which produces the
maximal utility sum for any player i since all players are identical. (ii) Lemma 1 implies that
in a transferable utility world we first maximize W and then distribute the utility sum equally
across all players. However, if the utilitarian welfare function is maximized such that all players
get the same utility, the second step can be omitted and Lemma 1 is also applicable to the
nontransferable utility world. 
Lemma 4 is applicable to the one-way flow model in Bala and Goyal (2000). In the one-way
flow model information which spreads through networks can only flow to the player who bears
the costs for the existing links. There, the efficient network is either the empty network or
the cycle.14 Of course, the empty network is only efficient if the costs of forming links are too
high. Otherwise, the cycle is the efficient network where every player forms one link and gets
the whole information set available in the set. Given Lemma 4, we know that the cycle is also
the jefficient network. The same line of reasoning holds for the co-author model explained in
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). If the number of players is even, then the efficient network in the
co-author model is the one where each component is formed by two players only. The reason
for this result is that each player gains the maximum amount of utility relative to the number
of links. If a further link is added to one player, then the utility of indirectly connected players
shrinks more than the direct links add to the players who form the link. Thence, social welfare
is reduced. Given Lemma 4, we can conclude that the jefficient network is also the network
containing components of pairs of players only.
Another frequently investigated network formation is the star network. There, the central player
is connected to N − 1 players while the periphery players are only connected to the center. Let
us assume a convergent series as defined above and denote the utilities of both groups of players
14Bala and Goyal (2000) used the notion wheel, while in graph theory the standard term is cycle.
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by uc for the central player and up for the periphery players, then
log (J) = N log
[
(N − 1)up + uc
N
]
+
D=∞∑
d=2
(−1)d+1
d
{
(N − 1)(up − uc)d
[
1 + (N − 1)d−1(−1)d]
[(N − 1)up + uc]d
}
which given a fixed number of players depends only on up and uc. It is immediately seen that
log(J) reduces to N log(ui) if and only if up = uc under the assumptions stated. If up 6= uc, then
all even d-terms are negative. The odd d-terms are negative if up > uc because from this point
onwards, as described above, a left-skewed utility distribution is evaluated and the d-terms are
positive if up < uc.
The J-star formula can also be reinterpreted in the following way. In a sense, it relates an
inequality measure to the total utility sum. Thus, we can rewrite
Lemma 5 (Star Networks) In star network formations it holds that
log (J) = N log
(
W
N
)
+
D=∞∑
d=2
(−1)d+1
d
(
Γ
W
)d
(N − 1)
[
1 + (N − 1)d−1(−1)d
]
where Γ = up − uc and W = (N − 1)up + uc.
The proof requires simply replacing and solving the above equations to the original formula. Γ
can be interpreted as an inequality measure while W is the sum of all utilities. It also holds that
Γ < W . This inequality holds since up−uc < (N −1)up+uc which implies 0 < (N −2)up+2uc.
This formula and its interpretation is transferable to any network where only two different utility
levels arise.
Remark 3 In a star network the Taylor-approximation converges if uc < 2up.
Proof: The standard condition for convergence is ui < 2u¯ for each player i. In the star network
ui < 2N−1 [(N − 1)up + uc] for i = p, c must hold. This inequality is always fulfilled for the
peripheral players because −2uc < (N − 2)up. For the central player the inequality can be
rewritten as (N − 2)uc < (2N − 2)up. For large N this reduces to uc < 2up and if a smaller
number of players forms the star then the inequality is a slightly less restrictive. 
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A basic feature of J andW can also be characterized graphically. Figure 2.1 shows the functions
W (u¯) and J(u¯).15 Of course, the dotted line representing W is a linear function of u¯ while
J depends not only on u¯, but also on the distribution of utilities. Therefore, the mapping
represented by the grey field in Figure 2.1 shows the possible values the jefficiency criterion
might take in dependence of u¯. The maximum J is reached where the utility distribution
degenerates to ui = u¯ for all player i. The minimum is reached if there exists at least one player
i such that ui = ε > 0. The arguments also suggest that for each u¯2 > u¯1 it is possible to find
a utility distribution such that J(u¯2) ≤ J(u¯1) where the inequality is strict if u¯1 > 0.
Figure 2.1: J and W in dependence of u¯
Own Source: Comparison of J(u¯) and W (u¯) where W is a monotonic
continuously increasing linear function of u¯ and J is a non-linear
correspondence of u¯. For each J(u¯2) > J(u¯1) we can find a utility
distribution J(u¯2)
′ < J(u¯1).
15Notice, it is meaningless to compare the absolute value of different social welfare functions. Therefore, do not
assume that J Q W .
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Before the jefficiency criterion J is applied to a network model a final result is proven.
Remark 4 Performing a mean preserving spread such that the convergence of the D-series is
still maintained reduces J .
The proof is appended.
For a symmetric utility distribution the outcome is immediately proven since all even d-parts
are decreased by a mean preserving spread and odd d-terms are zero for any symmetric utility
distributions.
2.4 Jefficiency in the Symmetric Connection Model
A (Multiplicative) Symmetric Connection Model
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced one of the simplest network formation models available,
where each player derives utility from direct and indirect links where more distant links
contribute less. Costs arise only for direct links. In this model only the empty network, the star,
and the complete network are among the class of efficient networks. If we look for the jefficient
networks, we discover a much richer set of networks.
Proposition 2 The set of jefficient networks of the symmetric connection model is different
from the set of efficient networks.
Proof: For N = 4 there are eleven possible network formations in the symmetric connection
model. Four out of these networks, for example g0, have at least one player who is not connected
to anyone else. Therefore, the jefficiency measure of these networks is zero. The following
networks are left: gR,1, gL, g = {12, 13, 23, 24}, gS , gR,2, gN−ij , and gN where gN−ij describes any
network where 2−1[N(N − 1)] − 1 links are formed. Let c = δ, then in all networks where one
player has only direct, and no indirect, links J = 0. Only JL and JR,2 are greater than zero and if
c = δ, then JL > JR,2. 
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A general solution for N is quite demanding. Given Gauss’ fundamental theorem of algebra, we
conjecture that the set of jefficient network depends on the number of players.16
Conjecture 1 In the symmetric connection model the set of jefficient networks increases with
the number of players in a network.
It seems reasonable that this conjecture is true in many cases and it is applicable to any additive
separable utility function.17 For instance, many utility functions in social network models are
additively separable, i.e. ui = f1(.) + f2(.). If a utility function has this property, then the
calculation of J requires the maximization of
J =
N∏
i=1
ui =
N∏
i=1
[f1(.) + f2(.)] (2.11)
In a simple environment such as a regular network it follows that J = [f1(.) + f2(.)]
N . Thus,
even for a regular network which has only a few players the maximization of the jefficiency
criterion might be complex. In network formations where players have different utility levels the
calculation of J is much harder. This complexity with respect to finding the optimal J can be
avoided if utility functions exhibit multiplicative separability only, i.e. if the utility function is
modelled without any additive component.
Multiplicative separable utility functions make it easier to find the jefficient network. Taking the
logartihm of J and the multiplicative separable utility functions shows that finding the jefficient
network is as simple as finding the efficient network of utility functions which contain only
additive components and have no multiplicative separable structure. Playing around with utility
and welfare functions is pointless from an economic point of view. However, in many disciplines
related to the social network literature – such as computer science, graph theory, Markov chain
theory, neural networks, etc. – multiplicative structures are used to describe existing network
outcomes. Intuitively, many economic phenomena such as critical mass effects in ‘network
economics’18, the development of bubbles in financial markets, the development of customs and
culture, social interaction effects, and others might be easier to model if multiplicative structures
are assumed. Hence, the introduction of the jefficiency criterion as an appropriate social welfare
16Gauss’ proof shows that in a polynomial of degree d there are d possible solutions. Some of the solutions
might be complex and some of them might have multiplicity greater than one.
17A utility function is ‘additive separability’ if the function contains a ‘plus’. In particular, if utility and
disutility are separated by a ‘plus’.
18Distinguish the general economic sub-discipline of social network research from ‘network economics’ which
is a research field in industrial economics. Both fields are related to each other but researchers do not cite each
other and both fields are different scientific markets.
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function and the introduction of utility functions exhibiting multiplicative structures has three
advantages. First, the maximization of the jefficiency is relatively simple, second, if the jefficiency
criterion is used as a social welfare function an inequality measure is used which has some
desirable properties, and third and most importantly, in many situations multiplicative utility
functions describe social network effects in a more realistic way. In the following paragraphs, it
is shown how simple the calculation of the jefficient network can be. The symmetric connection
model is used to construct a utility function which enables a simple derivation of the set of
jefficient networks.
The result in Proposition 2 shows that the set of jefficient networks may have a greater cardinality
than the set of efficient networks in the symmetric connection model. Above it was proven that
J is maximal if both equity and the production of utility is taken into account. Hence, the set of
jefficient networks may contain at least some regular networks where each player has the same
utility level and some minimal connected networks where the number of links and therefore the
costs of forming links is minimized, and possibly also some mixture of both network structures
may be jefficient.
In Mo¨bert (2006) we defined the class of all symmetric connection models – the SCM(W)-class
– grounded on the utilitarian efficiency criterion19 and showed that the structure of the
proof of the corresponding proposition in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) can be used as a
basis for the derivation of a whole class of symmetric connection models. Here a network
formation model which is closely related to the SCM(W)-class is defined. This model is called
“simple multiplicative symmetric connection model”.20 The idea of this network formation
model is based on the (original) symmetric connection model mentioned above. The “simple
multiplicative symmetric connection model” has the following utility function
ui = δ
∞∑
e=1
le
e
c−l1 (2.12)
where le indicates the number of links of distance e of player i to all other players, δ is the utility
of direct respectively indirect links and c are the costs of forming direct links.21
Proposition 3 The jefficient network is
(a) the complete network if c < δ0.5
(b) the star if δ0.5 < c < δ0.5+0.25N
19We call this class the SCM(W)-class which means the class of symmetric connection models based on the
utilitarian welfare criterion.
20In accordance to the “simple additive symmetric connection model” introduced in Mo¨bert (2006).
21It is possible to show that the maximization of J leads to a simple result which is similar to both the
maximization of W in the original and in the “simple additive symmetric connection model”.
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(c) the empty network if c > δ0.5+0.25N .
Proof: (a) If direct links are more valuable than indirect links, then δc > δ
0.5 which implies
that the fully connected network gN is formed if c < δ0.5. (b) Let us call the upper bound of
a connected component with m players and k ≥ m − 1 links JU = ( δc )2k(δ0.5)[m(m−1)−2k]. The
jefficiency measure of the star is JS = ( δc )
2(m−1)(δ0.5)(m−2)(m−1). Since JS ≥ JU for δ0.5 < c the
star is jefficient among the set of connected components. (c) The star is just restricted by the
emtpy network g0 which is jefficient if 1 > ( δc )
2(m−1)(δ0.5)(m−2)(m−1) which can be reduced to c >
δ0.5+0.25m. 
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper a well-known welfare measure is applied to social network models which takes
into account both allocation efficiency and has a positive risk-aversion against inequal utility
distributions, the Nash product, to social network formation models. The Nash product is here
also called jefficiency criterion which is a combination of the words ‘justice’ and ‘efficiency’.
Several relationships between the Benthamite standard efficiency criterion and the jefficiency
criterion is derived. In particular, a Taylor approximation is used to deduce a formula which
improves our understanding of the jefficiency criterion relative to the utilitarian welfare measure.
Furthermore, it is argued that a main reason for the application of the derivation of efficient
outcomes is easier to perform if utility functions are linearly specified. By means of an example,
it is shown that replacing the efficiency criterion by the jefficiency criterion leads to a larger
variety of network structures in the symmetric connection model. However, the results of the
“simple multiplicative symmetric connection model” demonstrated that multiplicative utility
functions22 may lead to simple welfare outcomes if welfare is measured by the jefficiency criterion.
Hence, the evaluation of multiplicative specified utility functions with respect to the jefficiency
criterion might be a natural choice both from a computational point of view to get relatively
simple results and from a normative point of view since the jefficiency criterion introduces some
form of inequality aversion into the social network literature.
The main advantage of the use of multiplicative utility functions, however, might be that
multiplicative utility functions exhibit characteristics which can explain some features of really
existing social networks. For instance, physicists such as Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi (1999)
22We call utility functions ’additive’ if they exhibit ’additive seperability’ properties, and ’multiplicative’ if they
ehibit ’multiplicative separability’ properties.
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have shown that a general characteristic of networks is that the distributions of links obeys the
power-law or similar distributions. This kind of link distribution characterized by fat tails is
also found in social networks. For instance, Goyal, van der Leij, and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2006)
discovered that the real existing co-author network of economists also exhibits fat tails in the
period 1970 to 2000. Mitzenmacher (2003) has shown that one necessity for the derivation
of such distributions is the introduction of multiplicative structures. Economists who search
for network formation models describing reality in an appropriate way might, therefore, prefer
the modelling of multiplicative utility functions instead of the linear functions used often in
today’s specifications. Also in research fields which are closely related to the social network
literature such as random graph theory and Markov chain theory many important results possess
multiplicative structures.23
23Intuitively, multiplicative utility functions are directly justifiable by the simple observation that the survival
of humans require the availability of several goods like air, water, food, etc. Without any of these resources
humankind is unable to survive. Hence, if only one of these resources is unavailable to some players, then the
utility levels of players in social network theories should be zero, and not above zero as in additively specified
utility functions. Of course, this statement holds not only for the social network literature but for many game
theoretical models (cf. Sen 1999).
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2.6 Appendix
Extended Proof (Remark 1)24: First, prove the sufficient condition, i.e. ui ≤ 2u¯ implies
convergence. Split the D-series into two parts such that
D=∞∑
d=2
N∑
i=1
(−1)d+1 1
d
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
= (2.13)
∑
d∈de
N∑
i=1
(−1)d+1 1
d
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
+
∑
d∈do
N∑
i=1
(−1)d+1 1
d
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
= Deven +Dodd
where de and do is the set of even and odd numbers. If Deven and Dodd converges then the
D-series itself converges. Each addend of the Deven-part is smaller than zero since (−1)d+1 < 0
whereas all other terms in the Deven-part are larger than zero. Show that
(−1)d+1 1
d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
< (−1)d+3 1
d+ 2
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+2
which can be rewritten as
d+ 2
d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
>
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+2
(2.15)
which is true since d+2d > 1 for each d and if ui < 2u¯ then each element
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)d
>
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)d+2
for each d. Additionally, we have to show that not only the sequence (.)d but also the series
converges. It is to show that
∑∞
r=1(1− ε)r converges for any ε > 0. Let z =
∑∞
r=1(1− ε)r then
it holds that z(1 − ε)−1 = 1 + z such that z = ε(1 − ε)−1. Hence, Deven converges. To prove
the convergence of the Dodd-part two cases must be distinguished. In case (1)
∑N
i=1
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)d
> 0
and this implies that
(−1)d+1 1
d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
> (−1)d+3 1
d+ 2
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+2
which implies Equation 2.15. Hence, the Dodd-part converges. In case (2)
∑N
i=1
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)d
< 0
and then convergence requires that
(−1)d+1 1
d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
< (−1)d+3 1
d+ 2
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+2
24Notice throughout the whole paper ui > 0 for all i such that u¯ > 0. Hence, multiplying an inequality by u¯
cannot turn the greater-than sign into a smaller-than sign.
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holds. This can be rewritten as
d+ 2
d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
<
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+2
which is also true. Hence, each part converges irrespective of whether d is even or odd and
irrespective of whether case (1) or (2) is considered. All conditions can be summarized in the
following inequality.∣∣∣∣∣(−1)d+1 1d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣(−1)d+3 1d+ 2
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+2∣∣∣∣∣
which is the starting point for Remark 1. 
Proof (Remark 4): We have to show that J > JMPS where MPS is the abbreviation for
‘mean preserving spread’. Let N+, N− and N be a partition on the player set. If i ∈ N+ then
vi > ui ≥ u¯, if i ∈ N− then vi < ui ≤ u¯, and if i ∈ N then vi = ui.25 Therefore, the utility
vector v defines our mean preserving spread of u. Independent of the order of D, we find for
every odd addend of order d + 1 an even addend of order d (see Remark 2) and N log(u¯) is
constant for each mean preserving spread. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that
−1
d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
+
1
d+ 1
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
> −1
d
N∑
i=1
(
vi − u¯
u¯
)d
+
1
d+ 1
N∑
i=1
(
vi − u¯
u¯
)d+1
We can eliminate all players who are not affected by the mean preserving spread.
−
∑
i∈N\N¯
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
+
d
d+ 1
∑
i∈N\N¯
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
> −
∑
i∈N\N¯
(
vi − u¯
u¯
)d
+
d
d+ 1
∑
i∈N\N¯
(
vi − u¯
u¯
)d+1
The last inequality can be written as
∑
i∈N\N¯
[(
vi − u¯
u¯
)d
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d]
>
d
d+ 1
∑
i∈N\N¯
[(
vi − u¯
u¯
)d+1
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1]
Let us define vi = p+ ui for i ∈ N+ where p > 0 and vi = −n+ ui for i ∈ N− where n > 0 then
∑
i∈N+
[(
p+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d]
+
∑
i∈N−
[(−n+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d]
>
d
d+ 1
 ∑
i∈N+
[(
p+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1]
+
∑
i∈N−
[(−n+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1]
25The restrictions vi > ui ≥ u¯ for i ∈ N+ and vi < ui ≤ u¯ for i ∈ N− is without loss of generality.
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This inequality should hold for any natural number d ≥ 2. Therefore, we can eliminate the first
fraction on the right-hand side.
∑
i∈N+
[(
p+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d]
+
∑
i∈N−
[(−n+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d]
(2.23)
>
∑
i∈N+
[(
p+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1]
+
∑
i∈N−
[(−n+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1]
Given convergence of the Taylor-series, the inequality holds since(
p+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
>
(
p+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
for each player i ∈ N+, and(−n+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d
> 0 >
(−n+ ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
−
(
ui − u¯
u¯
)d+1
for each player i ∈ N−. Hence, inequality (2.23) is fulfilled and a mean preserving spread reduces
the jefficiency criterion J . 
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Chapter 3
Power and Ownership Structures
among German Companies
Main Author: Jochen Mo¨bert
Coauthor: Patrick Tydecks
3.1 Introduction
Germany’s corporate control system has at least three dimensions, i.e. the supervisory board,
voting control at general assemblies (cf. Becht and Boehmer (2003)), and ownership stakes.1
All three are closely related, but due to several specialities in German corporate law the impact
of each dimension on the power of a company can be different. Ownership structures are an
important source of power because they can separate cash flows and voting power (cf. Bebchuk
et al. (2000), among others). In this work we identify the most powerful companies with respect
to ownership stakes. The identification is important since, in Germany in particular, powerful
companies might be large shareholders and such blockholders can have both a beneficial and
detrimental influence.2 Large shareholders can misuse their power in takeover proposals. A
1Cf. also Goergen et al. (2004) who provide a review of German corporate governance system.
2Agency costs might harm whereas increased monitoring efforts can create efficiency, evidence for the latter
argument evidence is found by Yafeh and Yosha (2003), Gorton and Schmid (2000) and mixed results are found
by Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999)).
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blockholder of both the absorbing company and the acquiring company profits if a firm is sold
below its value whereas minority shareholders of the acquired company are exploited. Such
blockholder strategies which expropriate minority shareholders are often described by the term
‘tunneling’ in the corporate governance literature (cf. Bertrand et al. (2002)). Franks and Mayer
(2001) analysed tunneling effects among German companies in 1990 and found little evidence
that tunneling was an important issue. However, the misuse of tunneling effects is documented in
several other cases. Attig et al. (2003) compile a data set on Canadian stock corporations and find
evidence for the misuse of power which the ultimate owners of pyramids hold. They argue that
ultimate owners maximize profits at the expense of minority shareholders and companies which
have a high distance to the ultimate owners. Meoli et al. (2006) elaborate the Telecom Italia
case where minority shareholders are expropriated by specific network and dual-class structures
and Atanasov (2005) documents the malpractice of tunneling during the mass privatization in
Bulgaria. There is also some evidence that tunneling effects played a role during the financial
downturn in the Asian crisis (cf. Johnson et al. (2000), Lemmon and Lins (2003)).3 Given these
cases and the globalised financial markets detrimental consequences of block ownership can be
seen as an issue in Germany as well.
In this article we exploit the large data sources available to get a micro-picture of a large part
of the German corporate landscape which provides the basis for thorough investigations in the
future. To put into practice such a micro-macro perspective a network approach is an appropriate
method. It offers both a local micro-perspective since each company and its shareholders can
be analysed alone as well as offering a bird’s-eye macro-view due to the interconnectedness of
all firms. Furthermore and particularly, the interaction between the micro and macro level
can be investigated. Network science offers a variety of ideal tools for the development of real
micro-based macroeconomics. The network perspective was already implicitly postulated in the
literature on corporate control. La Porta et al. (1999) argued “For most countries, this [network
perspective4] is the only way to understand the relationship between ownership and control”5
(cf. also Faccio and Lang (2002), Chapelle and Szafarz (2005), among others). A large network
data set is analysed and thereby extends the literature on company networks. Our aim is the
identification of the most powerful companies and measure the power of companies by centrality
concepts. These statistics have proven successful in the social network literature. Accordingly,
this contribution is based on the network literature and the vast corporate governance literature.
3Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004) provides us with an econometric method to distinguish detrimental and
beneficial effects of large shareholders.
4Authors’ note.
5“Our principal contribution is to find wherever possible the identities of the ultimate owners of capital and of
voting rights in firms, so when shares in a firm are owned by another company, we examine the ownership of that
company, and so on. For most countries, this is the only way to understand the relationship between ownership
and control. These data enable us to address, in a comparative perspective, four broad questions... .” La Porta
et al. (1999), p. 472.
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In addition to the identification of powerful companies our analysis sheds some light on the
‘Deutschland AG’. Due to its particularities, the German case is intensively debated in the
corporate governance literature. Many statements are based on a small data base which
concentrates especially on large companies such as listed stock corporations or the largest
one hundred companies.6 The German ownership structure called ‘Deutschland AG’ was (or
still is) interwoven and isolated relative to Anglo-Saxon markets that corporate control was
implicitly exerted by the national companies themselves. Hence, legitimate ownership rights
were disregarded and corporate control from outsiders, such as international shareholders as
well as other stakeholders, was limited. This corporate network restrained non-national firms
from gaining a foothold in the German company system and specific ownership structures among
major companies hindered hostile takeovers.
In recent years, it has been discussed that the corporate ownership structure is subject to change
in Germany. Due to the globalization and tax abatements on capital gains realized by sale,
many blockholders diversified their investment portfolio by adding international companies and
cutting down national holdings. In particular, bank and insurance companies have changed their
investment portfolios. Therefore, long-term relationships often existing for decades, especially
between banks and industrial companies, were broken.7 These often mentioned breakups of
bank-industry links being formed during the period of industrialisation (cf. Franks et al. (2005)
and Fohlin (2005) who provide us with insights into the historical development of financial
linkages in Germany), are the origin of statements such as “Is Deutschland AG kaputt?”8
However, such analyses define the ‘Deutschland AG’ as a sub sample of all important German
companies whereas all important ones might be of interest. Hence, the dissolution process
observed may be nonexistent in the basic population. Our data set instead contains many
more companies than other studies and may be more informative. Furthermore, the dissolution
process observed among large national firms might be replaced by linkages to international
connections. Becht and Ro¨ell (1999) have documented that companies from many countries in
continental Europe have large voting blocks. Possibly, the dissolution among national firms is
being replaced by new financial linkages among European corporations.9
6For instance, the equity stakes of the largest one hundred companies are investigated in biennial reports of
the German Monopolkommission. Publications of Ho¨pner and Krempel (2004) are often based on this data set.
7For simplicity, all non-financial companies are called industrial companies.
8The Economist, Dec 5th 2002, print edition.
9Besides a higher degree of internationalisation, concentration within an industry might also be an alternative
explanation for the dissolution process among large companies. Brisk competition might force cooperation among
firms. Hence, links are broken across an industry whereas the interlocking within main markets of companies
is intensified. Allen and Phillips (2000) found a positive impact on operating performance in research intensive
industries if blockholdings are combined with product market relationship between purchasing and target firm.
Also Fee et al. (2006) investigates the impact of financial linkages among trading partners. They find that equity
stakes between customers and suppliers increase the time span of trade relationships. Given these findings, it will
be interesting to investigate whether the ownership structure is intensive within industries. However, the answers
to these questions are left to future research.
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Before we start our network analysis, we will review important contributions to the company
network literature in Chapter 3.2. Subsequently, in Chapter 3.3 the data set is described. In
Chapter 3.4 the most central corporations are identified by the application of standard network
concepts. Furthermore, in a subchapter to Chapter 3.4 firm characteristics are used to explain
the centrality vector in an econometric model. Hence, we can identify the industries and the
firm characteristics being related to a high or low centrality. Chapter 3.5 concludes. For many
readers the Appendix might also be of interest. Many network structures of large German
companies are shown there.
3.2 Company Network Literature
The network literature on the ‘Deutschland AG’ and financial interlocking of firms is neither
very detailed nor exhaustive. However, there are some important contributions which are
first steps towards a deeper understanding of corporate ownership structures. These network
articles, mainly written by social scientists are briefly reviewed here. In order to focus in
on important contributions papers dealing with the German company network are reviewed.
Moreover, contributions concerned with firm networks from other countries or with interlocking
directorates in Germany are mentioned in passing.10 From a methodological point of view, it
is also important to mention that the reviewed papers as well as the present work are based on
simple network statistics. The start of the network literature is often traced back to Moreno
(1934) - incidentally, at the same time Berle and Means (1932) initiated the discussion on
separation of ownership and control. Hence, today after seven decades of research, there are
much more elaborated network concepts than the ones applied. However, many authors stick to
well-known but also well-established network statistics due to their simplicity.
A large network study with respect to size was performed by Kogut and Walker (2001), who
used data from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH.11 They investigated how the German
ownership network influences merger and acquisition activities from 1993 to 1997. Their firm
sample incorporates the largest five hundred non-financial companies, the 25 largest banks, and
the 25 largest insurers in 1993. After the selection of this sample the 684 owners of these 550 firms
were ascertained. Finally, a binary network of zeros and ones among companies was arranged.
The ones represent all direct links if the equity stake of a shareholder was above 5 percent.
Hence, this network formation process ignores all blockholders below 5 percent and equally
weighted all stakes above 5 percent. They therefore ignore a large part of small shareholders as
shown in the next chapter, where our network data set is analysed. The M&A data base includes
10An overview of large company networks in six different countries is given in Windolf (2002).
11The editor of one of Germany’s large business newspapers ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’.
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101 acquisitions which take place among the 550 companies from 1994 to 1997. By means of
simulation the authors showed that randomly rewiring company holdings affects the German
corporate system only slightly.12 If, for instance, one hundred links are rewired then the average
path length only dropped about 20% and the cluster coefficients about 30%. These findings
are in line with small world networks and indicate the intrinsic stability of the corporation
network. Furthermore, it is argued that mergers and acquisitions maintained the structure of
the German company network since very central companies seem to be more active in acquiring
firms than the average company in the sample. Therefore, their findings challenge the thesis on
the dissolution of the ‘Deutschland AG’.
Heinze (2004) investigated the change of interlocking directorates instead of the financial
interlocking of the ‘Deutschland AG’ from 1989 to 2001. He described the different control
structures by means of descriptive network statistics and also concentrated on large German
companies. Furthermore, he asserts that both the financial network and the personal network
of executive and supervisory board members are tightly knit and both networks co-evolved
historically. In the twelve year span, many links in the network structure were diluted. But
many local network structures such as cliques and core-periphery structures were unaffected.
Furthermore, the financial companies are still the most central players. We are not convinced
that financial and personal networks co-evolve similarly. Of course, shareholders can affect board
elections. However, German laws establish special rules affecting board composition which dilute
the power of shareholders. From a theoretical point of view, both types of links can be seen
as substitutes of a common goal national companies share. While globalization and German
tax policy boost incentives to abolish equity stakes, members of executive and control boards
might be willing to strengthen the ‘Deutschland AG’ by maintaining or intensifying personal
relationships.
Ho¨pner and Krempel (2004) visualized the German company network for 1996 and 2000. The
data base includes the one hundred largest companies and is provided by the German Monopolies
Commission,13 which publishes an official report about the competitive position of German
corporations every second year. Inspection by eye reveals that the network density shrinks
because several links were severed between financial and industrial companies. In addition,
links between financial companies are diluted. As mentioned above, these observations contrast
with the stability argument of Kogut and Walker (2001).
In an early study, Pappi et al. (1987) analyse the financial interlocking as well as interlocking
directorates of the largest 325 German companies in 1976. The 205 industrial companies were
12The rewiring procedure picks company u that severs an existing link to company v and forms a new one to
company w (see Watts and Strogatz (1999) for details).
13The German name is ‘Monopolkommission’.
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chosen due to the highest turnover level of all companies in 1976. The largest banks are identified
by their balance sheet total and the largest insurers were chosen due to a ranking of earned
premiums. Each company unit is sectioned into one of ten blocks which are defined by means of
a cluster analysis. Subsequently, relationships among the blocks are investigated by analysing
personal and financial linkages. Their analysis underpins the power of large German banks in
former decades.
Recently, the focus among network researchers turned to the analysis of the historical evolvement
of company networks. For instance, Windolf (2005) compares the development of U.S. and
German firms between 1896 and 1938. His research suggests that the difference between both
countries found today is caused by different developments in the 20th century. Whereas the
financial interlocking is quite similar, the interlocking among members of the supervisory board
was much more concentrated in Germany than in the U.S.
3.3 The Data Base
The data base used for the analysis is the Hoppenstedt Konzernstrukturdatenbank14. The data
bank is one of Germany’s major data banks containing ownership structures of more than 250,000
companies. This data source often abbreviated KSD was also used by Becht and Bo¨hmer (1997),
Kammerath (1999), Ko¨ke (1999), Becht and Bo¨hmer (2001, 2003), among others.15 and is also
one primary source of the German monopolies commission. 16 The KSD contains self-reported
information as well as actively collected information pieces via professional data managers.
The data collection process started on 20th May 2006 and was completed by 20th June 2006.
This process can be separated into four steps. First, we picked all German companies with
a turnover of at least one billion euro. This sample includes only single company units but
no parent companies which are just holdings or have a turnover below one billion euro. This
core sample contains 597 industrial companies.17 Second, we gathered all direct and indirect
ownership relationships among this core sample. Due to definitional issues, the revenues of
financial companies are not termed turnover. The turnover criterion was also chosen by Pappi
et al. (1987), however, for the financial companies, we adopted, due to better data availability,
14The data bank is available at www.hoppenstedt-konzernstrukturen.de
15See Table 2 in Goergen et al. (2004) for further references.
16Furthermore, the sometimes mentioned data source “Wer geho¨rt zu wem?” (which means “who owns whom?”)
of the Commerzbank is based on the KSD.
17Financial companies are not part of this core sample since by definition financial companies have no balance
sheet item called turnover.
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a different approach from these authors. The third step was the identification of all direct
and indirect parent companies from the first chosen sample of 597 units. These direct and
indirect links can be conveniently depicted in Network Figures as shown in the Appendix. Also,
Kogut and Walker (2001) used such network data but took into account only the direct parent
companies. We also include the parent companies of the parent companies up to distance six,
where the term ‘distance’ in network terminology is defined as the number of links between two
companies and offers therefore a much deeper view than earlier work on Germany’s corporate
structure. This third step extended the total sample to 2784 companies, which also contained
all major German financial companies. Fourth and finally, all shareholder relationships among
all firms were compiled. Our network data set is very different from previous work on company
structures performed by economists where the focus is mostly on the position of a single company.
For instance, La Porta et al. (1999) provide us with a description of the ownership structure of
Allianz and DaimlerChrysler.18 This limited micro-perspective instead of a network view makes
the application of network tools unappealing or even impossible.
The close relationship among Allianz, Dresdner Bank, and M¨unchner R¨uck isthe classical
paradigm of interwoven German companies (cf. La Porta et al. (1999)). In a certain manner,
the financial linkages among these three corporations enabled them to bypass German stock
corporation law19 and, correspondingly, hostile takeovers and, more importantly, corporate
control of outsiders were virtually impossible even if those firms and executives performed
poorly. Even today, Allianz and Mu¨nchner R¨uck are important blockholder of each other.
The Allianz holds 9.4% of the M¨unchner R¨uckwhereas the M¨unchner R¨uck holds 4.9% of all
Allianz shares. Otherwise the Allianz corporation has a dispersed ownership structure. Due to
its simple structure the Allianz network is omitted in the company Network Figures shown in the
Appendix. However, the ego-centered company networks of Aldi, AMB Generali, AXA, BMW,
Commerzbank, DaimlerChrysler, Ergo concern, Metro, Deutsche Post, Deutsche Telekom, and
Volkswagen are depicted in Network Figure 5 to 15 in the Appendix.
The final data set contains industrial and financial companies, state enterprises, partnerships,
and individuals. Our data set also offers an international perspective on the German company
network since not only national firms but also foreign firms are taken into account. The number
of foreign firms amounts to 824 or 29.53% of the sample size. The number of companies from
each country relative to the total number of companies in the network is reported in Table 3.1.
Apparently, large economies such as US, UK, Japan, etc. make up the largest number of foreign
18Throughout the paper we use reasonable abbreviations for company names. In particular, legal forms of
companies are never mentioned in the text. The legends of network figures shown in the Appendix contain full
company names. For instance, BMW is called ‘Bayerische Motoren Werke AG’ in Network Figure 8.
19A member of the control board in corporation A cannot be member of the executive board of corporation B
if an executive member of corporation B is a member of the control board of corporation A, §100(2)Nr.3 AktG
(Prohibition of cross interlocks).
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Table 3.1: Country Ranking
Country %-share Country %-share Country %-share
Germany 70.47 Cayman Islands 0.32 Bahrain 0.04
US 4.71 Norway 0.32 Cyprus 0.04
United Kingdom 3.23 Bermuda 0.25 Czech Republic 0.04
Italy 3.20 Canada 0.18 Ireland 0.04
France 3.09 UA Emirates 0.14 Iran 0.04
The Netherlands 2.91 Russia 0.14 Libya 0.04
Japan 2.73 Denmark 0.11 Monaco 0.04
Swiss 1.98 South Africa 0.11 Mexico 0.04
Luxembourg 1.36 Finland 0.07 Portugal 0.04
Austria 1.19 Hong Kong 0.07 T&C Islands 0.04
Belgium 0.93 Kuwait 0.07 Virgin Islands 0.04
Sweden 0.93 Korea 0.04 ———————– ————
Spain 0.54 Saudi Arabia 0.04 Total 100.0
Australia 0.40 Netherlands Antilles 0.04 ———————– ————
Data Source: Hoppenstedt Konzernstruktur Datenbank (KSD). The total number of companies is 2784. UAE
abbreviates United Arab Emirates. Official country name of Ireland is ‘The Republic of Ireland’, and T&C
Islands full name is ‘Turks and Caicos Islands’.
firms related to the German company network. Interestingly, firms based in tax havens such
as the Cayman Islands and Bermuda have a similarly large number of relationships comparable
with companies located in Spain and Canada.
Another important firm characteristic is the legal form of companies. Legal forms of different
countries are not completely comparable. However, the different types of companies were
allocated to different groups in keeping with Table 3.9, as shown in the Appendix. Given this
assignment, most companies in our sample are limited companies as documented in Table 3.2.
Expectedly, a large share of private and public limited companies is found. A high number
of individuals and state enterprises is also included into the German company network. This
finding is often exposed as one major difference in the shareholder structure of Anglo-Saxon
and German companies as well as other companies located in continental Europe. According
to Burkart et al. (2003), the large number of family-owned German corporations is caused by
weak minority shareholder protection which is often attributed to the poor German corporate
governance system. Even after recent changes no stronger market-oriented governance system is
assumed (cf. Terberger (2003), Goergen (2004), among others). Hence, the importance of family
blockholders will continue to be a feature in the future. Moreover, the number of individuals in
our network may underrate their power since individuals and families are often ultimate owners
of firms. Faccio and Lang (2002) find that Western European firms are either family controlled
or have dispersed ownership structures. Their comparison of ultimate owners across countries
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Table 3.2: Legal Forms of Companies in our Sample
Legal Form
Legal Form Group in Germany #Obs %-share
Private Limited Company Ltd.-Group GmbH 1023 36.75
Public Limited Company Inc.-Group AG 690 24.78
Partnership Partner-Group KG/OHG 303 10.88
Others Other-Group 69 2.48
Foundations Stiftung 35 1.26
Cooperatives e.G. 26 0.93
Civil Law Association GbR 4 0.14
Association e.V. 4 0.14
Private Individuals 368 13.22
State Enterprises 102 3.66
Missing Observations 229 8.23
Sum 2784 100.00
Data Source: Hoppenstedt KSD - data bank access is provided via
www.konzernstrukturen.de. Abbreviations are listed in Table 3.2. #Obs signify the
number of observations.
unveils the exceptional position of family firms in Germany. For instance, for publicly traded
firms the ultimate owner is a family in about two-thirds of cases and about nine out of ten
unlisted German firms are family-owned.
For generations shareholders of large German corporations have been well-known families. For
instance, the Quandt family holds a large share in BMW and the Pie¨ch family and Porsche
family are still among the large blockholders of VW (compare Network Figures 8 and 15). The
figures show that these families are not only represented by one company protecting rights of a
whole family but that there are quite complex holding structures in which several individuals of
each family are involved. Interestingly, individuals are sometimes only indirect blockholders of
the automobile corporations since limited companies typically in complete individual ownership
lie in between. For instance, Johanna Quandt is the sole owner of Johanna Quandt GmbH &
Co. KG which holds 14.21% of all BMW shares. Often the impact of family ownership on
firm performance and corporate control is debated. On the one hand family ownership might
facilitate a thorough development of a company, on the other hand block ownership might
hinder effective corporate control. Recently, Villalonga and Amit (2006) analysed the impact
of family ownership on firm performance and found mixed results for US firms. Nowak et
al. (2006) as well as Maury (2005) report a positive relationship between operating performance
and family-ownership.
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State enterprises are also involved in many German companies. Again, Network Figure 15 of
VW exemplarily shows a state-firm relationship. The Hannoversche Beteiligungs mbH is a large
shareholder of Volkswagen and is owned by the Bundesland Lower Saxony20. Similarly, the
German state is still engaged in the DAX companies Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom
imaged in Network Figures 13 and 14. The vast majority of ‘state enterprises’ are owned by
medium-sized and large cities which are often connected to public utility companies as well as
local saving banks.21 Interestingly, in their cross-country comparison La Porta et al. (1999)
and La Porta et al. (2002) argue that both a relatively high number of family-owned firms and
a large influence of government entities indicate insufficient shareholder rights. For Germany,
the low degree of shareholder protection relative to Anglo-Saxon countries is often reported and
details about German corporate law - briefly discussed in the following paragraph - point out
this fact.
3.3.1 Descriptive Network Statistics
A network consists of vertices and arcs between the vertices. In a company network the
vertices are the companies themselves and arcs represent the ownership structures among
these companies, where the arrows point from the companies to their shareholders. In total,
our company network exhibits 3711 arcs and consists of 192 components, where companies
of two different network components are neither directly nor indirectly connected.22 Weights
are attached to each arc to capture the different shares being held and the power exerted by
owners. However, for the sake of clarity links in network figures shown in the Appendix are
categorized into three classes. The first class summarizes small equity stakes below 10%, the
second class contains equity stakes lying in the right open interval from 10% to 50%, and the
third class contains equity stakes at or above 50%. In the network figures the three classes have
different line widths. For instance, in Network Figure 15 an arc with a weight of 15.46 goes
from Volkswagen to the Porsche corporation which indicates that Porsche holds 15.46% of all
Volkswagen shares.23
20Lower Saxony is one out of 16 German states.
21Also, the German banking industry has specific regulations. Almost all cities and communities are owners of
small saving banks - called Sparkassen - which all together are larger with respect to standard bank characteristics
than most listed German competitors.
22In fact, the 192 components are weak components which take into account all companies being connected to
each other independent of the direction of the arrows (strong components distinguish the direction of the arrows).
See de Nooy et al. (2005) for details.
23In all Network Figures links are classified into three groups where thicker lines stand for higher equity stakes
among the firms. The thinnest lines represent equity stakes up to 10%, medium lines represent stakes from 10%
up to 50%, and the thickest lines represent equity stakes from 50% to 100%.
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The mode weight in the complete network shown in Network Figure 1 is 100% whereas the
mean value is 45.5% and the median is 27.7%. The mode weight is observed in about one third
of all links. Obviously, holdings often completely own their subsidiaries. Means and medians
of previous studies are both about 50% - an overview of several other Germany-related studies
is documented in Becht and Boehmer (2003) as well as Goergen et al. (2004). Differences
between previous studies and our median can be attributed to our larger data base, to different
sample periods, or both. Other often observable link weights are equity holdings of about 10%,
20%, 50%, 75%, and about only a few percent as illustrated in Figure 3.1(a) and (b). Regarding
block ownership, our findings are in accordance with previous studies, e.g. La Porta et al. (1998),
who found strong concentrations in ownership structure in nearly all countries. Concentrated
ownership structure is also induced by Gemany’s Companies Act24. Germans stock corporation
law gives (minority) shareholders specific rights.
For instance, individual discharges of each member of the supervisory board - instead of
contemporaneous discharge of all members - is enforceable by shareholders holding 10% of the
voting equity (§120(1) AktG - see also §137 AktG). Similarly, an investor requires at least 20%
of the voting equity (§122 AktG) to enforce extraordinary general meetings. At least 50% of all
votes are necessary to enforce decisions at general assemblies (§133 AktG). Also, the appointment
of auditors scrutinising the formation process, the increase of capital, or capital reduction (§142
AktG) as well as raising a claim against board members or directors (§147 AktG) explicitly
requires an ordinary majority. A qualified interest enables shareholders to amend corporate
statues (§ 179 AktG) and to increase in registered capital (§182 AktG). Hence, it is obvious that
chosen blockholder stakes are not randomly assigned between firms but are chosen to foster or
block specific rules.
Figure 3.1(c) shows the distribution of incoming arcs (indegree) and the distribution of outgoing
arcs (outdegree) of all companies in our network. Both functions are quite similar. The linearity
in the log-log diagram indicates that there are a few central companies with many links and
many firms who just have a small number of equity stakes.25 Subfigure 3.1(d) shows the mean
and the difference ∆ of 66 cross-holdings in the total network.26 Mean and difference are
always calculated for each cross-holding. One cross-holding between Allianz and Mu¨nchner R¨uck
was mentioned above and another exists between ‘Ko¨lnische Verwaltungs-Aktiengesellschaft f¨ur
Versicherungswerte’ and the AXA concern as shown in Network Figure 7. Most cross-holdings
such as the Allianz-M¨unchner R¨uck link have capital weights below 10% in both directions,
24The German company act is called Aktiengesetz and is commonly abbreviated by AktG.
25Mathematically, the linearity is reproducible by power law or lognormal distributions. Baraba´si and Albert
(1999) show that many network data sets exhibit power laws. For a general discussion of the characteristics of
these distributions and how human behaviour can produce such distributions read Mitzenmacher (2003).
26Cross-holdings are defined as direct cross-holdings whereas Ko¨ke (1999) uses a broader definition which also
takes into account circles of large distances.
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therefore, both the difference and the mean of cross-holdings are small. The second cross-holding
in Network Figure 7 has values of 25.631% and 23.02%. Hence, the mean is in the 20% interval
whereas the difference lies in the 10% interval in Figure 3.1(d).
37
3.3.2 MAN-Analysis
One powerful mean to analyse the networks is the triad MAN-classification scheme proposed
by Holland and Leinhardt (1970). This descriptive statistic is a simple count mechanism which
picks all possible combinations of triads27 among all nodes - in our case there are
(
2784
3
)
=
3, 592, 429, 984 triads. After each combination the existing links among the nodes are observed.
There are sixteen possible combinations depicted in Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6 representing the
MAN-classification scheme. M represents the number of mutual dyads, A asymmetric dyads,
and N null dyads in a triad. In addition, for some triads a letter is added to indicate the direction
of the arrows in a triad where D abbreviates down, U up, T transitive, and C cycle.
The MAN-classification scheme measures micro network formations and, contemporaneously,
provides access to a macro perspective. All 16 possible triad formations observed in the company
network are summarized in Table 3.3. For instance, 003 triads - the triads which contains three
null dyads, i.e. no links at all - are found much more often than expected, whereas 012 triads
are less often observed than expected. Thereby, the term ‘expected’ refers to a random network
where each link has the same probability to be present. Table 6.1 in Chapter 6 shows the
probabilities to observe certain triad formations in a random network. Our results indicate that
the network formation process underlies a non-random process. In total, 003 triads and 012
triads are less often observed than expected. This indicates that certain network formations -
those where more than one arc is involved - are likely to emerge. One such triad involving more
than one arc contains mutual links, i.e. cross-holdings. The MAN-classification scheme reports
a very high relative number of 102 triads as indicated by the ratio of observed to expected
triads (O/E ratio in Table 3.3). Hence, we can conclude that firms have a high incentive for
cross-holdings. This micro network structure is often seen as a classical form of ownership
concentration. The reciprocal relationship can hinder the exercise of corporate control if the
reciprocal voting power is large enough and managers are reluctant to explicitly control each
other. Given the relative high number of mutual links it is also not surprising that we observe
more 201, 120D, 120U, and 120C triads than expected. However, the absolute number of these
triads is fairly low such that these formations are of minor importance.
Other often debated shareholder structures are pyramids, also called trees and forests.28 Due to
the low absolute number of cross-holdings and due to many asymmetric dyads, tree structures
should be likely to emerge. La Porta et al. (1999) as well as Faccio and Lang (2002) report the
tree structures as a prevalent company structure in many developed countries. To compare the
27In network terminology, triads are networks among three nodes and dyads are networks among two nodes.
28In the corporate governance literature these structures are called pyramids, whereas the graph theoretical
notion is tree or forest. Hence, we also use to the last notions. Cf. Godsil and Royle (2001).
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Figure 3.1: Characteristics of Arcs and Nodes
(a) 0-100 Interval (b) 0-99 Interval
Total Network Giant Component
(c) Log-Log Specification (d) Mutual Dyads
Outdegree Indegree ∆ Mean
Data Source: Hoppenstedt KSD. Figure (a) is the distribution of link weights in the [0, 100] interval and Figure (b)
the corresponding [0, 99] interval. Figure (c) shows the indegree and outdegree distribution of nodes. Figure (d)
reports the difference of capital weights (∆Capital Weights) for all mutual links. Each value at the abscissa is
the upper threshold of a 10%-interval. For example, there are 48 links for which WAB −WBA < 10% where 10%
is the upper threshold of the [0, 10) interval and WAB is the weight from vertex A to vertex B. Personally liable
partners are excluded in Figure (d).
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relevance of tree structures found in previous results with our data set, we can rely on the 021D
and 021U triads. They represent small local trees probably embedded in large forests and also
hint at the degree of centrality among nodes. The number of 021D and 021U triads is large in
absolute as well as relative terms. Both triad types are observed more often than expected.29
Hence, our statistics confirm well-known results but condenses company information in simple
macro measures. Given the high number of 021D and 021U triads and the overall impression
of the total German company network indicates that forests are an important structure in our
data base. The emergence of these forests is often interpreted as evidence for the balance
of power in company networks. Correspondingly, corporate control is exercised in the opposite
direction of the arcs. Firms and subsidiaries are (partly) controlled by parent companies or other
shareholders whereas the arrows tend to the controlling unit. Such forests are well documented
by La Porta et al. (1999) and enhance the control of many companies by an ultimate owner. The
pyramids enable the ultimate owner to control companies he is indirectly connected to even if he
is only a minority shareholder. For instance, in Network Figure 8 the shareholders of BMW are
shown. Via the Dresdner Bank the Allianz Corporation has direct as well as indirect influence
at BMW’s general assembly. This line of argument may explain why large equity stakes of 60%
and 75% are less often observed in the giant component (compare Figure 3.1b) than in the total
network. Possibly, corporate control via forests is easier to exert in a larger network component
than in smaller ones. Hence, shareholdings and forests may be substitutes.
Additional ownership structures mentioned by Windolf and Beyer (1996) are circles and (nearly)
complete cliques. Also, Kogut and Walker (2001) argued that the German corporate network
consists of closely knit clusters and brokers filling structural holes between these clusters. As
described above, the brokers might be ultimate owners or other central companies which hold
pivotal positions in the pyramids. However, the evidence for the existence of circles such as
030C triads is weak. Although the O/E-ratio of 030C triads is large, the number of observed
triads is low. In contrast, there is a large number of 021C triads, which confirms that circles are
often found in triad formations. Yet, the expected number of 021C triads in a random network is
even larger, such that the existence of circles in triads can be interpreted as a statistical artefact.
Similarly, 210 and 300 triads representing clusters and (nearly) complete cliques are infrequently
observed. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the impact of circles, cliques, and clusters on
the overall structure is moderate and at least for our data set it seems implausible to call circles
or cliques a basic ownership structure. In contrast, network patterns discussed in mainstream
economics journals focusing on trees and cross-holdings are prevalent.
29An overall test of independence has a χ2-value of 6 · 108 and, accordingly, clearly refutes the notion that the
network is formed by accident.
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Table 3.3: Observed and Expected Number of Isomorphic Triads
MAN-Type Observed Expected O/E ratio
003 3,582,363,243 3,582,129,437.72 1.0000653
012 9,821,853 10,288,226.42 0.95
102 227,396 2,462.40 92.35
021D 6,307 2,462.40 2.56
021U 5,872 2,462.40 2.38
021C 4,179 4,924.80 0.85
030T 473 2.36 200.42
111U 385 2.36 163.14
111D 157 2.36 66.53
201 75 0.00 dbz
030C 12 0.79 15.19
120D 11 0.00 dbz
120U 9 0.00 dbz
120C 8 0.00 dbz
210 4 0.00 dbz
300 0 0.00 dbz
Sum 3,592,429,984 3,592,429,984
Data Source: Hoppenstedt KSD. MAN-Types are defined by Holland and
Leinhardt (1970). M counts the mutual dyads, A the asymmetric dyads,
and N the null dyads in a triad. In addition, D down, U up, T transitive,
and C cycle indicate the direction of links in asymmetric dyads. Confer
also Chapter 6.2. The ‘O/E ratio’ is the ratio of observed number of triad
types in our data set relative to the expected number of triad types in a
random network model. dbz abbreviates ‘division by zero’.
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3.3.3 Sub-Networks
Until now, we have concentrated on information regarding the full company network. The data
description is completed by turning to the analysis of subnetworks which only take into account
capital linkages and related firms above certain weight thresholds. Table 3.4 summarizes different
network measures for the full network and sub-networks. Each of the three sub-networks is
reduced to links with weights above 24%, 49%, or 74%. In all sub-networks the disproportionate
number of 021U triads emerge again, whereas the 021D triads are less frequently observed than in
a random network having the same number of vertices and arcs. These findings also suggest that
the balance of power is funnelled30 into a small number of companies which are the nodes pointed
to by the arrows in the 021U triads. These companies might be the brokers mentioned in Kogut
and Walker (2001) or the apex of the pyramids mentioned in La Porta et al. (2002), Claessens
(2000), Attig et al. (2003), among others, which are able to coordinate different developments in
their subsidiaries and, hence, occupy a strategic position which allows control of local parts of
the network. Again, in all four networks 021C triads are less often observed than expected. This
underpins the fact that circles are formed incidentally and cannot be seen as a power enhancing
mean.
Another important feature can be read off Table 3.4. The number of components increases when
financial linkages below the three thresholds 24%, 49%, and 74% are ignored. The number of
large components above fifty nodes decreases continuously, whereas the number of components
having more than five or twenty nodes first increases if we take no account of financial links
below 24% but then also declines if further thresholds are considered. The giant component in
the total network contains 1626 nodes and 2271 arcs. The distribution of capital weights in the
giant component is similar to the distribution in the total network. Except as already mentioned,
blockholdings of about 60% and 75% are found relatively seldom in the giant component, whereas
in the other components these values are relatively often observed. Unsurprisingly, the giant
component is quickly decomposed into smaller pieces if low weighted links are disregarded.
The giant components of all sub-networks are shown in Network Figures 2 to 4. The
giant component of the sub-network containing only equity stakes above 24% consists almost
completely of energy companies such as E.ON, RAG, Vattenfall31, and others. Additionally,
many public utilities are part of this sub-network. The giant component of the second
sub-network containing only equity stakes above 49% is mainly a Siemens-Bosch network - one
of Germany’s large technology companies - and the giant component of the 74% sub-network is
30This notion is introduced into the network literature by Newman (2001b). It implies that all geodesic paths
from one vertex to all others in a network component typically go through a very small number of adjacent
vertices.
31Vattenfall is a Swedish company.
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Table 3.4: Importance of Capital Weights for Company Sub-Networks
Threshold 0% 24% 49% 74%
Companies 2784 2061 1867 1585
Arcs 3711 1771 1445 1152
021D-Triads 6307+ 223− 43− 1−
021U-Triads 5872+ 2207+ 1898+ 1009+
021C-Triads 4179− 1054− 696− 493−
Components 192 373 433 437
Component(Companies>5) 66 107 97 83
Component(Companies>20) 8 20 10 3
Component(Companies>50) 3 2 0 0
Companies in Giant Component 1626 117 40 28
Arcs in Giant Component 2271 122 40 27
Data Source: Hoppenstedt KSD. The full network has a threshold of 0%. A
sub-network includes all links with weights above the threshold level. 021D-triads
counts the number of triads with zero mutual, two asymmetric, one null dyad,
and D indicates that both arrows point to one link, i.e. there is one shareholder
with two different equity stakes (U=up, C=cycle). +(−) indicates whether the
observed number of triads is above (below) the expected number of triads.
Component(Companies>K) counts the number of network components containing
more than K companies, where the number of network components is the number
of totally disconnected network parts.
an Aldi network where the Siepmann Stiftung is the center of a star. Network Figure 5 shows
the complete Aldi network in which other foundations, personal liable partners, etc. are also
included.
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3.4 Important Companies
3.4.1 Central Nodes in the Global Network
Here we continue the explorative analysis of the previous Chapter and identify the power of each
corporation. The power is measured by a standard network measures the indegree closeness
centrality. The indegeree closeness centrality InClos32of company i is defined as
InClosi =
|NCi|
|AC|
|NCi|∑
j∈NCi d(i, j)
(3.1)
where NCi is the set of companies which are part of the network component i belongs to, AC
is the set of all companies, the bars indicate cardinality of a set, i.e. |AC| = 2784 for our data
set, and d(i, j) is the distance, i.e. the length of the shortest path, between companies i and
j in the same network component.33 Companies which are closely connected to others can
impact upon these companies since we take into account indegrees only. In contrast, a company
which has no other equity stakes has an indegree closeness centrality of zero. It is reasonable to
assume that companies with a larger InClosi value are more powerful than companies having a
smaller centrality.34 The closeness centrality is readily calculated and can therefore enhance the
literature on company concentration (cf. Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), Attig
et al. (2003), Chapelle and Szafarz (2005), among others).35
Unfortunately, as nearly all centrality measures also the indegree closeness centrality is not
well-grounded on economic reasoning.36 To the best of our knowledge, only Bonacich’s (1987)
power index of company i defined as
∑n
j=1
∑+∞
k=0 g
k
ij where j indicates all other n−1 companies,
0 < gij ≤ 1 shows that company i holds directly or indirectly g% of all shares from company
j, and k is the path of length.37 Ballester et al. (2006) have shown that the power index can
be interpreted as the result of a Nash equilibrium if a quadratic utility function is supposed.
However, for our purposes the applicability of the power index is unsuitable. For instance,
investors holding 75% of a company have similar control rights than investors who are the only
32Notice, that this formula deviates from the standard closeness centrality since our network consists of several
components. The standard centrality definition is extended by the the first fraction which controls for the number
of nodes in each network component.
33See Kosch¨utzki et al. (2005) for definitions and more advanced centrality statistics.
34The article by Freeman (1979) is a standard reference, although he was not the first to propose centrality
concepts. Compare, for instance, Beauchamp (1965) and Sabidussi (1966).
35Interestingly, without mentioning the term ‘network’, Chapelle and Szafarz (2005) use network techniques
by applying matrix algebra to calculate ultimate owners. Note that, mathematically the notions ‘network’ and
‘matrix’ are synonyms.
36Borgatti (2003) discusses problems in applied work which arises due to the lack of a theoretical foundation.
37In the original work the power index also includes a scaling factor. For brevity, we omit it.
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shareholder of a company. However, the power index measure implies that a 100%-holding is
much more powerful where this difference in power increases with k. Even more questionable is
the usefulness of the index if we compare a 100%-holding with a 10%-holding.
In the network literature, there is a whole spade of centrality measures which try to identify
very important or powerful vertices. We have chosen the indegree closeness centrality because it
ignores any weights and only takes into account whether there is an ownership stake or not. This
choice is at least partly in accordance with definitions of the largest shareholder in the literature.
For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) propose to define investors holding at least 10% as large
shareholders. Lech (2002) proposes a somewhat higher threshold around 25%. As shown above,
companies holding stakes above these thresholds also have special rights which allow to control
the management more effectively. Hence, the regulations laid down in the German shareholder
act might also suggest a similar definition.
In addition, even a non-blockholder holding only a few percent or per mille of all shares of a
company might be powerful. Since an investor planning an acquisition of a company might
either face an opponent trying to hinder the investor activities or in the opposite case enables
the investor to purchase these shares in an OTC transaction without revealing information to
the market and, thereby, the stock market price is not boosted. Therefore, the definition of the
indegree closeness centrality might be an appropriate indicator for the power of companies. A
more sophisticated centrality measure might be preferable, however, so far it is unavailable.38
In Table 3.5 possibly important nodes are ranked by the indegree closeness centrality of nodes.
Two different rankings are shown. The full sample ranking includes all observations whereas the
reduced sample ranking focuses on parent companies only and thereby, focuses on companies and
discounts subsidiaries as well as state entities and individuals. The indegree statistic measures
only the number of links to a company, i.e. counts the number of equity stakes a company has
in other companies. As in previous studies, many insurance companies are among the most
central companies. In particular, corporations such as Allianz, M¨unchner R¨uck, and Ergo as
well as many subsidiaries of these companies are found. For instance, Allianz Subalpina39 is a
98.003% subsidiary of RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta` S.p.A. which is a 76.34% subsidiary
of the Allianz concern. Similarly, D.A.S., Hamburg-Mannheimer SV, and Victoria Versicherung
are all part of the Ergo concern. For details, see the Ergo network imaged in Network Figure 11.
Other frequently found industries are banks, energy suppliers, wholesale and retail firms.
38Furthermore, game theoretical power measures such as the Shapley-Shubik or the Banzhaf index exhibit
undesirable features. Compare Prigge (2007).
39This company holds rank 24 in the indegree closeness centrality column. The registered name is ‘Allianz
Subalpina Societa` di assicurazioni e riassicurazioni’, based in Turin.
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Among the banks there are large German banks but there are also many foreign competitors
from Italy such as UniCredito, the parent company of the Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank,
and Mediobanca. Details about the investment bank Mediobanca, its ownership structure, its
power in Italia, and its recent role in the hostile take over of Telecom Italia is provided by
Kruse (2005) and Meoli et al. (2006). Japanese banks such as Japan Trustee Services Bank, The
Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corporation, and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation can also
be found. Japanese banks tend to cluster in local company networks called keiretsus (cf. Lincoln
et al. (1996) and Lincoln and Gerlach (2004)).40 The Japanes banks have a high number
of linkages among firms but are not among the most central companies. In contrast, Italian
banks and insurance companies exhibit a high closeness centrality and, therefore, might be more
influential on the German economy than companies from other countries.
The national energy market is dominated by E.ON, EnBW, RWE, and Vattenfall41. All
local-operating German energy companies have to use the power grid of these four companies
covering the whole German state. Each of the four big energy players covers a certain
geographical area and much smaller competitors operating on a local basis have to use the
power grid of one of these companies. Therefore, the big four energy companies are at least
within their industry relatively powerful and except Vattenfall is not listed among the top 30 in
the reduced sample ranking in Table 3.5. Parts of their ownership structure is shown in Network
Figure 2 which stresses the strong interconnectedness among many energy companies as well as
their close relationships to public utilities and cities.
Table 3.5 contains also foundations called Markus Stiftung and Luks Stiftung. Both are part
of the Aldi concern which are one of Germany’s and Europe’s largest retailers.42 The beautiful
Network Figure 5 for Aldi is an isolated network component in the total network. Additional
information about the Aldi network can also be found in Network Figure 4, i.e. the giant
component of the total network where links below 74% are eliminated. The owners of both
companies are the brothers Karl and Theo Albrecht and are the richest Germans.43 Accordingly,
the entity ‘Familie Albrecht’ is also related to this company network.
Finally, the French state - Republik Frankreich - is one of the entities exhibiting a high closeness
centrality in the full sample ranking. It is well known that the French state is a large blockholder
in large French companies. However, we were quite surprised to learn that this entity is found
40Miyajima and Kuroki (2005) show that Japanese firms can be separated into two groups after the banking
crisis in the nineties. The less efficient companies are still strongly connected with banks, whereas the more
prosperous corporations exhibit a higher tendency to break these links.
41Vattenfall is a Swedish company.
42Actually, there are two concerns Aldi Nord and Aldi S¨ud.
43Their wealth is estimated at approx. 18.5 and 15.5 billion USD. See Forbes Special Report ‘The World’s
Billionaires’ 03.10.2005.
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to play a central role in the German company network, too. Among the direct links, only
a 50% holding of the ‘Stiftung Centre Culturel Franco-Allemand de Karlsruhe’ and a 49.02%
holding of the ‘Internationale Mosel’ are reported. Both participations are rather unimportant
for the overall network. Industrial relations between German and French companies are probably
essential since the French state directly impinges on EADS, France Te´le´com, Gaz de France,
and Renault. More importantly, there are several indirect relations to financial corporations.
The French state holds a 77.69% stake at GAN, and this company is a shareholder of the
Italian Mediobanca, which is also among the most central banks. Mediobanca has, as shown in
Network Figure 9, a strategic cross-holding with the Commerzbank and, as shown in Network
Figure 6, is also an indirect shareholder of the AMB Generali Holding via Assicurazioni Genarali.
Finally, there is a seven-distance relationship with the AXA Konzern which contributes to
the high centrality the French state exhibits in the German company network. The following
seven-distance path is imaged in Network Figure 7.
AXA Konzern AG −→ AXA S.A. −→ Les Ateliers de Construction du
Nord de la France S.A. −→ Eurazeo SA −→ Cre´dit Agricole S.A. −→
Assurances Ge´ne´rales de France S.A. −→ C.D.C. Ca´sse des De´poˆts et
Consignations −→ Republik Frankreich
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Indegree Closeness Centrality
(a) Full Sample (b) Reduced Sample
Own Source. InClos is the variable name of indegree closeness centrality. The abscissa is restricted to values
below 1.5. As shown in Table 3.5, there are only two centrality values above this threshold. All indegree closeness
centrality statistics are multiplied by 10−2.
3.4.2 Analysing the Centrality Concept
In this subchapter we identify several factors which are related to the centrality of all firms.44
The relationship of the left-hand-side variable InClos, measuring the indegree closeness centrality
of firms and covariates, is based on two samples. The first sample includes variables which are
observed for all companies, i.e. 2784 observations are available. The second sample - also called
reduced sample - has a larger number of covariates but reduces the non-missing observations to
987. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of InClos for both samples.
Hypotheses
Table 3.6 describes 24 right-hand side variables included in the estimation below. The
Sign-column shows expected signs for each explanatory variable. For members of the giant
component (NET MoG) we expect a positive sign since nodes of larger network components
typically exhibit higher indegree closeness centrality. In contrast, we expect a negative sign for
44Heinze (2004) applied the same methodology we adopted here to explain the centrality of interlocking
directorates. However, we have some doubt about the validity of this method. The independence assumption
prerequisite for the application of standard econometric methods is violated in the case of network data (see
Gill and Swartz (2004)). Fortunately, if our doubts are unfounded, then results are viable and if our doubts are
justified, then many results published in well-known journals may be error-prone since to the best of our knowledge
the interdependencies among companies are always ignored. The issue of interdependence among observations is
especially important since most studies focus on large companies which are often closely related in one form or
another form.
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Table 3.5: Most Central Companies and Entities
10−2 10−2
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Full Sample Ranking
#Obs: 2784
Company/Entity In
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Reduced Sample Ranking
#Obs: 275
Company/Entity In
de
gr
ee
C
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ss
1 Allianz AG 3.28 Allianz AG 3.28
2 M¨unchener R¨uck AG 3.1 Mu¨nchener R¨uck AG 3.11
3 Familie Albrecht 1.66 Bayer. Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG 1.04
4 Republik Frankreich 1.62 COMMERZBANK AG .95
5 UniCredito Italiano SpA 1.44 E.ON AG .88
6 Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Torino 1.35 Coca-Cola Erfrischungsgetra¨nke AG .74
7 AVIVA Plc 1.35 KARSTADT QUELLE AG .65
8 Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio Verona1) 1.30 RWE AG .60
9 Markus Stiftung 1.26 DEUTSCHE BANK AG .59
10 Barclays PLC 1.24 Norddeutsche Landesbank .49
11 The Capital Group Companies Inc. 1.23 Siemens AG .46
12 Capital Research & Management2) 1.23 EnBW AG .43
13 Lukas Stiftung 1.22 ThyssenKrupp AG .39
14 Assicurazioni Generali SpA 1.21 Landesbank Baden-W¨urttemberg .34
15 Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG 1.16 Franz Haniel & Cie. GmbH .33
16 RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta` SpA 1.14 SHB AG11) .32
17 Mediobanca Banca dCF SpA3) 1.11 EDEKA ZENTRALE AG & Co. KG .32
18 Victoria Versicherung AG 1.11 Deutsche Lufthansa AG .29
19 Hamburg-Mannheimer SV AG 1.11 Deutsche Bahn AG .28
20 Fondazione Cassamarca5) 1.11 Robert Bosch GmbH .27
21 RB Vita SpA 1.11 DaimlerChrysler AG .27
22 Europa¨ische Reiseversicherung AG 1.11 REWE-ZENTRALFINANZ e.G. .27
23 Carimonte Holding SpA 1.11 RAG AG .22
24 Allianz Subalpina8) 1.11 VOLKSWAGEN AG .22
25 D.A.S. AG9) 1.11 MAN AG .21
26 Fidelity Investments Ltd 1.10 Deutsche Telekom AG .21
27 Legal & General Group PLC 1.10 Deutsche BP AG .20
28 D.A.S. AG10) 1.10 Salzgitter AG .19
29 KarstadtQuelle Lebensversicherung AG 1.10 ExxonMobil GmbH12) .19
30 DKV Deutsche Krankenversicherung AG 1.10 Bayerische Landesbank .19
Own Source: Full company names are provided to simplify identification of companies. #Obs signifies the
number of observations. 1)− 12) full names are provided in Table 3.8 in the Appendix. Note 9) and 10) have
identical abbreviations but different full names. Further abbreviation: SV=Sachversicherung (property insurance).
Translations: Lebensversicherung=life insurance, Krankenversicherung=health insurance, Reiseversicherung=travel
insurance, Familie=family, Stiftung=foundation, Europa¨ische=European, Republik Frankreich=France. The
international company name of M¨unchner R¨uck isMunich Re Group. In the reduced sample ranking, several firms
of the EDEKA association have a closeness centrality of approximately 0.25 and are among the top 30. However, we
exclude them since EDEKA Zentral is already considered in the ranking.
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firms having a turnover above 1 billion euro. These companies are often only operational entities
controlled by holdings and other shareholders who are not involved in day-to-day management
decisions but have a great impact on firm strategies. We also expect that large firms are
more central than smaller ones. Hence, positive signs are allocated to incorporated and listed
companies (LF Inc, List) as well as to companies having high balance-sheet totals (ACC Tot).
All other legal forms may have a negative impact upon the indegree closeness centrality since
they indicate smaller firms, personally liable partners, or states entities. A legal form indicator
variable for missing observations is also included to check whether important information may
be contained there.
The results of Table 3.5 suggests positive coefficients for French, Italian, and Japanese companies.
Companies from the United Kingdom and the United States outnumber all other countries, but
only little evidence for a high centrality of UK or US firms is found. Therefore, negative signs
are assumed. The centrality measure in Figure 3.2 implies that most firms are unimportant
for the whole network, whereas only a few are powerful. Since most vertices represent German
companies, a negative sign for the indicator variable COU Ger is expectable.
Banks and insurance companies were found to be central corporations in Germany (cf. Ho¨pner
and Krempel (2004)). The public utility companies described above might also be powerful.
Hence, positive signs are expected for the first three industries mentioned in Table 3.6. Other
industries may be less involved in the corporate company network. In contrast to these
industries, negative signs for the manufacturing industry and trade industry are in accordance
with our expectations. We also assume a positive sign for the regressor variable Multi since
firms offering various products may have stronger incentives to be interwoven with many other
companies. Finally, higher profits as well as strong equity positions measured by ACC Pro and
ACC Equ should both positively affect the probability of acquiring other firms or expand a
business and are likely to increase the centrality of a company.45
45Notice, for all variable groups the reference group always contains all other companies.
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Econometric Models
In Table 3.7 results of the least squares regression are reported where we regress the indegree
closeness centrality on firm characteristics (see Table 3.6 for variable names). Table 3.7 contains
two Sub-Tables 7a and Sub-Table 7b. The first table reports coefficients and p-values of
full-sample regressions, i.e. only firm characteristics being observed for all 2784 companies in
the network are included. Equation 3.2 shows the estimation of column OLSA1.
InClos = β0 + β1NET + β2LF + β3IND + β4COU + β5Multi+ β6List+ u (3.2)
where variable names in capitals indicate vectors (containing all variables of each variable group).
NET represents network variables, LF legal form variables, IND industry variables, COU country
variables, Multi indicates whether a firm is active in several different industry sectors, List
indicates listed companies and u is the error term. Sub-Table 7b contains also coefficients of
accounting variables ACC being observed for 987 German companies. Hence, the estimation
results shown in column OLSB1 are based on Equation 3.2 where the country vector COU is
excluded but equity capital, balance sheet total, and annual net profit are inserted. Using the
full variable set in columns OLS·1 – the dot in the subscript here is used to indicate that the
statement holds for both the full sample and the reduced sample – is appropriate due to the low
degree of multicollinearity being found among indicator variables. In contrast, the correlations
among accounting variables themselves are large enough to affect estimation results, as shown
below.46
In the second column of each Sub-Table we report the results of a stepwise regression which
repeatedly decrements all insignificant variables until 5%-significant variables having coefficients
above 0.05 in absolute value are left. One disadvantage of our approach is that the indicator
variables only measure average effects for each group. Hence, the centrality difference between
banks and insurers in France is the same as between banks and insurers in Italy. Furthermore,
the distribution of centrality shown in Figure 3.2 indicates a nonlinear relationship similar to a
hyperbola. Therefore, we can assume that indegree closeness centrality increases more sharply
if an already fairly central company adds a power-enhancing characteristic than if a peripheral
company adds the same characteristic. A simple solution to take into account this form of
nonlinearity is a semi-log specification in a linear model. However, this specification is not
applicable due to company centralities of zero. Instead, nonlinear least squares is applied to
46The correlations mentioned are ρ(ACC Tot,ACC Pro)=0.386, ρ(ACC Tot,ACC Equ)=0.411,
ρ(ACC Equ,ACC Pro)=0.767.
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Table 3.6: Covariates available for the Explanation of Indegree Closeness Centrality
Category (abbr.) Variable Description Sign
Network NET MoG Indicates firms being a member of the giant
component
+
(NET) NET 597 Indicates firms having a turnover above 1 bill. Euro –
Legal Form LF Inc Indicates incorporated companies +
(LF) LF Ltd Indicates limited companies –
LF Par Indicates partnerships –
LF PP Indicates personally liable partners –
LF Sta Indicates state enterprises/state entities –
LF Mis Indicator variables for missing observations + –
Industry IND Ins Indicates insurance companies +
(IND) IND Ban Indicates banks +
IND Uti Indicates public utility companies +
IND Man Indicates manufacturing companies –
IND Tra Indicates wholesale and retail companies + –
Country COU Ger Indicates German firms or entities –
(COU) COU Fra Indicates French firms or entities +
COU Ita Indicates Italian firms or entities +
COU Jap Indicates Japanese firms or entities +
COU UK Indicates British firms or entities –
COU USA Indicates U.S. firms or entities –
Conglomerate Multi Indicates firms being active in a main industry and at
least five sub-industries
+
Listed List Indicates firms having positive market capitalization +
Accounting ACC Tot Balance sheet total +
(ACC) ACC Pro Annual net profit +
ACC Equ Equity Capital +
Own Source: All variables of the first six categories (from the Network-category up to the Listed-category) are
indicator variables and are observed for the whole sample - 2784 companies. The variables of the Accounting
category is observed for 987 companies.
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Equation 3.3 and Equation 3.4.
InClos = exp(β0 + β1NET 597 + β2IND Ins+ β3IND Ban+ (3.3)
β4COU Fra+ β5COU Ita+ β6COU Jap+ β7List) + A
InClos = exp(β0 + β1NET 597 + β2IND Ins+ β3IND Uti+ (3.4)
β4ACC Equ+ β5ACC Tot) + B
where all variables are scalars, exp(.) indicates the exponential function, and A and B are error
terms. Regression results of Equation 3.3 are given in column NLSA whereas column NLSB
reports results of Equation 3.4. In each estimation only significant variables left in the linear
stepwise regression are used as regressors in the nonlinear estimation.
Regression Results
The ordinary least squares regressions in columns OLS·1 and OLS·2 are discussed first. In
particular, the accounting variables may be endogenous such that we would like to account
for this problem. However, the available data set contains no reasonable instruments since
all additional variables such as number of employees, further balance sheet information, and
others may directly affect the dependent variable as well as the endogenous one. The network
variables are statistically and economically significant and have the expected signs. Firms being
a member of the giant component have a higher centrality, whereas industrial enterprises having
large turnovers above one billion euro tend to have smaller centrality measures than average
firms. Four out of five legal form variables confirm our expectations. Contrary to expectations,
LF Inc has a negative sign. In regression a, the coefficient is statistically insignificant whereas
it is highly significant in the reduced-sample regression. This slight difference might be caused
by correlation between List and LF Inc of 0.388 in regression a and 0.517 in regression b. This
line of argument is also underpinned by the observation that List is an important variable in
the full-sample regression a and not included in column OLSb2 and NLSb. In regression b
no coefficient is available for LF PP since accounting information excludes private individuals.
The variable LF Mis indicates the missing observations. In regression a no important influence
is measured whereas in b the coefficients are statistically significant. However, in the first
regression 131 observations are labelled as a missing variable, whereas only two are left in the
reduced sample.
Among the coefficients of industry variables the largest values are observed for insurance
companies. This confirms our results from the previous Sub-Chapter where these companies
are among the most central companies. At first sight, the results for banks are mixed. In the
full-sample regression significant positive coefficients are found, however, no higher centrality can
be reported in the reduced-sample regression. This is substantiated by the fact that banks have
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higher balance sheet totals than non-banks. Excluding the variable ACC Tot and inserting the
bank indicator variable results in a 1%-significant coefficient of 0.185.47 Therefore, we confirm
the result of Pappi et al. (1987) and Ho¨pner and Krempel (2004), i.e. that banks are still among
the most powerful German companies. Expectations are also confirmed with respect to other
industry variables. However, only IND Man is significant at the 5% level in column OLSb1. All
other coefficients have the assumed sign but are insignificant.
Similarly, the signs and sizes of country variable coefficients in the full-sample regression
correspond to expectations for France, Italy, and Japan. The strongest impact is found for
Italy. The coefficient for the United States is negative, as assumed, but insignificant. For
the United Kingdom and Germany results are not in accordance with expectations. In fact,
for Germany the coefficient is also significant but the overall impact on closeness centrality is
relatively small.
Two of the three accounting information have the expected sign such that a higher equity and
a higher balance sheet total increases the centrality of the firm. In interpreting the coefficients
take into account that ACC Equ is measured in million euros whereas ACC Tot is measured in
billion euros. Hence, given the coefficients of 0.007 and 0.400 in OLSB2 the equity variable seems
to be more important. Company earnings seem of little relevance in determining the power of
firms.
Finally, we found a positive and significant relationship for the variables Multi and List. But a
strong influence can only be measured for List in regression a, whereas Multi is dropped in the
stepwise regressions OLS·2. Hence, not only large but also listed companies are more central.
The coefficients of nonlinear least squares estimation strengthen the results of the OLS regression.
All results with respect to sign and magnitude are confirmed. To compare the magnitudes of
characteristics on centrality the coefficients must be plugged into Equation 3.3 and Equation 3.4.
Then the fitted centrality for Italian banks is approximately exp(−2.093+0.399+1.319) = 0.687,
whereas the centrality based on coefficients in OLSa2 is 0.606. French insurance companies using
the results reported in column NLSa is exp(−2.093 + 0.842 + 0.547) = 0.495, which is close to
closeness centrality based on coefficients in OLSa2 is 0.506.48 Hence, our results seem quite
robust to the nonlinear specification.
47The corresponding p-value is 0.008.
48The last value rests upon the following equation 0.114+0.248+0.144=0.506.
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Table 3.7: (Non-)Linear Least Squares Estimation
Table 3.7 contains several regression results. In each estimation the dependent Variable is
InClos, the indegree closeness centrality. The Table is split into two Sub-Tables 7A and 7B.
The regression results shown in the first Sub-Table are based on the full sample, whereas the
regression results in the second Sub-Table is based on 987 observations. However, the reduced
sample includes also accounting information of German companies. The first two columns of
each Sub-Table are estimated by ordinary least squares, whereas the last column reports results
of nonlinear least squares estimation.
Sub-Table 7a Sub-Table 7b
Full Sample Reduced Sample
Variable OLSa1 OLSa2 NLSa Variable OLSb1 OLSb2 NLSb
Network Variables Network Variables
NET MoG 0.043** NET MoG -0.017
(0.000) (0.136)
NET 597 -0.100** -0.084** -1.120** NET 597 -0.048* -0.058** -0.527**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.003) (0.001)
Legal Form Variables Legal Form Variables
LF Inc -0.046 LF Inc -0.094*
(0.127) (0.012)
LF Ltd -0.076** LF Ltd -0.111**
(0.009) (0.002)
LF Par -0.068* LF Par -0.094*
(0.021) (0.011)
LF PP -0.078** LF PP
(0.009)
LF Sta -0.061+ LF Sta -0.162*
(0.068) (0.028)
LF Mis -0.006 LF Mis -0.036
(0.871) (0.661)
Industry Variables Industry Variables
IND Ins 0.229** 0.248** 0.842** IND Ins 2.830** 2.929** 2.947**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IND Ban 0.054* 0.066** 0.399** IND Ban 0.107
(0.029) (0.007) (0.000) (0.123)
IND Uti 0.007 IND Uti 0.120* 0.139** 1.082**
(0.524) (0.015) (0.009) (0.000)
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Sub-Table 7a continued Sub-Table 7b continued
IND Man -0.005 IND Man -0.038*
(0.526) (0.012)
IND Tra 0.005 IND Tra -0.008
(0.599) (0.656)
Country Variables Accounting Variables
COU Ger 0.029** ACC Pro -0.030
(0.005) (0.329)
COU Fra 0.134** 0.144** 0.547** ACC Equ 0.010** 0.007** 0.011**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000)
COU Ita 0.417** 0.426** 1.319** ACC Tot 0.256** 0.400* 1.106**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.012) (0.000)
COU Jap 0.096** 0.096** 0.433**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
COU UK 0.044
(0.111)
COU USA -0.019
(0.279)
Other Variables Other Variables
Multi 0.051+ Multi 0.056**
(0.081) (0.001)
List 0.048+ 0.069** 0.443** List 0.014
(0.050) (0.005) (0.000) (0.538)
Constant 0.134** 0.114** -2.093** Constant 0.182** 0.101** -2.109**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.279 0.257 0.4661) R2 0.870 0.849 0.8391)
#Obs 2784 2784 2784 #Obs 275 275 275
Data Source: Hoppenstedt KSD and Hoppenstedt Annual Data Information (www.bilanzen.de). p-values in
parenthesis. 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels are labelled by **, *, +. All except the accounting variables ACC Pro,
ACC Tot, and ACC Equ are indicator variables. ACC Pro and ACC Equ is measured in million Euros whereas
ACC Tot is measured in billion Euros. 1) R2 is not the standard goodness-of-fit since the nonlinear least squares
regression contains no intercept.
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3.5 Conclusions
Until now, researchers investigating ownership structures have been content with analysing small
local company settings. There is a vast literature on patterns called pyramids or cross-holdings.
However, these descriptions represent nothing else than local network formations and are, of
course, embedded in larger network structures. Future analyses of ownership structures will be
enhanced by complex and comprehensive network tools. For instance, network statistics might
offer informative variables such as centrality measures, distance to ultimate owners, etc. These
variables might lead to new insights on the impact of ownership structures on firm performance.
Network analysis is attractive for empirical researchers given the huge data availability in coming
years. Detailed data sets make it possible to track firm policies in greater detail, taking into
account firm-specific environments and dependence structures of companies. Following the
adoption of network methods, the German as well as the global corporate control system can
be analysed and theories on corporate control and governance can be tested econometrically.
In this article we demonstrate that the global description of company networks is possible by
analysing ownership structures among German companies in 2006. The financial linkages of a
huge unique data set containing 2784 single companies were constructed and described. Several
statistics were applied to discover general features of the company network. From our point of
view, one major highlight is the MAN-classification scheme, offering a micro-macro perspective
which simplifies both specific firm analysis as well as country-specific or global analyses of
ownership structures. After the description of certain structural properties a centrality measure,
the indegree closeness centrality, was calculated for all vertices. Finally, the explanation of the
centrality vector was performed by applying standard econometric techniques.
Our results show that most central German companies are still banks and insurance companies.
Given previous results of Agarwal and Elston (2001) as well as Dittmann et al. (2005) showing
that bank-controlled firms have not been able to outperform in the past, regression results might
be interpreted as an undesirable network characteristic. Another interesting result is the high
degree of internationalisation detected in the company network. Today, large German firms
are multinational corporations themselves or are often strongly connected to other non-German
multinationals. It is reasonable to assume that this fact is a major difference to earlier networks.
We found that the UK and US firms in the German company network outnumber firms of
other nations, although most Anglo-Saxon firms are less central than firms from other nations.
In particular, Italian corporations, but also French and Japanese companies, occupy central
positions in the German corporate system. The results of the MAN-classification scheme
(cf. Chapter 6.2) indicate that especially cross-holdings and pyramids are the most common
triad formations in the German company network. Other formations such as circles, which are
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found relatively often in absolute terms, are formed incidentally and are less often observed
than in a random network. The importance of pyramids is also underpinned by the observation
that in the giant network component containing 1626 vertices the number of financial linkages
with weights of about 60% and 75% is small, whereas in the total network there are many more
capital weights of similar importance.
This paper can be seen as a first step towards an even deeper knowledge of the ‘Deutschland
AG’. The present work can be extended in several ways. First, the KSD data bank contains
approximately 250,000 ownership links such that the complete ‘Deutschland AG’ may differ
from Network Figure 1. Second, it is also interesting to identify whether and how such network
structures affect profitability. In particular, if this network data set is available for different
points in time, a panel study can reveal insightful results.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.8: Full Company Names abbreviated in Table 3.5
Footnote Company
1) Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio Verona, Vicenza, Belluno e Ancona
2) Capital Research & Management Company
3) Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario S.p.A.
4) The Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corporation (Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko)
5) Fondazione Cassamarca - Cassa di Risparmio della Marca Trivigniana
6) Fidelity Management & Research Company
7) The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd. (Dai-Ichi Kangyo Ginko)
8) Allianz Subalpina Societa` di assicurazioni e riassicurazioni
9) Deutscher Automobil Schutz Allgemeine Rechtsschutz-Versicherungs-AG
10) D.A.S. Deutscher Automobil Schutz Versicherungs-AG
11) SHB Stuttgarter Finanz- und Beteiligungs AG
12) ExxonMobil Central Europe Holding GmbH
Own Source.
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Table 3.9: Legal Forms of Companies in our Sample
Abbreviation Countries Local Name Group #Obs
A/S Denmark Aktieslskab Inc. 9
AB Sweden Aktiebolag Inc. 15
AG Germany Aktiengesellschaft Inc. 374
AG & Co KG Germany Inc. 16
ASA Norway Allmennaksjeselskap Inc. 2
BV The Netherlands Besloten Vennootshap met Ltd. 44
beperkte aansprakelijkheid
CV The Netherlands Commanditaire Vennootschap Partner 2
e.G. Germany eingetragene Genossenschaft Other 26
e.V. Germany eingetragener Verein Other 4
Foundation Anglo-Saxon Other 1
GbR Germany Gesellschaft des bu¨rgerlichen Rechts Other 4
GmbH Germany Gesellschaft mit beschra¨nkter Haftung Ltd. 816
GmbH & Co. KG Germany Partner 213
GmbH & Co. oHG Germany Partner 16
KG Germany Kommanditgesellschaft Partner 43
KGaA Germany Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien Inc. 7
LLC USA Limited Liability Company Partner 22
LLP USA, UK Limited liability partnership Partner 3
LP USA Limited Partnership Ltd. 16
Ltd. UK Limited Ltd. 133
NV Belgium Naamloze Vennootschap Inc. 37
The Netherlands Naamloze Vennootschap Inc.
oHG Germany offene Handelsgesellschaft Partner 4
PLC UK Public company limited by shares Inc. 31
SA Belgium Socie´te´ Anonyme Inc. 120
Brazil Sociedade Anoˆnima Inc.
France Socie´te´ Anonyme Inc.
Luxembourg Socie´te´ Anonyme Inc.
Portugal Sociedade Anoˆnima Inc.
Spain Sociedad Ano´nima Inc.
SARL France Societe a responsabilite limitee Ltd. 14
Luxembourg Societe a responsabilite limitee Ltd.
SAS France Socie´te´ par Actions Simplifie´e Inc. 7
SCA France Socie´te´ en commandite par actions Inc. 4
SPA Italy Societa per azioni Inc. 68
Stiftung Germany Stiftung Other 34
Own Source: #Obs signifies the number of observations in the data set.
60
N
et
w
or
k
Fi
gu
re
1:
To
ta
lN
et
w
or
k
N
et
w
or
k
Fi
gu
re
2:
G
ia
nt
24
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
????
?? ?
?
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
62




	















































1
Ak
tie
n
-
G
es
el
ls
ch
af
td
er
D
illi
n
ge
r
H
üt
te
n
w
er
ke
42
G
as
ag
Be
rli
n
er
G
as
w
er
ke
AG
83
St
ad
tw
er
ke
Au
gs
bu
rg
En
er
gie
G
m
bH
2
AR
BE
D
S.
A.
43
G
as
an
st
al
tK
ai
se
rs
la
u
te
rn
AG
84
St
ad
tw
er
ke
Au
gs
bu
rg
H
ol
di
n
g
G
m
bH
3
Ar
ce
lo
r
Ei
se
n
hü
tte
n
st
ad
tG
m
bH
44
G
az
de
Fr
an
ce
Be
rli
n
er
In
ve
st
is
se
m
en
ts
SA
S
85
St
ad
tw
er
ke
Ch
em
n
itz
AG
4
Ar
ce
lo
r
G
er
m
an
yH
ol
di
n
g
G
m
bH
45
G
az
de
Fr
an
ce
D
eu
ts
ch
la
n
d
G
m
bH
86
St
ad
tw
er
ke
Fr
an
kf
u
rt
am
M
ai
n
H
ol
di
n
g
G
m
bH
5
Ar
ce
lo
r
S.
A.
46
G
az
de
Fr
an
ce
Pr
od
u
kt
io
n
Ex
pl
.
D
eu
ts
ch
la
n
d
G
m
bH
87
St
ad
tw
er
ke
H
an
n
ov
er
AG
6
Ba
ye
rn
ga
s
G
m
bH
47
H
EA
G
AG
88
St
ad
tw
er
ke
M
ün
ch
en
G
m
bH
7
BK
B
AG
48
H
EA
G
Sü
dh
es
si
sc
he
En
er
gie
AG
(H
SE
)
89
St
ad
tw
er
ke
R
eg
en
sb
u
rg
G
m
bH
8
ci
tiw
or
ks
AG
49
Je
an
La
n
g
90
St
ad
tw
er
ke
St
ro
m
-
/W
är
m
ev
er
so
rg
u
n
gs
ge
se
ll.
m
bH
9
CO
N
TI
G
AS
D
eu
ts
ch
e
En
er
gie
-
AG
50
Kr
ei
se
91
St
ad
tw
er
ke
Zw
ei
br
üc
ke
n
G
m
bH
10
D
eg
u
ss
a
AG
51
La
n
de
se
le
kt
riz
itä
ts
ve
rb
an
d
O
ld
en
bu
rg
92
St
ah
lw
er
ke
Br
em
en
G
m
bH
11
D
eu
ts
ch
e
St
ei
n
ko
hl
e
AG
52
La
n
de
sh
au
pt
st
ad
tH
an
n
ov
er
93
ST
EA
G
AG
12
D
H
S
-
D
illi
n
ge
r
H
üt
te
Sa
ar
st
ah
lA
G
53
La
n
de
sh
au
pt
st
ad
tM
ün
ch
en
94
ST
EA
G
Sa
ar
En
er
gie
AG
13
E.
O
N
AG
54
M
ai
n
ov
a
AG
95
SW
M
Ve
rs
or
gu
n
gs
G
m
bH
14
E.
O
N
Av
ac
on
AG
55
N
-
ER
G
IE
AG
96
Th
üg
a
AG
15
E.
O
N
Ba
ye
rn
AG
56
Öf
fe
n
tlic
he
G
eb
ie
ts
kö
rp
er
sc
ha
fte
n
97
Th
ür
in
ge
r
En
er
gie
-
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
tm
bH
16
E.
O
N
ed
is
AG
57
R
AG
AG
98
Va
tte
n
fa
ll(
D
eu
ts
ch
la
n
d)
G
m
bH
17
E.
O
N
En
er
gie
26
.
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
-
G
m
bH
58
R
AG
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
-
G
m
bH
99
Va
tte
n
fa
llA
B
18
E.
O
N
En
er
gie
AG
59
R
AG
Co
al
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
AG
10
0
Va
tte
n
fa
llE
u
ro
pe
AG
19
E.
O
N
Fi
n
an
za
n
la
ge
n
G
m
bH
60
R
AG
Pr
oje
kt
ge
se
lls
ch
af
tm
bh
10
1
Va
tte
n
fa
llE
u
ro
pe
Be
rli
n
AG
&
Co
.
KG
20
E.
O
N
H
an
se
AG
61
R
AG
Sa
ar
be
rg
G
m
bH
10
2
Va
tte
n
fa
llE
u
ro
pe
Be
rli
n
Ve
rw
al
tu
n
gs
-
AG
21
E.
O
N
Ke
rn
kr
af
tG
m
bH
62
R
AG
Tr
ad
in
g
G
m
bH
10
3
Va
tte
n
fa
llE
u
ro
pe
G
en
er
at
io
n
AG
&
Co
.
KG
22
E.
O
N
Kr
af
tw
er
ke
G
m
bH
63
R
AG
Ve
rk
au
fG
m
bH
10
4
Va
tte
n
fa
llE
u
ro
pe
G
en
er
at
io
n
Ve
rw
al
tu
n
gs
-
AG
23
E.
O
N
M
itt
e
AG
64
R
eg
en
sb
u
rg
er
Ba
de
be
tri
eb
e
G
m
bH
10
5
Va
tte
n
fa
llE
u
ro
pe
H
am
bu
rg
AG
24
E.
O
N
N
et
z
G
m
bH
65
R
eg
en
sb
u
rg
er
En
er
gie
-
u
n
d
W
as
se
rv
er
so
rg
u
n
g
AG
10
6
Va
tte
n
fa
llE
u
ro
pe
Sa
le
s
G
m
bH
25
E.
O
N
N
or
di
c
AB
66
R
ew
ag
R
eg
en
sb
u
rg
er
En
er
.
-
u
n
d
W
as
s.
AG
&
Co
KG
10
7
Va
tte
n
fa
llE
u
ro
pe
Tr
an
sm
is
si
on
G
m
bH
26
E.
O
N
N
or
di
c
H
ol
di
n
g
G
m
bH
67
R
üt
ge
rs
G
m
bH
10
8
Ve
rs
or
gu
n
gs
-
u
n
d
Ve
rk
eh
rs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
tH
an
n
ov
er
m
bH
27
E.
O
N
R
AG
-
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
tm
bH
68
Sa
ar
Fe
rn
ga
s
AG
10
9
Ve
rs
or
gu
n
gs
-
u
n
d
Ve
rk
eh
rs
ho
ld
.
G
m
bH
Ch
em
n
itz
(V
VH
C)
28
E.
O
N
R
u
hr
ga
s
AG
69
Sa
ar
st
ah
lA
G
11
0
Ve
rw
al
tu
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
tR
AG
-
Be
te
ilig
u
n
g
m
bH
29
E.
O
N
R
u
hr
ga
s
H
ol
di
n
g
G
m
bH
70
SH
S
-
St
ru
kt
u
r-
H
ol
di
n
g-
St
ah
lG
m
bH
&
Co
.
KG
aA
11
1
VN
G
-
Ve
rb
u
n
dn
et
z
G
as
AG
30
E.
O
N
R
u
hr
ga
s
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
AG
71
SI
D
AR
ST
EE
L
N
.
V.
11
2
VN
G
Ve
rb
u
n
dn
et
z
G
as
Ve
rw
al
tu
n
gs
-
u
n
d
Be
t.-
G
m
bH
31
E.
O
N
R
u
hr
ga
s
Th
üg
a
H
ol
di
n
g
G
m
bH
72
SI
D
M
AR
N
.
V.
11
3
VN
G
-
Er
dg
as
co
m
m
er
z
G
m
bH
32
E.
O
N
Sa
le
s
&
Tr
ad
in
g
G
m
bH
73
St
aa
tS
ch
w
ed
en
11
4
W
EM
AG
AG
33
E.
O
N
Sv
er
ige
AB
74
St
ad
tC
he
m
n
itz
11
5
W
es
er
-
Em
s-
En
er
gie
be
te
ilig
u
n
ge
n
G
m
bH
34
E.
O
N
Th
ür
in
ge
r
En
er
gie
AG
75
St
ad
tD
ar
m
st
ad
t
11
6
St
ad
tA
u
gs
bu
rg
35
E.
O
N
W
as
se
rk
ra
ft
G
m
bH
76
St
ad
tF
ra
n
kf
u
rt
am
M
ai
n
11
7
St
ad
tR
eg
en
sb
u
rg
36
E.
O
N
W
es
tfa
le
n
W
es
er
AG
77
St
ad
tK
ai
se
rs
la
u
te
rn
37
EE
G
-
Er
dg
as
Er
dö
lG
m
bH
78
St
ad
tL
an
da
u
38
EE
G
-
Er
dg
as
Tr
an
sp
or
tG
m
bH
79
St
ad
tN
ür
n
be
rg
39
En
er
gie
Sü
dw
es
tA
G
80
St
ad
tZ
w
ei
br
üc
ke
n
40
Er
dg
as
ve
rs
or
gu
n
gs
ge
se
ll.
Th
ür
.
-
Sa
.
m
bH
(E
VG
)
81
St
ad
th
ol
di
n
g
La
n
da
u
in
de
r
Pf
al
z
G
m
bH
41
EW
E
AG
82
St
äd
tis
ch
e
W
er
ke
N
ür
n
be
rg
G
m
bH
N
et
w
or
k
Fi
gu
re
3:
G
ia
nt
49
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
64




	















































1
A.
Fr
ie
dr
.
Fl
en
de
r
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
21
R
ob
er
tB
os
ch
St
ift
u
n
g
G
m
bH
2
Au
to
m
ob
ile
s
Pe
u
ge
ot
S.
A.
22
S.
I.P
.
Ve
rw
al
tu
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
tm
bH
3
BB
T
Th
er
m
ot
ec
hn
ik
G
m
bH
23
SA
S
Au
to
sy
st
em
te
ch
n
ik
Ve
rw
al
tu
n
gs
G
m
bH
4
Bl
au
pu
n
kt
G
m
bH
24
Si
em
en
s
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
5
Bo
sc
h
R
ex
ro
th
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
25
Si
em
en
s
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t 
st
er
re
ic
h
6
BS
H
 
Bo
sc
h 
u
n
d 
Si
em
en
s 
H
au
sg
er
!
e 
G
m
bH
26
Si
em
en
s 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
ge
n
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t G
m
bH
7
Bu
de
ru
s 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
27
Si
em
en
s 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
ve
rw
al
tu
n
g 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
O
H
G
8
Fa
u
re
ci
a 
Au
to
m
ot
ive
 
G
m
bH
28
Si
em
en
s 
Bu
si
n
es
s 
Se
rv
ic
es
 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
-
G
m
bH
9
Fa
u
re
ci
a 
Au
to
si
tz
e 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
29
Si
em
en
s 
Bu
si
n
es
s 
Se
rv
ic
es
 
G
m
bH
10
Fa
u
re
ci
a 
S.
A.
30
Si
em
en
s 
Bu
si
n
es
s 
Se
rv
ic
es
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
O
H
G
11
Fl
en
de
r 
H
ol
di
n
g 
G
m
bH
31
Si
em
en
s 
R
ea
l E
st
at
e 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
O
H
G
12
Fu
jits
u
 
Lt
d.
32
Si
em
en
s 
R
ea
l E
st
at
e 
M
an
ag
em
en
t G
m
bH
13
Fu
jits
u
 
Si
em
en
s 
Co
m
pu
te
rs
 
(H
ol
di
n
g) 
B.
V.
33
So
m
m
er
 
Al
lib
er
t S
.
A.
14
Fu
jits
u
 
Si
em
en
s 
Co
m
pu
te
rs
 
G
m
bH
34
St
ad
t F
rie
dr
ic
hs
ha
fe
n
15
Ka
be
l- 
u
n
d 
D
ra
ht
w
er
ke
 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
35
VV
K 
Ve
rs
.
-
Ve
rm
.
-
 
u
n
d 
Ve
rk
eh
rs
-
Ko
n
to
r 
G
m
bH
16
Lu
fts
ch
iff
ba
u
 
Ze
pp
el
in
 
G
m
bH
36
ZE
PP
EL
IN
 
G
m
bH
17
O
sr
am
 
G
m
bH
37
Ze
pp
el
in
-
St
ift
u
n
g
18
PE
UG
EO
T 
D
EU
TS
CH
LA
N
D
 
G
M
BH
38
ZF
 
FR
IE
D
R
IC
H
SH
AF
EN
 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
19
Pe
u
ge
ot
 
S.
A.
39
ZF
 
G
et
rie
be
 
G
m
bH
20
R
ob
er
t B
os
ch
 
G
m
bH
40
ZF
 
Le
n
ks
ys
te
m
e 
G
m
bH
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 4
: G
ia
nt
 7
4
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
????
1
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 A
de
ls
do
rf
2
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 A
lte
ns
ta
dt
3
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 B
in
ge
n 
am
 R
he
in
4
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 B
ou
s
5
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 D
on
au
es
ch
in
ge
n
6
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 E
be
rs
be
rg
7
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 E
ic
he
na
u
8
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 G
ei
se
nf
el
d
9
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 H
el
m
st
ad
t
10
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 K
er
pe
n
11
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 K
et
sc
h
12
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 K
irc
hh
ei
m
 a
n 
d.
 W
ei
ns
tr.
13
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 L
an
ge
nf
el
d 
L.
 (R
he
in
la
nd
)
14
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 L
an
ge
ns
el
bo
ld
15
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 M
ah
lb
er
g
16
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 M
ön
ch
en
gl
ad
ba
ch
17
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 M
on
ta
ba
ur
18
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 M
ör
fe
ld
en
-W
al
ld
or
f
19
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 M
üh
lh
ei
m
 a
n 
de
r R
uh
r
20
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 M
ur
r
21
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 R
as
ta
tt
22
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 R
he
in
be
rg
23
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 S
an
kt
 A
ug
us
tin
24
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 W
itt
lic
h
25
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 A
ic
ht
al
26
A
LD
I G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 R
eg
en
st
au
f
27
A
ld
i G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 R
ot
h
28
S
ie
pm
an
n 
S
tif
tu
ng
T
hi
s i
s t
he
 G
ia
nt
 C
om
po
ne
nt
 o
f t
he
 C
om
pl
et
e 
N
et
w
or
k 
w
he
re
 a
ll 
lin
ks
 b
el
ow
 7
4%
 a
re
 d
el
et
ed
.
66
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 5
: A
LD
I
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ?
?
??
???
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
????
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
67



1
A.
 
D
ol
d 
G
m
bH
47
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
R
ad
ev
or
m
w
al
d
93
H
ah
n
 
G
m
bH
2
Al
be
rs
 
G
m
bH
48
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
R
as
ta
tt
94
H
ak
e 
G
m
bH
3
Al
di
 
Ei
n
ka
u
f G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
oH
G
 
Es
se
n
49
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
R
he
in
be
rg
95
H
ec
kl 
G
m
bH
4
Al
di
 
Ei
n
ka
u
f G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
oH
G
 
M
üh
lh
ei
m
 
an
 
de
r 
R
u
hr
50
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
R
in
te
ln
96
H
eu
ßi
n
ge
r 
G
m
bH
5
Al
di
 
Ei
n
ka
u
f G
m
bH
 
D
u
is
bu
rg
51
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Sa
lzg
itt
er
97
H
irt
z 
G
m
bH
6
Al
di
 
Ei
n
ka
u
f G
m
bH
 
H
er
te
n
52
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Sa
n
kt
 
Au
gu
st
in
98
H
of
fm
an
n
 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t m
bH
7
AL
D
I G
es
el
ls
ch
af
t &
 
Co
.
 
KG
 
G
ro
ßb
ee
re
n
53
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Sc
ha
rb
eu
tz
99
H
ol
ge
r 
Sc
hm
id
t G
m
bH
8
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
Be
u
ch
a 
KG
54
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Sc
hl
oß
 
H
ol
te
-
St
u
ke
n
br
oc
k
10
0
H
ol
ge
r 
Sc
hn
ei
de
r 
G
m
bH
9
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Ad
el
sd
or
f
55
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Sc
hw
el
m
10
1
Id
er
s 
G
m
bH
10
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Al
te
n
st
ad
t
56
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Se
ef
el
d
10
2
Ja
ko
bu
s-
St
ift
u
n
g
11
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Ba
d 
La
as
ph
e
57
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Se
ev
et
al
10
3
Ka
rl 
Al
br
ec
ht
12
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Ba
rg
te
he
id
e
58
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
W
er
l
10
4
Ke
hl
 
G
m
bH
13
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Be
rli
n
59
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
W
ey
he
10
5
Ke
n
zle
r 
G
m
bH
14
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Be
ve
rs
te
dt
60
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
W
ils
dr
u
ff
10
6
Ki
eß
l G
m
bH
15
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Bi
n
ge
n
 
am
 
R
he
in
61
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
W
itt
lic
h
10
7
La
n
ge
n
st
ro
eh
er
 
G
m
bH
16
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Bo
u
s
62
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
W
itt
st
oc
k
10
8
La
rb
er
g 
G
m
bH
17
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
D
at
te
ln
63
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
Ko
m
m
an
di
tg
es
el
ls
ch
af
t A
ic
ht
al
10
9
Le
ss
n
er
 
G
m
bH
18
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
D
on
au
es
ch
in
ge
n
64
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
Ko
m
m
an
di
tg
es
el
ls
ch
af
t G
re
ve
n
11
0
Li
eb
is
ch
 
G
m
bH
19
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Eb
er
sb
er
g
65
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
Ko
m
m
an
di
tg
es
el
ls
ch
af
t R
eg
en
st
au
f
11
1
Lu
ka
s 
St
ift
u
n
g
20
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Ei
ch
en
au
66
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
Ko
m
m
an
di
tg
es
el
ls
ch
af
t R
ot
h
11
2
M
ar
kh
of
f G
m
bH
21
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Es
se
n
67
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
u
.
 
Co
.
 
KG
 
N
ot
do
rf
11
3
M
ar
ku
s 
Ka
ffe
e 
G
m
bH
22
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
G
ei
se
n
fe
ld
68
Be
rg
er
 
G
m
bH
11
4
M
ar
ku
s 
Ka
ffe
e 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
H
er
te
n
23
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
H
el
m
st
ad
t
69
Be
rth
ol
d 
Al
br
ec
ht
11
5
M
ar
ku
s 
Ka
ffe
e 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
W
ey
he
24
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
H
er
te
n
70
Bi
lle
n
 
G
m
bH
11
6
M
ar
ku
s 
St
ift
u
n
g
25
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
H
es
el
71
Br
eh
m
 
G
m
bH
11
7
M
ic
ha
le
k 
G
m
bH
26
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
H
or
st
72
Br
ök
er
 
G
m
bH
11
8
M
ül
le
r 
G
m
bH
27
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
H
oy
er
sw
er
de
r
73
Bu
rg
ar
d 
G
m
bH
11
9
N
eu
bo
ld
 
G
m
bH
28
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Ja
rm
en
74
Bu
ttk
u
s 
G
m
bH
12
0
N
oa
ck
 
G
m
bH
29
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Ke
rp
en
75
Ca
ro
lu
s-
St
ift
u
n
g
12
1
O
tte
 
G
m
bH
30
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Ke
ts
ch
76
D
an
ie
l G
m
bH
12
2
Pe
n
ke
rt 
G
m
bH
31
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Ki
rc
hh
ei
m
 
an
 
de
r 
W
ei
n
st
ra
ße
77
D
av
id
 
G
m
bH
12
3
Po
lo
ss
ek
 
G
m
bH
32
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Kö
n
n
er
n
78
D
el
sc
he
n
 
G
m
bH
12
4
R
ei
tz
ig 
G
m
bH
33
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
La
n
ge
n
fe
ld
 
La
n
ge
n
fe
ld
 
(R
he
in
la
n
d)
79
D
ie
kh
au
s 
G
m
bH
12
5
R
ob
in
so
n
 
G
m
bH
34
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
La
n
ge
n
se
lb
ol
d
80
D
re
es
 
G
m
bH
12
6
R
oe
ttg
en
 
G
m
bH
35
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
La
n
ge
n
w
et
ze
n
do
rf
81
Eb
el
 
G
m
bH
12
7
Sa
n
de
r 
G
m
bH
36
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Le
hr
te
82
Ec
k 
G
m
bH
12
8
Si
ep
m
an
n
 
St
ift
u
n
g
37
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
Li
n
ge
n
 
(E
m
s)
83
Ed
en
 
G
m
bH
12
9
St
ei
n
br
en
n
er
 
G
m
bH
38
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
M
ah
lb
er
g
84
Ek
ro
t G
m
bH
13
0
Th
eo
 
Al
br
ec
ht
 
jun
.
39
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
M
ei
tz
en
do
rf
85
El
sn
er
 
G
m
bH
13
1
Th
u
ll G
m
bH
40
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
M
itt
en
w
al
de
86
Fa
m
ilie
 
Al
br
ec
ht
13
2
Th
u
n
ig 
G
m
bH
41
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
M
ön
ch
en
gla
db
ac
h
87
Fe
n
te
n
 
G
es
el
ls
ch
af
t m
it 
be
sc
hr
än
kt
er
 
H
af
tu
n
g
13
3
Tö
lle
 
G
m
bH
42
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
M
on
ta
ba
u
r
88
Fe
u
ch
t G
m
bH
13
4
Vo
llm
er
 
G
m
bH
43
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
M
ör
fe
ld
en
-
W
al
ld
or
f
89
Fr
an
k 
Sc
hr
öd
er
 
G
m
bH
13
5
W
ei
la
n
d 
G
m
bH
44
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
M
üh
lh
ei
m
 
an
 
de
r 
R
u
hr
90
G
er
de
s 
G
m
bH
13
6
O
er
te
l-S
tif
tu
n
g
45
Al
di
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
M
u
rr
91
G
oe
ts
ch
 
G
m
bH
46
AL
D
I G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
 
N
oh
ra
92
G
ün
th
er
 
G
m
bH
???
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 6
: A
M
B 
G
en
er
al
i
69





	


1
Al
lia
n
z 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
44
H
am
bu
rg
-
M
an
n
he
im
er
 
Sa
ch
ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
-
AG
87
Fi
n
ad
in
 
-
 
S.
p.
A.
 
Fi
n
an
zia
ria
 
di
 
In
ve
st
im
en
ti
2
Al
lia
n
z 
D
eu
ts
ch
la
n
d 
AG
45
H
am
bu
rg
-
M
an
n
he
im
er
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
-
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
88
Co
m
pa
gn
ia
 
Fi
du
ci
ar
ia
 
N
az
io
n
al
e 
S.
p.
A.
3
Al
lia
n
z 
Fi
n
an
zb
et
ei
lig
u
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
46
In
a 
Vi
ta
 
S.
p.
A.
89
Ba
n
ca
 
de
l G
ot
ta
rd
o 
S.
A.
4
Al
lia
n
z 
Le
be
n
sv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
gs
-
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
47
Ita
lc
em
en
ti 
Fa
bb
ric
he
 
R
iu
n
ite
 
Ce
m
en
to
 
S.
p.
A.
90
Si
n
er
gia
 
Te
rz
a 
S.
p.
A.
5
Al
lia
n
z 
Su
ba
lp
in
a 
So
ci
et
à 
di
 
as
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i e
 
ria
ss
ic
u
ra
zio
n
i
48
Ita
lm
ob
ilia
re
 
S.
p.
A.
91
Ca
n
oe
 
Se
cu
rit
ie
s 
S.
A.
6
As
op
os
 
Ve
rm
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
49
KA
R
ST
AD
T 
QU
EL
LE
 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
92
H
ike
 
Se
cu
rit
ie
s 
S.
A.
7
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i G
en
er
al
i S
.
p.
A.
50
KA
R
ST
AD
T 
QU
EL
LE
 
Ku
n
de
n
-
Se
rv
ic
e 
G
m
bH
93
Li
m
bo
 
In
ve
st
 
S.
A.
8
AV
IV
A 
Pl
c.
51
KA
R
ST
AD
T 
QU
EL
LE
 
Se
rv
ic
e 
G
m
bH
94
Im
m
ob
ilia
re
 
Co
st
ru
zio
n
i I
M
.
CO
.
 
S.
p.
A.
9
B 
an
d 
B 
In
ve
st
is
se
m
en
t S
.
C.
 
Im
m
ob
iliè
re
52
Ka
rs
ta
dt
Qu
el
le
 
Le
be
n
sv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
g 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
95
SA
IF
IN
 
-
 
SA
I F
in
an
zia
ria
 
S.
p.
A.
10
Ba
n
ca
 
di
 
R
om
a 
S.
p.
A.
53
Le
o 
H
er
l
96
Sc
hw
ei
ze
ris
ch
e 
LV
.
 
-
 
u
n
d 
R
en
te
n
an
st
al
t
11
Ba
n
ca
 
d'I
ta
lia
 
S.
p.
A.
54
M
ad
el
ei
n
e 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z
97
G
iu
lia
 
M
ar
ia
 
Li
gr
es
ti
12
Ba
n
ca
 
M
ed
io
si
m
 
Ba
n
ca
 
de
lla
 
R
et
e 
S.
p.
A.
55
M
ad
el
ei
n
e 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z 
Ve
rm
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
 
B.
 
G
m
bH
98
Jo
n
el
la
 
Li
gr
es
ti
13
Ba
n
co
 
di
 
Si
ci
lia
 
S.
p.
A.
56
M
ad
el
ei
n
e 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z 
Ve
rm
ög
en
sv
er
w
.
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
99
G
io
ac
ch
in
o 
Pa
ol
o 
Li
gr
es
ti
14
Ba
rc
la
ys
 
PL
C
57
M
ar
tin
 
D
ed
i
10
0
AM
B 
G
en
er
al
i H
ol
di
n
g 
AG
15
Ba
ye
ris
ch
e 
H
yp
o-
 
u
n
d 
Ve
re
in
sb
an
k 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
58
M
ar
tin
 
D
ed
i V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
10
1
G
en
er
al
i B
et
ei
lig
u
n
gs
-
G
m
bH
16
Ca
is
se
 
Ce
n
tra
le
 
de
s 
As
su
ra
n
ce
s 
M
u
tu
el
le
s 
A.
S.
M
.
59
M
ar
tin
 
D
ed
i V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
10
2
F.
 
M
an
do
ri
17
Ca
pi
ta
l R
es
ea
rc
h 
& 
M
an
ag
em
en
t C
om
pa
n
y
60
M
ED
IO
BA
N
CA
 
Ba
n
ca
 
di
 
Cr
ed
ito
 
Fi
n
an
zia
rio
 
S.
p.
A.
10
3
M
.
 
Ar
de
si
18
Ca
pi
ta
lia
 
S.
p.
A.
61
M
er
ril
l L
yn
ch
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
M
an
ag
er
s 
G
ro
u
p 
Lt
d.
10
4
Fa
m
ilie
 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z
19
Ca
rim
on
te
 
H
ol
di
n
g 
S.
p.
A.
62
M
ün
ch
en
er
 
R
üc
kv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
gs
-
G
es
el
ls
ch
af
t A
G
10
5
Pu
tn
am
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
.
 
LL
C
20
CO
M
M
ER
ZB
AN
K 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
63
N
ov
ar
a 
Vi
ta
 
S.
p.
A.
10
6
So
c.
 
R
ea
le
 
M
u
tu
a 
di
 
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i
21
Co
m
pa
gn
ia
 
di
 
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
e 
di
 
M
ila
n
o 
S.
p.
A.
64
Po
 
Vi
ta
 
Co
m
pa
gn
ia
 
di
 
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i S
.
p.
A.
10
7
C.
 
G
es
tio
n
i
22
Co
m
pa
ss
 
S.
p.
A.
65
R
AS
 
R
iu
n
io
n
e 
Ad
ria
tic
a 
di
 
Si
cu
rtà
 
S.
p.
A.
10
8
A.
 
Sp
ag
gia
ri
23
Co
n
so
rti
u
m
 
S.
r.
l.
66
R
B 
Vi
ta
 
S.
p.
A.
10
9
Cr
éd
it 
In
du
st
rie
l d
'A
ls
ac
e 
et
 
de
 
Lo
rr
ai
n
e 
S.
A.
24
D
.
A.
S.
 
D
eu
ts
ch
er
 
Au
to
m
ob
il S
ch
u
tz
 
Al
lge
m
ei
n
e 
R
.
-
V.
 
AG
67
R
ep
u
bl
ik 
Fr
an
kr
ei
ch
11
0
Cr
éd
it 
In
du
st
rie
l e
t C
om
m
er
ci
al
 
(C
IC
)
25
D
.
A.
S.
 
D
eu
ts
ch
er
 
Au
to
m
ob
il S
ch
u
tz
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
-
AG
68
Sa
de
 
Fi
n
an
zia
ria
 
S.
p.
A.
11
1
Le
ga
l &
 
G
en
er
al
 
G
ro
u
p 
PL
C
26
D
KV
 
D
eu
ts
ch
e 
Kr
an
ke
n
ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
g 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
69
SI
AT
 
-
 
So
ci
et
à 
Ita
lia
n
a 
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i e
 
R
ia
ss
ic
u
ra
zio
n
i -
 
p.
A.
11
2
Fi
de
lity
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
Lt
d.
27
D
R
ES
D
N
ER
 
BA
N
K 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
70
So
ci
et
à 
pe
r 
Am
m
in
is
tra
zio
n
i F
id
u
ci
ar
ie
 
SP
AF
ID
 
S.
p.
A.
11
3
ER
G
O
 
Ac
ht
e 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t m
bH
28
EF
FE
 
Fi
n
an
zia
ria
 
S.
p.
A.
71
So
ci
et
à 
pe
r 
la
 
Bo
n
ific
a 
de
i T
er
re
n
i F
.
 
e 
pe
r 
le
 
I. 
A.
 
-
 
S.
p.
A.
11
4
M
R
 
ER
G
O
 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
ge
n
 
G
m
bH
29
ER
G
O
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
gr
u
pp
e 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
72
So
ci
ét
é 
de
r 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n
 
Fi
n
an
ci
èr
e 
Ita
lm
ob
ilia
re
 
S.
A.
11
5
Ka
rs
ta
dt
Qu
el
le
 
Fi
n
an
z 
Se
rv
ic
e 
G
m
bH
30
Eu
ro
pä
is
ch
e 
R
ei
se
ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
g 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
73
Th
e 
Ca
pi
ta
l G
ro
u
p 
Co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
In
c.
31
Fi
de
lity
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Li
m
ite
d
74
Th
e 
La
w
re
n
ce
 
R
e 
Ire
la
n
d 
Lt
d.
32
Fi
de
lity
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
75
Tr
ad
in
gla
b 
Ba
n
ca
 
S.
p.
A.
33
Fi
de
lity
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Li
m
ite
d
76
Un
ic
re
di
t B
an
ca
 
d'I
m
pr
es
a 
S.
p.
A.
34
Fi
n
an
ci
èr
e 
du
 
Pe
rg
u
et
 
S.
A.
S.
77
Un
ic
re
di
t B
an
ca
 
M
ob
ilia
re
 
S.
p.
A.
35
Fi
n
ec
oG
ro
u
p 
S.
p.
A.
78
Un
ic
re
di
t B
an
ca
 
S.
p.
A.
36
FI
N
SA
I I
N
TE
R
N
AT
IO
N
AL
 
S.
A.
79
Un
ic
re
di
t P
riv
at
e 
Ba
n
kin
g 
S.
p.
A.
37
Fo
n
da
zio
n
e 
Ca
ss
a 
di
 
R
is
pa
rm
io
 
di
 
To
rin
o
80
Un
iC
re
di
to
 
Ita
lia
n
o 
S.
p.
A.
38
Fo
n
da
zio
n
e 
Ca
ss
a 
di
 
R
is
pa
rm
io
 
Ve
ro
n
a.
 
Vi
ce
n
za
.
 
B.
 
e 
A.
81
VI
CT
O
R
IA
 
Le
be
n
sv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
g 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
39
Fo
n
da
zio
n
e 
Ca
ss
am
ar
ca
 
-
Ca
ss
a 
di
 
R
is
pa
rm
io
 
de
lla
 
M
.
 
T.
82
VI
CT
O
R
IA
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
g 
Ak
tie
n
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
40
Fo
n
di
ar
ia
 
-
 
SA
I S
.
p.
A.
83
R
om
a 
Vi
ta
 
S.
p.
A.
41
G
AN
 
S.
A.
84
To
ro
 
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i S
.
p.
A.
42
G
en
er
al
i V
ita
 
S.
p.
A.
85
D
E 
AG
O
ST
IN
I S
.
p.
A.
43
G
ris
fo
n
ta
 
AG
86
Pr
em
af
in
 
Fi
n
an
zia
ria
 
-
 
S.
p.
A.
 
H
ol
di
n
g 
de
 
Pa
rte
ci
pa
zio
n
i
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 7
: A
X
A
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
1
A
llia
nz
 A
kt
ie
ng
es
el
ls
ch
af
t
2
A
ss
ur
an
ce
s 
G
én
ér
al
es
 d
e 
Fr
an
ce
 S
.A
.
3
A
XA
 A
S
S
U
R
A
N
C
E
S
 V
IE
 M
U
TU
E
LL
E
S
4
A
XA
 K
on
ze
rn
 A
kt
ie
ng
es
el
ls
ch
af
t
5
A
XA
 S
.A
.
6
B
N
P
 P
ar
ib
as
 S
.A
.
7
C
.D
.C
. C
ai
ss
e 
de
s 
D
ép
ôt
s 
et
 C
on
si
gn
at
io
ns
8
FI
N
A
XA
 S
A
9
K
öl
ni
sc
he
 V
er
w
al
tu
ng
s-
A
G
10
Le
s 
A
te
lie
rs
 d
e 
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
du
 N
or
d 
de
 la
 F
ra
nc
e 
S
.A
.
11
M
ün
ch
en
er
 R
üc
kv
er
si
ch
er
un
gs
-G
es
el
ls
ch
af
t A
G
12
R
ep
ub
lik
 F
ra
nk
re
ic
h
13
V
in
ci
 B
.V
.
14
C
ré
di
t A
gr
ic
ol
e 
S
.A
.
15
R
ue
 la
 B
oé
tie
 S
A
S
16
C
ré
di
t A
gr
ic
ol
e 
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 S
N
C
17
A
XA
 A
ss
ur
an
ce
s 
IA
R
D
 M
ut
ue
lle
 S
.A
.
18
A
XA
 C
ou
rta
ge
 A
ss
ur
an
ce
 M
ut
ue
lle
19
E
U
R
A
ZE
O
 S
A
20
S
oc
ié
té
 C
iv
ile
 H
au
ss
m
an
n 
P
er
ci
er
71
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 8
: B
M
W
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
1
A
llia
nz
 A
G
2
A
llia
nz
 D
eu
ts
ch
la
nd
 A
G
3
A
llia
nz
 F
in
an
zb
et
ei
lig
un
gs
 G
m
bH
4
A
llia
nz
 L
eb
en
sv
er
si
ch
er
un
gs
-A
G
5
A
so
po
s 
V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
ng
sg
es
el
ls
ch
af
t
6
B
ay
er
is
ch
e 
M
ot
or
en
 W
er
ke
 A
G
7
D
R
E
S
D
N
E
R
 B
A
N
K
 A
G
8
Jo
ha
nn
a 
Q
ua
nd
t
9
Jo
ha
nn
a 
Q
ua
nd
t G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 fü
r A
ut
om
ob
ilw
er
te
10
M
ün
ch
en
er
 R
üc
kv
er
si
ch
er
un
gs
-G
es
el
ls
ch
af
t A
G
11
S
te
fa
n 
Q
ua
nd
t
12
S
te
fa
n 
Q
ua
nd
t G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 fü
r A
ut
om
ob
ilw
er
te
13
S
us
an
ne
 K
la
tte
n
14
S
us
an
ne
 K
la
tte
n 
G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
 fü
r A
ut
om
ob
ilw
er
te
72
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 9
: C
om
m
er
zb
an
k
? ?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ???
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
?
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
????
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
? 73





	


1
Al
lia
n
z 
AG
44
H
am
bu
rg
-
M
an
n
he
im
er
 
Sa
ch
ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
-
AG
87
Fi
n
ad
in
 
-
 
S.
p.
A.
 
Fi
n
an
zia
ria
 
di
 
In
ve
st
im
en
ti
2
Al
lia
n
z 
D
eu
ts
ch
la
n
d 
AG
45
H
am
bu
rg
-
M
an
n
he
im
er
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
-
AG
88
Co
m
pa
gn
ia
 
Fi
du
ci
ar
ia
 
N
az
io
n
al
e 
S.
p.
A.
3
Al
lia
n
z 
Fi
n
an
zb
et
ei
lig
u
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
46
In
a 
Vi
ta
 
S.
p.
A.
89
Ba
n
ca
 
de
l G
ot
ta
rd
o 
S.
A.
4
Al
lia
n
z 
Le
be
n
sv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
gs
-
AG
47
Ita
lc
em
en
ti 
Fa
bb
ric
he
 
R
iu
n
ite
 
Ce
m
en
to
 
S.
p.
A.
90
Si
n
er
gia
 
Te
rz
a 
S.
p.
A.
5
Al
lia
n
z 
Su
ba
lp
in
a 
So
ci
et
à 
di
 
as
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i e
 
ria
ss
ic
u
ra
zio
n
i
48
Ita
lm
ob
ilia
re
 
S.
p.
A.
91
Ca
n
oe
 
Se
cu
rit
ie
s 
S.
A.
6
As
op
os
 
Ve
rm
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
49
KA
R
ST
AD
T 
QU
EL
LE
 
AG
92
H
ike
 
Se
cu
rit
ie
s 
S.
A.
7
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i G
en
er
al
i S
.
p.
A.
50
KA
R
ST
AD
T 
QU
EL
LE
 
Ku
n
de
n
-
Se
rv
ic
e 
G
m
bH
93
Li
m
bo
 
In
ve
st
 
S.
A.
8
AV
IV
A 
Pl
c.
51
KA
R
ST
AD
T 
QU
EL
LE
 
Se
rv
ic
e 
G
m
bH
94
Im
m
ob
ilia
re
 
Co
st
ru
zio
n
i I
M
.
CO
.
 
S.
p.
A.
9
B 
an
d 
B 
In
ve
st
is
se
m
en
t S
.
C.
 
Im
m
ob
iliè
re
52
Ka
rs
ta
dt
Qu
el
le
 
Le
be
n
sv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
g 
AG
95
SA
IF
IN
 
-
 
SA
I F
in
an
zia
ria
 
S.
p.
A.
10
Ba
n
ca
 
di
 
R
om
a 
S.
p.
A.
53
Le
o 
H
er
l
96
Sc
hw
ei
ze
ris
ch
e 
LV
-
 
u
n
d 
R
en
te
n
an
st
al
t
11
Ba
n
ca
 
d'I
ta
lia
 
S.
p.
A.
54
M
ad
el
ei
n
e 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z
97
G
iu
lia
 
M
ar
ia
 
Li
gr
es
ti
12
Ba
n
ca
 
M
ed
io
si
m
 
Ba
n
ca
 
de
lla
 
R
et
e 
S.
p.
A.
55
M
ad
el
ei
n
e 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z 
Ve
rm
ög
en
sv
er
w
.
 
Be
te
il. 
G
m
bH
98
Jo
n
el
la
 
Li
gr
es
ti
13
Ba
n
co
 
di
 
Si
ci
lia
 
S.
p.
A.
56
M
ad
el
ei
n
e 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z 
Ve
rm
ög
en
sv
er
w
.
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
99
G
io
ac
ch
in
o 
Pa
ol
o 
Li
gr
es
ti
14
Ba
rc
la
ys
 
PL
C
57
M
ar
tin
 
D
ed
i
10
0
F.
 
M
an
do
ri
15
Ba
ye
ris
ch
e 
H
yp
o-
 
u
n
d 
Ve
re
in
sb
an
k 
AG
58
M
ar
tin
 
D
ed
i V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
10
1
M
.
 
Ar
de
si
16
Ca
is
se
 
Ce
n
tra
le
 
de
s 
As
su
ra
n
ce
s 
M
u
tu
el
le
s 
A.
 
S.
 
M
.
59
M
ar
tin
 
D
ed
i V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
10
2
Fa
m
ilie
 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z
17
Ca
pi
ta
l R
es
ea
rc
h 
& 
M
an
ag
em
en
t C
om
pa
n
y
60
M
ED
IO
BA
N
CA
 
Ba
n
ca
 
di
 
Cr
ed
ito
 
Fi
n
an
zia
rio
 
S.
p.
A.
10
3
Pu
tn
am
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
.
 
LL
C
18
Ca
pi
ta
lia
 
S.
p.
A.
61
M
er
ril
l L
yn
ch
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
M
an
ag
er
s 
G
ro
u
p 
Lt
d.
10
4
So
c.
 
R
ea
le
 
M
u
tu
a 
di
 
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i
19
Ca
rim
on
te
 
H
ol
di
n
g 
S.
p.
A.
62
M
ün
ch
en
er
 
R
üc
kv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
gs
-
G
es
el
ls
ch
af
t A
G
10
5
C.
 
G
es
tio
n
i
20
CO
M
M
ER
ZB
AN
K 
AG
63
N
ov
ar
a 
Vi
ta
 
S.
p.
A.
10
6
A.
 
Sp
ag
gia
ri
21
Co
m
pa
gn
ia
 
di
 
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
e 
di
 
M
ila
n
o 
S.
p.
A.
64
Po
 
Vi
ta
 
Co
m
pa
gn
ia
 
di
 
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i S
.
p.
A.
10
7
Cr
éd
it 
In
du
st
rie
l d
'A
ls
ac
e 
et
 
de
 
Lo
rr
ai
n
e 
S.
A.
22
Co
m
pa
ss
 
S.
p.
A.
65
R
AS
 
R
iu
n
io
n
e 
Ad
ria
tic
a 
di
 
Si
cu
rtà
 
S.
p.
A.
10
8
Cr
éd
it 
In
du
st
rie
l e
t C
om
m
er
ci
al
 
(C
IC
)
23
Co
n
so
rti
u
m
 
S.
r.
l.
66
R
B 
Vi
ta
 
S.
p.
A.
10
9
Le
ga
l &
 
G
en
er
al
 
G
ro
u
p 
PL
C
24
D
.
A.
S.
 
D
eu
ts
ch
er
 
Au
to
m
ob
il S
ch
u
tz
 
Al
lge
m
ei
n
e 
R
V-
AG
67
R
ep
u
bl
ik 
Fr
an
kr
ei
ch
11
0
Fi
de
lity
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
Lt
d.
25
D
.
A.
S.
 
D
eu
ts
ch
er
 
Au
to
m
ob
il S
ch
u
tz
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
-
AG
68
Sa
de
 
Fi
n
an
zia
ria
 
S.
p.
A.
11
1
ER
G
O
 
Ac
ht
e 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t m
bH
26
D
KV
 
D
eu
ts
ch
e 
Kr
an
ke
n
ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
g 
AG
69
SI
AT
 
-
 
So
ci
et
à 
Ita
lia
n
a 
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i e
 
R
ia
ss
ic
u
ra
zio
n
i -
 
p.
A.
11
2
M
R
 
ER
G
O
 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
ge
n
 
G
m
bH
27
D
R
ES
D
N
ER
 
BA
N
K 
AG
70
So
ci
et
à 
pe
r 
Am
m
in
is
tra
zio
n
i F
id
u
ci
ar
ie
 
SP
AF
ID
 
S.
p.
A.
11
3
Ka
rs
ta
dt
Qu
el
le
 
Fi
n
an
z 
Se
rv
ic
e 
G
m
bH
28
EF
FE
 
Fi
n
an
zia
ria
 
S.
p.
A.
71
So
ci
et
à 
pe
r 
la
 
Bo
n
ific
a 
de
i T
er
re
n
i F
.
 
e 
pe
r 
le
 
I. 
A.
 
-
 
S.
p.
A.
29
ER
G
O
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
gr
u
pp
e 
AG
72
So
ci
ét
é 
de
r 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n
 
Fi
n
an
ci
èr
e 
Ita
lm
ob
ilia
re
 
S.
A.
30
Eu
ro
pä
is
ch
e 
R
ei
se
ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
g 
AG
73
Th
e 
Ca
pi
ta
l G
ro
u
p 
Co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
In
c.
31
Fi
de
lity
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Li
m
ite
d
74
Th
e 
La
w
re
n
ce
 
R
e 
Ire
la
n
d 
Lt
d.
32
Fi
de
lity
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
75
Tr
ad
in
gla
b 
Ba
n
ca
 
S.
p.
A.
33
Fi
de
lity
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Li
m
ite
d
76
Un
ic
re
di
t B
an
ca
 
d'I
m
pr
es
a 
S.
p.
A.
34
Fi
n
an
ci
èr
e 
du
 
Pe
rg
u
et
 
S.
A.
S.
77
Un
ic
re
di
t B
an
ca
 
M
ob
ilia
re
 
S.
p.
A.
35
Fi
n
ec
oG
ro
u
p 
S.
p.
A.
78
Un
ic
re
di
t B
an
ca
 
S.
p.
A.
36
FI
N
SA
I I
N
TE
R
N
AT
IO
N
AL
 
S.
A.
79
Un
ic
re
di
t P
riv
at
e 
Ba
n
kin
g 
S.
p.
A.
37
Fo
n
da
zio
n
e 
Ca
ss
a 
di
 
R
is
pa
rm
io
 
di
 
To
rin
o
80
Un
iC
re
di
to
 
Ita
lia
n
o 
S.
p.
A.
38
Fo
n
da
zio
n
e 
Ca
ss
a 
di
 
R
is
pa
rm
io
 
Ve
ro
n
a.
 
Vi
ce
n
za
.
 
B.
 
e 
A.
81
VI
CT
O
R
IA
 
Le
be
n
sv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
g 
AG
39
Fo
n
da
zio
n
e 
Ca
ss
am
ar
ca
 
-
Ca
ss
a 
di
 
R
is
pa
rm
io
 
de
lla
 
M
.
 
T.
82
VI
CT
O
R
IA
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
g 
AG
40
Fo
n
di
ar
ia
 
-
 
SA
I S
.
p.
A.
83
R
om
a 
Vi
ta
 
S.
p.
A.
41
G
AN
 
S.
A.
84
To
ro
 
As
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i S
.
p.
A.
42
G
en
er
al
i V
ita
 
S.
p.
A.
85
D
E 
AG
O
ST
IN
I S
.
p.
A.
43
G
ris
fo
n
ta
 
AG
86
Pr
em
af
in
 
Fi
n
an
zia
ria
 
-
 
S.
p.
A.
 
H
ol
di
n
g 
de
 
Pa
rte
ci
pa
zio
n
i
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 10
: D
ai
m
le
rC
hr
ys
le
r
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
1
D
ai
m
le
rC
hr
ys
le
r A
G
2
D
B
 V
al
ue
 G
m
bH
3
D
eu
ts
ch
e 
B
an
k 
A
G
4
D
ub
ai
 H
ol
di
ng
 L
td
.
5
D
ub
ai
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ap
ita
l L
td
.
6
E
m
ira
t K
uw
ai
t
7
M
oh
am
m
ed
 b
in
 R
as
hi
d 
A
L 
M
ak
to
um
75
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 11
: E
rg
o
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
76



1
Al
lia
n
z 
AG
26
KA
R
ST
AD
T 
QU
EL
LE
 
AG
2
Al
lia
n
z 
D
eu
ts
ch
la
n
d 
AG
27
KA
R
ST
AD
T 
QU
EL
LE
 
Ku
n
de
n
-
Se
rv
ic
e 
G
m
bH
3
Al
lia
n
z 
Fi
n
an
zb
et
ei
lig
u
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
28
KA
R
ST
AD
T 
QU
EL
LE
 
Se
rv
ic
e 
G
m
bH
4
Al
lia
n
z 
Le
be
n
sv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
gs
-
AG
29
Ka
rs
ta
dt
Qu
el
le
 
Le
be
n
sv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
g 
AG
5
Al
lia
n
z 
Su
ba
lp
in
a 
So
ci
et
à 
di
 
as
si
cu
ra
zio
n
i e
 
ria
ss
ic
u
ra
zio
n
i
30
Le
o 
H
er
l
6
As
op
os
 
Ve
rm
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t
31
M
ad
el
ei
n
e 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z
7
AV
IV
A 
Pl
c.
32
M
ad
el
ei
n
e 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z 
Ve
rm
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
8
Ba
rc
la
ys
 
PL
C
33
M
ad
el
ei
n
e 
Sc
hi
ck
ed
an
z 
Ve
rm
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
9
Ba
ye
ris
ch
e 
H
yp
o-
 
u
n
d 
Ve
re
in
sb
an
k 
AG
34
M
ar
tin
 
D
ed
i
10
Ca
pi
ta
l R
es
ea
rc
h 
& 
M
an
ag
em
en
t C
om
pa
n
y
35
M
ar
tin
 
D
ed
i V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
11
Ca
rim
on
te
 
H
ol
di
n
g 
S.
p.
A.
36
M
ar
tin
 
D
ed
i V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
al
tu
n
gs
 
G
m
bH
 
& 
Co
.
 
KG
12
D
.
A.
S.
 
D
eu
ts
ch
er
 
Au
to
m
ob
il S
ch
u
tz
 
Al
lge
m
ei
n
e 
R
ec
ht
ss
ch
u
tz
-
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
-
AG
37
M
ün
ch
en
er
 
R
üc
kv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
gs
-
G
es
el
ls
ch
af
t A
G
 
in
 
M
ün
ch
en
13
D
.
A.
S.
 
D
eu
ts
ch
er
 
Au
to
m
ob
il S
ch
u
tz
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
-
AG
38
R
AS
 
R
iu
n
io
n
e 
Ad
ria
tic
a 
di
 
Si
cu
rtà
 
S.
p.
A.
14
D
KV
 
D
eu
ts
ch
e 
Kr
an
ke
n
ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
g 
AG
39
R
B 
Vi
ta
 
S.
p.
A.
15
D
R
ES
D
N
ER
 
BA
N
K 
AG
40
Th
e 
Ca
pi
ta
l G
ro
u
p 
Co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
In
c.
16
ER
G
O
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
gr
u
pp
e 
AG
41
Un
iC
re
di
to
 
Ita
lia
n
o 
S.
p.
A.
17
Eu
ro
pä
is
ch
e 
R
ei
se
ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
g 
AG
42
VI
CT
O
R
IA
 
Le
be
n
sv
er
si
ch
er
u
n
g 
AG
18
Fi
de
lity
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
43
VI
CT
O
R
IA
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
g 
AG
19
Fi
de
lity
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Li
m
ite
d
44
Cr
éd
it 
In
du
st
rie
l d
'A
ls
ac
e 
et
 
de
 
Lo
rr
ai
n
e 
S.
A.
20
Fo
n
da
zio
n
e 
Ca
ss
a 
di
 
R
is
pa
rm
io
 
di
 
To
rin
o
45
Cr
éd
it 
In
du
st
rie
l e
t C
om
m
er
ci
al
 
(C
IC
)
21
Fo
n
da
zio
n
e 
Ca
ss
a 
di
 
R
is
pa
rm
io
 
Ve
ro
n
a,
 
Vi
ce
n
za
,
 
Be
llu
n
o 
e 
An
co
n
a
46
Le
ga
l &
 
G
en
er
al
 
G
ro
u
p 
PL
C
22
Fo
n
da
zio
n
e 
Ca
ss
am
ar
ca
 
-
Ca
ss
a 
di
 
R
is
pa
rm
io
 
de
lla
 
M
ar
ca
 
Tr
ivi
gn
ia
n
a
47
Fi
de
lity
 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
Lt
d.
23
G
ris
fo
n
ta
 
AG
48
ER
G
O
 
Ac
ht
e 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t m
bH
24
H
am
bu
rg
-
M
an
n
he
im
er
 
Sa
ch
ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
-
AG
49
M
R
 
ER
G
O
 
Be
te
ilig
u
n
ge
n
 
G
m
bH
25
H
am
bu
rg
-
M
an
n
he
im
er
 
Ve
rs
ic
he
ru
n
gs
-
AG
50
Ka
rs
ta
dt
Qu
el
le
 
Fi
n
an
z 
Se
rv
ic
e 
G
m
bH
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 12
: M
et
ro
??
?
?
?
??
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
1
1.
 H
S
B
 B
et
ei
lig
un
gs
ve
rw
. G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
2
1.
 H
S
B
 V
er
w
al
tu
ng
 G
m
bH
3
B
ei
sh
ei
m
 H
ol
di
ng
 G
m
bH
4
B
V
G
 B
et
ei
lig
un
gs
- u
nd
 V
er
m
.v
er
w
.G
m
bH
5
D
r. 
M
ic
ha
el
 S
ch
m
id
t-R
ut
he
nb
ec
k
6
Fa
m
ili
e 
H
an
ie
l
7
Fr
an
z 
H
an
ie
l &
 C
ie
. G
m
bH
8
G
eb
r. 
S
ch
m
id
t G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
9
H
an
ie
l F
in
an
ce
 B
.V
.
10
H
an
ie
l F
in
an
ce
 D
eu
ts
ch
la
nd
 G
m
bH
11
M
E
TR
O
 A
G
12
M
et
ro
 V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
. G
m
bH
13
M
et
ro
 V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
. G
m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
14
O
.B
. B
et
rie
bs
 G
m
bH
15
O
.B
.V
. V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
. m
bH
16
O
.B
.V
. V
er
m
ög
en
sv
er
w
. m
bH
 &
 C
o.
 K
G
17
P
ro
f. 
D
r. 
O
tto
 B
ei
sh
ei
m
18
P
ro
f. 
O
tto
 B
ei
sh
ei
m
-S
tif
tu
ng
19
S
U
P
R
A
 H
ol
di
ng
 A
G
20
S
up
ra
 T
ru
st
21
S
up
ra
pa
rt 
A
G
78
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 13
: D
eu
ts
ch
e 
Po
st
1
B
un
de
sl
än
de
r
2
B
un
de
sr
ep
ub
lik
 D
eu
ts
ch
la
nd
3
D
eu
ts
ch
e 
P
os
t A
G
4
K
fW
 B
an
ke
ng
ru
pp
e
?
?
??
79
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 14
: D
eu
ts
ch
e 
Te
le
ko
m
1
B
la
ck
st
on
e 
G
ro
up
 L
.P
.
2
B
un
de
sl
än
de
r
3
B
un
de
sr
ep
ub
lik
 D
eu
ts
ch
la
nd
4
D
eu
ts
ch
e 
Te
le
ko
m
 A
G
5
K
fW
 B
an
ke
ng
ru
pp
e
?
?
?
?
? 80
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 15
: V
ol
ks
wa
ge
n
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
1
B
ra
nd
es
 In
ve
st
m
en
t P
ar
tn
er
s 
In
c.
2
D
r. 
Fe
rd
in
an
d 
P
ië
ch
3
D
r. 
H
an
s-
M
ic
he
l P
ië
ch
4
D
r. 
In
g.
 h
.c
. F
. P
or
sc
he
 A
kt
ie
ng
es
el
ls
ch
af
t
5
D
r. 
W
ol
fg
an
g 
P
or
sc
he
6
Fa
m
ilie
 P
or
sc
he
7
Fa
m
ilie
 P
or
sc
he
 B
et
ei
lig
un
g 
G
m
bH
8
Fa
m
ilie
n 
P
or
sc
he
-D
ax
er
-P
ië
ch
 B
et
ei
lig
un
g 
G
m
bH
9
Fe
rd
in
an
d 
A
le
xa
nd
er
 P
or
sc
he
10
Fe
rd
in
an
d 
P
ië
ch
 G
m
bH
11
G
er
ha
rd
 P
or
sc
he
12
H
an
no
ve
rs
ch
e 
B
et
ei
lig
un
gs
ge
se
lls
ch
af
t m
bH
13
H
an
s-
M
ic
he
l P
ië
ch
 G
m
bH
14
H
an
s-
P
et
er
 P
or
sc
he
15
La
nd
 N
ie
de
rs
ac
hs
en
16
Lo
ui
se
 D
ax
er
-P
ië
ch
17
P
or
sc
he
 G
m
bH
18
Th
e 
C
ap
ita
l G
ro
up
 C
om
pa
ni
es
 In
c.
19
V
ol
ks
w
ag
en
 A
kt
ie
ng
es
el
ls
ch
af
t
??
82
Chapter 4
DAX-Executive Remuneration and
the Supervisory Board Network of
Executives
Main Author: Jochen Mo¨bert
Coauthors: Horst Entorf, Florian Gattung, Immanuel Pahlke
4.1 Introduction
What is an appropriate remuneration level of top managers? Is it justified that DAX-executives
earn several million euros each year? Currently, this corporate governance topic is often discussed
in Germany. On the one side high executive remuneration can be a result of surpassing company
profits. On the other side they might represent the absence of control and the misuse of power.
Often circumstantial evidence is available for both lines of arguments. Union representatives
hint at the already high remuneration packages and regard them as unjustified. Executives may
argue that the increases are a result of the positive economic development of their companies.
Additionally, they also point to the large remuneration packages in Anglo-Saxon countries.
In recent years, executive remuneration of all DAX-companies rose continuously. Such changes
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in the executive pay need the approval of the supervisory board members. Many members
of DAX-supervisory boards also hold executive positions of other DAX-companies. Hence,
executives decide on the remuneration level of other executives.
In this contribution, the linkages of companies due to these executives being also members of
supervisory boards at other companies are examined. In particular, the network resulting out
of all personal linkages is shown for all DAX-companies. Subsequently, hypotheses are tested
shedding some light on the relationship of executive remuneration and this social network of
executives. This paper is also innovative regarding the application of panel regressions controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity. However, before the data set is investigated a literature review is
provided in Chapter 4.2. Chapter 4.3 establishes hypotheses and shows results of a descriptive
analysis. Chapter 4.4 tests the hypotheses and contains the main findings. Chapter 4.5 concludes
and provides proposals regarding amendments.
4.2 Executive Remuneration Literature
The corporate governance literature covering executive remuneration is fairly large and
complex. This review is focussed on contributions examining the network of board members.
Incidentally, other important non-network articles dealing with executive pay and the structures
of management boards are quoted. The population for this review are articles examining the
situation in Germany or the U.S. There are fundamental differences between the U.S. and
the German corporate governance system. U.S. companies are governed by one entity such
that a management board is a one-tier board. In contrast, a two-tier management board is
enshrined in the German shareholder act. The executive board steers the company whereas
the supervisory board is obliged to approve or veto executive proposals on important company
decisions. Although the U.S. system is different, it is worthwhile to take into account the
U.S. literature due to its extent and quality. Moreover, many questions which are debated in
the U.S. literature might also be enlightening for the German system.
The articles being closest to ours are Larcker et al. (2005) and Guedj and Barnea (2007). Both
articles examine whether board networks impact on executive remuneration. Larcker et al. (2005)
study the impact of social networks on CEO remuneration by exploiting a huge cross-sectional
data base of 22,074 directors and 3,114 U.S. firms. They find that director links between insiders
and outsiders which are close to each other increase CEO remuneration. Guedj and Barnea
(2007) use two-way fixed effect estimators since a large U.S. panel data set is analysed including
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1500 S&P firms between 1996 and 2004. In accordance with Larcker et al., a significant impact
of network statistics - similar measures are applied here - on executive remuneration is found.
The results of these studies reveal that indirect network effects might be important to understand
economic outcomes. The study outset of most non-network studies makes it impossible to take
indirect connections into account. This difference might explain the small impact of personal
relationships on executive remuneration being found in non-network analyses. For instance,
Hallock (1997, 1999) investigates CEO interlocks of 773 large U.S. firms in 1992. A small positive
relationship between CEO interlocks and remuneration was found. The interlocks are only a
small subset of the complete director network such that only a small effect of these sub-networks
on executive remuneration is measured. Similarly, the analysis performed by Core, Holthausen
and Larcker (1999) also reveals no strong influence of CEO interlocks on executive remuneration.
Miczaika and Witt (2004) use Pearson correlation coefficients to test whether executive
remuneration is influenced by the number of personal interlocks among DAX and MDAX
companies in 2002. No positive relationship was found. Other German studies using executive
remuneration as dependent variable are Schmid (1997), Kaserer and Wagner (2004), among
others. However, they are not focussed on network relationships, interlocks or other personal
relationships. Hence, for the German corporate governance literature our work is a novel
contribution.
From a methodological point of view, the network research in Germany is less developed than
the U.S. literature on networks. However, for more than a decade a group of sociologists have
performed descriptive analyses on German company networks. Accordingly, there are several
interesting results regarding the development of supervisory board networks. Beyer (1996) shows
the high interconnectedness of large German companies in 1992. Around 80% of all companies
are directly or indirectly connected with each other. These figures are confirmed by Windolf
and Nollert (2001). Banks and insurers exhibit most links and take up central positions in the
German network. Heinze (2002) compares the network structure in 1989 with 2001 and finds
structurally fairly stable networks. Kengelbach and Roos (2006) continue the research of Heinze
(2002) and report an increasing number of network links from 2001 to 2004.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Non-Network Variables
Variable Year Mean Median Std. Err. Maximum Minimum
AER 2001 1.16 1.08 0.55 2.94 0.20
2003 1.47 1.29 0.72 3.73 0.62
2005 1.77 1.64 0.67 3.83 0.90
EBT 2001 0.87 0.64 1.48 4.41 -2.50
2003 0.97 0.72 1.61 5.54 -2.15
2005 2.53 1.70 2.17 7.88 -1.92
Average executive renumeration (AER) is measured in Mio. euro und earnings before
taxes (EBT) in billion euro. Executive renumeration in 2005 without chief executive
officer. Data source: Executive renumeration: DSW, 2003, 2005, 2006. EBT is taken
out of annual reports.
4.3 The Data Base
The analysis of executive remuneration and the network of supervisory board focuses on 30
companies being part of Germany’s blue chip index DAX in 2003.1 Companies such as ‘Hypo
Real Estate’ and ‘Deutsche Postbank’ are not studied since they were listed in the stock exchange
and the DAX after 2003. The panel data set investigated contains the network of executives
and members of supervisory boards for the years 2001, 2003 and 2005.
Company Data
The dependent variable is the average executive remuneration - subsequently the acronym AER
is used - of each DAX company in each year. AER of each company is the sum of total
remuneration pay divided by the number of executive members of each company. The data
source exploited is published by the German shareholder association2.
Table 4.1 shows a continuous increase in AER. Mean and median as well as maximum and
minimum rise by several hundred thousand euros whereas the standard deviation is nearly
constant. Across the observation period the AER rises around 50% from 1.2 Mio. euros to
1.8 Mio. euros. Infineon and Commerzbank show the highest AER growth in the data set.
In 2001, executives of Infineon had the lowest AER and quadrupled their remuneration pay
whereas executives of Commerzbank also increased their remuneration level significantly within
five years.
1Table A1 in the Appendix of this chapter contains the abbreviations of company names being used throughout
the chapter.
2The official German name is ‘Deutscher Schutzverband fu¨r Wertpapierbesitz e.V. (DSW)’.
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Table 4.2: Number of Persons in the Management and Supervisory Board
Year Persons in Management Board in Supervisory Board
2001 683 228 595
2003 712 219 641
2005 655 202 586
Data source: Annual reports of DAX-companies.
The German Corporate Governance Code3 and the German shareholder association recommend
performance-oriented remuneration systems. The goal of such a flexible remuneration system
is the avoidance of rising AER when company profits or share prices are constant or even
decline. Therefore, several profit variables such as earnings before interests and taxation (EBIT),
earnings before taxes (EBT), annual surplus as well as the change in market capitalization are
taken into account. The EBT variable exhibits the highest significance and robust results such
that statistical figures center upon it. Table 4.1 shows that the AER as well as the EBT rise
continuously. From 2001 to 2005 all descriptive statistical measures of EBT rise. A positive
influence of company profits on the AER is expectable due to variable remuneration packages
(cf. Winter 2002).
Finally, this subsection concludes by discussing the effect of a former CEO becoming chief of
the supervisory board (CSB) in the same company. Ho¨pner (2002) argues that this special
replacement process comes along with higher executive earnings for large German companies.
The binary variable CSBeCEO indicates companies where such a replacement process occurs
and is introduced to test this hypothesis.
Network Analysis of DAX Supervisory Boards
The descriptive analysis is continued by describing the network of supervisory board links. A
link is defined as a directed link if an executive of company A is a member of the supervisory
board of company B. Accordingly, non-directed links can be defined if a non-executive of a DAX
company is a member of two different DAX-supervisory boards (cf. Beyer and Ho¨pner 2004).
Our estimation results suggest that undirected links are not causal for the level of executive
remuneration. Table 4.2 shows the number of persons being on the management board and
supervisory board of all DAX companies.
For each company two directed variables can be distinguished. The variable OutDegree counts
the number of arcs emanating from a vertex and are directed towards a different company.
Accordingly, the variable InDegree counts the number of arcs being directed towards the
3The official German name is “Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex”.
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considered vertex but emanates from different companies. In particular, financial companies
have a large number of managers being supervisors in other companies. Ho¨pner (2002) reports a
strong influence of banks on industrial companies and interprets his finding as a weak monitoring
via outsiders whereas insiders are active monitors.4
The InDegree and OutDegree variables are highly correlated with the indegree
closeness-centrality and outdegree closeness-centrality. This fact rests on the small size of
the network and the high network density of around 0.07.5 Indegree and outdegree variables
are only used as regressors in the panel analysis below because they are easier to interpret than
the centrality measures.
Figure 4.1: Network of DAX Executives 2005
Own Source: Short forms of company names are explained in Table 4.7 in the Appendix. The network
figure is drawn with Ucinet and Netdraw (cf. Borgatti et al. 2002).
4Cf. Ho¨pner (2004) reports moderate monitoring levels of outsiders and a strong monitoring of insiders.
5The correlation coefficient is 0.8482 and 0.8383. The OutDegree Closeness-Centrality of person i is defined
as Ci =
g−1∑g
j=1 d(i,j)
where g is the number of actors in the network d(i, j) is the number of links on the shortest
path between company i and company j (cf. Wasserman and Faust 1994).
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Table 4.3: Outdegree and Indegree in 2001 and 2005
Outdegree Indegree
Company 2001 2005 Company Company 2001 2005 Company
ALLI 12 10 ALLI MURE 8 5 INFI
DEBA 10 7 DEBA INFI 6 5 MAN
SIEM 8 6 EON MAN 5 4 COMM
HYPO 6 4 THYS VW 4 4 BAYE
EON 4 4 VW COMM 4 3 DELU
BASF 4 3 SIEM DEBO¨ 4 3 MURE
THYS 3 3 DELU SIEM 3 3 LIND
DAIM 3 2 SAP EON 3 3 BASF
VW 3 2 MURE LIND 3 3 DEBO¨
RWE 2 2 COMM ALLI 2 2 DEBA
Own Source: Short forms of company names are explained in Table 4.7 in the Appendix.
Outdegree is the number of links emanating from a company. Indegree is the number of
links being directed towards a company.
Figure 4.1 shows the directed network of interlocking DAX-directors. Network measures such
as line width increase with the number of directed links between two companies and the size
of the vertices depends on the number of outdegrees and indegrees. In 2005 adidas (ADID),
Altana (ALTA), Daimler (DAIM) and Fresenius (FRES) were not interwoven with other DAX
companies and are separated vertices in the network shown above.
Companies having a high closeness-centrality are often seen as powerful entities (cf. Windolf
and Nollert 2001 and others). In this analysis, the centrality statistic and degree measure are
quite similar such that companies having a high number of outdegrees could be interpreted
as powerful. Accordingly, a company is influential if many executives are supervisors of other
companies and have the possibility to exercise control. In contrast, companies having a high
number of indegrees have many DAX-executives on that supervisory boards and might be tightly
monitored. The top ten companies with the most outdegrees and indegrees are listed in Table
4.3. To emphasize the changes within the network, data from 2001 and 2005 is compared.
§100(2) No.3 AktG6 prohibits reciprocal network links of executives and supervisory board
members. However, transitive and cyclic network structures are feasible. They might be
substitutes for reciprocal links and could impact on executive remuneration. If cyclic network
structures exist as shown in 4.2b and supervisory board members might increase executive pay in
6AktG is the abbreviation of ‘Aktiengesetz’ - Germany’s Companies Act.
89
Figure 4.2: Network Triads - Transitive and Circular Structures
(a) (b)
Own Source: Three positions can be distinguished in transitive triads. Position ‘Out2’ has two
outdegrees. Position ‘Out1In1’ has one outdegree and one indegree. Position ‘In2’ has two indegrees.
In a circular triad each vertex has one outdegree and one indegree.
one company then the optionee might pass the favour on to a second executive and, eventually,
the second executive would pass the favour on to the initiator such that all executives benefit
from each other and increase their AER.
Also, transitive triplets as shown in Figure 4.2a might lead to rising executive remuneration. If
AER rises in a company holding position ‘Out2’ then, subsequently executives of this company
might favour higher executive pay in company ‘In2’ and ‘Out1In1’ and also ‘Out1In1’, then may
agree to increase AER in company ‘In2’, too.
Table 4.4 shows how often companies take one of the three positions within the transitive triplets
in 2001. The table points out that in particular financial companies such as HypoVereinsbank,
Allianz and Deutsche Bank are often involved in transitive structures.
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Table 4.4: Transitive Structures in 2001
Company Out2 Company Out1In1 Company In2
HYPO 8 ALLI 4 MURE 9
ALLI 5 DEBA 1 MAN 6
DEBA 5 DELU 1 INFI 3
SIEM 3 ADID 0 LIND 2
DAIM 1 ALTA 0 ALLI 1
EON 1 BASF 0 BMW 1
ADID 0 BAYE 0 DEBO¨ 1
ALTA 0 BMW 0 DELU 1
BASF 0 COMM 0 EON 1
BAYE 0 CONT 0 SIEM 1
Own Source: Short forms of companies are explained in Table 4.7 in
the Appendix. The three positions ‘Out2’, ‘Out1In1’ and ‘In2’ within
the transitive structures are shown in Figure 4.2.
4.4 Results
To investigate the factors impacting on executive remuneration, the dependent variable is
regressed on company and network variables discussed before. The available data allows
the application of panel methods. Accordingly, the regressions performed control for time
constant unobserved heterogeneity which might include variables such as corporate culture
or organisational structures. These unobserved variables may be highly correlated with
observed factors such that fixed effects estimators are applied to avoid inconsistent estimators.
Equation 4.1 describes the applied regression which contains company-specific variables and
time effects
AERit −AERi = α+ (Cit − Ci)β + (Nit −N i)γ + (Y Dt − Y D)δ + εit − εi (4.1)
where AERit is the average executive remuneration, α the constant, Cit a vector containing
company variables and Nit a vector of network variables of company i at point in time t
and Y Dt is an indicator variable for year t. The bars indicate averages such that AERi =
1
3
∑05
t=01AERit and all other means are defined accordingly. The within estimator eliminates
constant unobserved factors already mentioned. Hence, the influence of network variables on
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executive remuneration is separated from these variables such that the data generating process
might be revealed.
Table 4.5 shows heteroscedasticity-robust estimation results. The intercept measures AER being
unrelated to company profits and network variables. The coefficient of the intercept variable
is rather robust and amounts to approximately 1.1 Mio. euros. The year variables YD03 and
YD05 measure the corresponding mean across DAX-companies in 2003 and 2005. Accordingly,
the average executive pay being independent of company profits and network effects of all
DAX-executives rises by 0.3 Mio. euros and 0.5 Mio. euros in 2003 and 2005, relative to 2001.
Also, the coefficient of EBT is positive in accordance with our expectations. Ceteris paribus,
executive remuneration increases by 80.000 euros if company profits rise by 1 billion euros. In
contrast, the frequently debated variable CSBeCEO exhibits neither a significant nor a positive
coefficient. Therefore, these results do not corroborate the hypothesis that companies where the
former CEO is the current chief of the supervisory board suffer from a loss of control.
In specification (3) to (6), the influence of several network variables on executive pay is tested. In
specification (3), the variables OutDegree and InDegree, i.e. the number of outdegrees and the
number of indegrees of DAX companies are added as regressors. Even if a 10% significance
level is applied the variables are insignificant. The non-significance may be driven by the
small size of sample. The signs of both variables accord with findings in the literature. The
results may represent important factors influencing executive remuneration. In particular, the
variable OutDegree has a p-value of 13% and, therefore, is almost significant to the 10%-level.
Accordingly, the following interpretation may be appropriate. If an executive of company A
is also a member of the supervisory board of company B then the executive remuneration in
company A rises. In the opposite case, the AER in company A is lower if the number of
executives of other DAX companies rises in the supervisory board.
Specification (4) measures the effect of the difference between the variables OutDegree and
InDegree. The new variable DifDegree is significant to the 10% significance level and the
coefficient amounts to 0.049. This implies that if the difference between the number of executives
being sent to and the number of executives being hired from other DAX-companies is one then
AER increases by 49.000 euro. Correspondingly, the effect on AER multiples if the difference
between the OutDegree and InDegree variable is larger than one.
The panel regression identifies significant variables such as DifDegree but the causality driving
the effects is not immediately revealed. The remuneration of an executive is not affected if
a position at a supervisory board of another company is accepted. The transitive and cyclic
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Table 4.5: Results of Fixed Effects Estimation
Dependent variable: Average executive remuneration (AER) in Mio. euro
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 1.098 1.110 1.028 1.094 1.090 1.028
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
YD03 0.302 0.311 0.300 0.301 0.293 0.343
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
YD05 0.476 0.489 0.477 0.468 0.478 0.532
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EBT 0.076 0.077 0.082 0.081 0.075 0.077
(0.099) (0.099) (0.078) (0.070) (0.113) (0.074)
CSBeCEO -0.056
(0.603)
OutDegree 0.061
(0.130)
InDegree -0.031
(0.487)
DifDegree 0.049
(0.057)
Cycle 0.089
(0.326)
TransOut2 0.085
(0.014)
TransOut1In1 0.054
(0.526)
TransIn2 -0.010
(0.653)
#Obs 90 90 90 90 90 90
R2(overall) 0.282 0.294 0.394 0.400 0.283 0.357
R2(within) 0.491 0.493 0.520 0.518 0.497 0.543
R2(betw) 0.326 0.353 0.360 0.381 0.323 0.345
Legend: p-values in parentheses. Variables significant at the 10%-level are in bold letters.
YD0x=indicator variable being one for 200x, EBT=Earnings Before Taxation, CSBeCEO is an indicator
variable being one if the former CEO is the current chief of the supervisory board (CSB) of the
same company, OutDegree=number of executives of a considered company being a member of the
supervisory board in another company, InDegree=number of members at the supervisory board of
the considered company being executives at other DAX companies. DifDegree=OutDegree-InDegree,
TransOut2=counts the number of transitive triplets of a DAX company in Position Out2. TransOut1Ini
and TransIn2 are defined accordingly. #Obs=number of observations, R2=explained variance relative
to total variance.
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network triads can shed some light on to the data generation process as discussed in the precedent
chapter. The effect of these structures are investigated in specification (5) and (6). The variable
Cycle counts the number of circular network triplets of each company (cf. Figure 4.2b). Due to
specification (5) the number of cycles increases the AER, however, the coefficient of this variable
is insignificant. Moreover, only a small number of circular network triplets are observed in the
data set.
Specification (6) tests the influence of transitive network triads. The number of different network
positions of each company within transitive triplets is counted by the variables TransOut2,
TransOut1In1 and TransIn2. The variable TransOut2 implies that two executives7 of that
company are sent to two other companies within a triplet (cf. Figure 2a). The coefficient of
this variable is highly significant. Due to our results such a network position seems fairly
attractive. An additional transitive structure in the board network increases AER of the
emanating company by 85.000 euro. The increased power of executives rises the remuneration
significantly in comparison with companies exhibiting similarly observed as well as unobserved
characteristics.
The descriptive data analysis in Chapter 4.3 reveals the numerous network links of financial
companies. Therefore, the significant network variables of specification (4) and (6) are separated
into variables of financial and non-financial companies. This procedure allows to check whether
documented results are only spurious correlations due to the presence of financial companies.
Banks and insurers often pay high executive remuneration and - without any causality - may
also have a high number of seats on supervisory boards to push their business. Specifications
(7) and (8) in Table 4.6 show the results of the fixed-effects estimation with the new variables
where financial companies are separated from non-financial companies. The suffixes “Fin” and
“Non” are used to distinguish both groups.
In accordance with specification (8), AER of financial companies increases by 114.000 euro, if a
company holds position TransOut2 in a transitive triplet. However, also the AER of non-financial
companies is affected by network variables. AER of non-financial companies rises by 66.000 euro
if DifDegreeNon is one. This results suggest that the findings documented in Table 4.5 are not
spurious since even the executive remuneration of non-financial companies is related to network
effects.
7Alternatively, the same executive can be sent to two different companies.
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Table 4.6: Financial vs. Non-Financial Companies
Dependent variable: AER in Mio. euros
Variable (7) (8)
Constant 1.047 1.041
(0.000) (0.000)
YD03 0.362 0.352
(0.000) (0.000)
YD05 0.516 0.517
(0.000) (0.000)
EBT 0.090 0.086
(0.043) (0.045)
DifDegreeFin -0.028
(0.532)
DifDegreeNon 0.076 0.066
(0.057) (0.059)
TransOut2Fin 0.131 0.114
(0.000) (0.000)
TransOut2Non -0.056
(0.586)
#Obs 90 90
R2(overall) 0.400 0.412
R2(within) 0.578 0.578
R2(betw) 0.351 0.364
Legend: p-values in parentheses. Variables significant at the 10%-level are
in bold letters. AER abbreviates ‘average executive remuneration’. All
variables are defined according to Table 4.5 whereas the suffix ‘Fin’ denotes
financial companies and the suffix ‘Non’ denotes non-financial companies.
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4.5 Conclusion
The analysis performed shows that with respect to average executive remuneration the executive
network of DAX companies cannot be seen as a means of transferring control to executive
boards and supervisory boards. Especially, there is evidence that companies with lower average
executive remuneration have more executives of other DAX companies on their supervisory
board. In contrast, not the controlled company but the controlling unit increases average
executive remuneration. Executive remuneration rises significantly if an executive is also a
supervisory board member on other DAX boards. A reasonable explanation might be that
executives in a controlling position are well connected. Accordingly, they have excellent chances
at the executive job market and may be able to realise higher earnings in salary negotiations.
Alternative explanations could be a higher prestige as well as outstanding capabilities justifying
high remuneration packages.
The results document that executives have high incentives to take on additional jobs at
supervisory boards in different companies. Company profits higher than 1 billion euro increase
- almost independently of the chosen specification - average executive remuneration by the
same amount as an additional outdegree relationship or an additional transitive structure in the
board network. In the light of this result, it is a debatable point whether incentives structures
of executives are well specified. Put another way, the question arises whether executives are
not sorely tempted to maximize their own remuneration whereas interests of stakeholders and
shareholders are neglected. Network studies investigating the impact of supervisory board
networks on firm perfomance often find that more connected executives run less profitable firms.
The finding corroborates the business hypothesis stating that strongly connected directors are
not able to successfully run their own company as well as to efficiently monitor other companies.
The confirmation of this business hypothesis is documented for Dutch companies (cf. Non and
Franses 2007), for large French companies (cf. Kramarz and Thesmar 2006), for German DAX
companies (cf. Miczaika and Witt 2004, Prinz 2006) and for U.S. companies (cf. Core et al. 1999,
Fich and Shivdasani 2006).
In Germany, the public as well as the academic discussion on reforming current law regarding the
remuneration of executives could be refined in two key points. First, companies where a former
CEO becomes chief of the supervisory board have no larger average executive remuneration than
other companies. Accordingly, the interdiction of this process may be pointless. Second, the
maximal number of supervisory boardseats of each executive should be restricted. As shown,
strong financial incentives exist to take many positions on supervisory boards whereas neither
an advantage for the sending nor for the receiving company may arise.
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.7: Full Company Names and their Abbreviations
Number Name Short Form
1 adidas AG ADID
2 Allianz AG ALLI
3 Altana AG ALTA
4 BASF AG BASF
5 Bayer AG BAYE
6 BMW AG BMW
7 Commerzbank AG COMM
8 Continental AG CONT
9 DaimerChrysler AG DAIM
10 Deutsche Bank AG DEBA
11 Deutsche Bo¨rse AG DEBO¨
12 Deutsche Lufthansa AG DELU
13 Deutsche Post AG DEPO
14 Deutsche Telekom AG DTAG
15 E.ON AG EON
16 Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co KGaA FRES
17 Henkel KGaA HENK
18 HypoVereinsbank HYPO
19 Infineon Technologies AG INFI
20 Linde AG LIND
21 MAN AG MAN
22 METRO AG METR
23 M¨unchener R¨uck AG MU¨RU¨
24 RWE AG RWE
25 SAP AG SAP
26 Schering AG SCHE
27 Siemens AG SIEM
28 ThyssenKrupp AG THYS
29 TUI AG TUI
30 Volkswagen AG VW
Own Source.
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Chapter 5
The Coauthor Network of
the Deterrence Puzzle
Main Author: Jochen Mo¨bert
Coauthor: Thomas Rupp
5.1 Introduction
One of the most intriguing questions in criminology and the economics of crime is under
which circumstances deterrence variables are a practical instrument of policy to reduce criminal
activities. Becker’s application of the “expected utility theory” to the crime market takes into
account measures such as the severity of punishment or a higher probability of being arrested
(cf. Becker 1968). There are numerous empirical studies investigating the impact of these
variables on delinquency. It is widely known that results vary with respect to economic and
statistical significance. Such inconclusive results have existed for decades with the consequence
that this controversial research problem could be called ‘deterrence puzzle’.
The goal of this contribution is not to offer an innovative solution to this puzzle. Instead, the
coauthor network of most researchers who contributed to this line of research is depicted and
described. The network under study consists of vertices representing the authors and edges
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between these vertices representing research articles written by several authors (cf. Network
Figure 1 to 7). Subsequently, we investigate the impact of author characteristics on sign
and significance of deterrence variables. Therefore, the data set exploited and evaluation
methods applied on it open up new vistas for the understanding of the criminological research
market. This interdisciplinary market might also shed some light on incentives and behaviour
of researchers in other academic fields.
The main contribution of this article is the measurement and evaluation of non-content related
variables on research outcomes. A comparison of author-specific effects, market-specific effects
as well as network effects is performed. The author-specific analysis measures the impact of
previous studies on subsequent findings of researchers as well as the relationship between certain
deterrence variables of each author. Market-specific inspections reveal how strongly authors’
results are influenced by peer groups and network-specific variables contain information on
whether research results are affected by the coauthor network of researchers. This work is also
unique with respect to its historical dimension. The coauthor network encompasses researchers
from more than three decades. To the best of our knowledge and that of Goyal, van der Leij,
Moraga-Gonza´lez’s (2006),1 this coauthor analysis investigates the longest time span.
The large amount of data necessary to carry out the analysis is a spin-off from the research
project “Metaanalysis of Empirical Studies on Deterrence”2 , which surveyed relevant empirical
contributions to the deterrence research. The project goal is to assess the actual and current
situation of deterrence research. In a first step, scientific data base, such as ISI, Ingenta, Econlit,
SSRN, RePEc among others, were examined in detail for contributions to the deterrence research.
Other meta analyses and bibliographies of studies included in the data base were also used as
source of references. Research articles tackling issues such as Index I and II3 crimes have been
selected from several thousand articles. The project team also selected articles which investigate
tax evasion, environmental crimes, and violating requirements related to the deterrence research.
The top five journals among the many in which articles were found were Criminology, Journal
of Law and Economics, Law and Society Review, Applied Economics, and Accident Analysis
and Prevention.4 Finally, 491 studies, their results, methods and other variables are evaluated.
1Goyal et al. (2006) say that their study is the one which takes into account the longest period of time.
2This project is funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft - DFG).
3In the US often two crime indices are distinguished. The index I contains murder, assault, larceny, sexual
offences, among others. The list of index II crimes often contains less grave offences such as narcotics, vandalism,
fraud, among others.
4The publications contained in the meta data base are also taken from many other journals, e.g. Journal of
Criminal Justice, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, American Economic Review, American Sociological
Review, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Social Forces, Social Science Quarterly, Journal of Legal
Studies, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Review of Economics and Statistics, Social Problems,
Economic Inquiry, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, Journal of Studies on Alcohol, Southern Economic
Journal, International Review of Law and Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Crime and Delinquency,
Journal of Behavioral Economics, and Journal of Political Economy, among others.
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First analyses of this research project are documented in Do¨lling et al. (2006, 2007) and Rupp
(2006).
Before the data is investigated, relevant contributions to the coauthor network literature are
reviewed in Chapter 5.2. In Chapter 5.3 hypotheses investigated are introduced. In Chapter 5.4
the coauthor network is described and evaluated. The relationship between deterrence variables
is analysed in Chapter 5.5 and Chapter 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Literature on Coauthor Networks
Scientometric work attracts a great deal of attention. For instance, articles on journal rankings
or institutional rankings are among the most downloaded research articles (cf. Kalaitzidakis et
al. 1999, 2003, Neary et al. 2003, S¨ussmuthet al. 2006, among others). In recent years, due to the
increasing data availability research on coauthor networks seems to arouse similar interest. Such
contributions on coauthor networks and, occasionally, other scientometric studies are reviewed
here.
At the beginning of this century, several researchers started the investigation of coauthor
networks. Newman (2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2004) used network methods to compare the coauthor
network of different disciplines such as physics, biology, computer science, and mathematics.5
In all networks similar structures were found with respect to the power-law form of articles
per author - also called Lotka’s Law6, authors per collaborators, the existence of the giant
component, the small-world property, and others. But the networks differ with respect to
certain other measures. For example, the average distance in a coauthor network of high-energy
physicists is 4.0 while the same figure is 9.7 for computer scientists. This finding is probably
caused by the high number of authors per article in high-energy physics – some papers are
written by several hundred coauthors (cf. Newman 2001b) – which shrinks network distances.7
This observation poses the question what can we learn from the comparison of collaboration
networks of different disciplines. Of course, the existence of some general characteristics found
in many networks is interesting but this descriptive research ignores incentives and behaviour.
Hence, it seems difficult that general advice can be given as a result of this line of research.
5In Newman (2001a, 2001b, 2001c) the same data set is used to compare the collaboration network of physicists,
biologists, and computer scientists. In Newman (2004) coauthor networks in physics, biology, and mathematics
are investigated.
6See Lotka (1926). For a recent historical update of this finding read Bremholm (2004).
7Cronin (2001) termed this phenomenon often found in high energy physics as ‘hyper-authorship’.
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The high-energy physicists face a totally different working environment than other scientists.
An explanation for the findings is provided by Laband and Tollison (2000). They compared
the formal and informal relationship among biologists and economists and showed that research
articles in biology are written by more coauthors than articles by economists’. Biologists often
name each member of a research team. Economists have, in turn, a larger number of informal
intellectual collaboration than biologists. Hence, the research done by Newman and other
physicists might only be the first step towards a more social network analysis where customs
and goals of researcher are taken into account.
A network study similar to Newman’s work was performed by Baraba´si et al. (2001). This
research group take up a dynamic view which is often missed in the theoretical as well as empirical
social network literature. They investigate how the coauthor networks of mathematicians and
neuro-scientists developed through an eight year span. The main innovation of these authors
is the development of a descriptive theory explaining the data. Moreover, they use parameters
calculated from their data sets to perform a Monte-Carlo simulation. The simulation model
replicates functional forms of many network characteristics. However, some observed values
seem contradictory to the simulation results. For instance, the diameter is decreasing over
time although the theoretical models imply an increasing diameter. The authors convincingly
explained this artefact by the lack of a complete data set. In reality the development of the
coauthor network among mathematicians and neuro-scientists started before the eight year time
span investigated. The simulations performed confirm that the missing links among researchers
before the first observation period may be causal for the discrepancy of observed and simulated
data. Fortunately, we can hope that our work is unaffected by this problem since our data base
is almost complete.
Coauthor data can also be analysed as a bipartite network where the set of authors and articles
are two partitions and links are only formed between them. In bipartite networks the number of
links to a paper represents the number of coauthors and number of links to an author count the
number of articles written by each author. Bo¨rner et al. (2004) develop a model replicating the
dynamic evolvement of network statistics which are found in a 20-year data set of PNAS.8 PNAS
contains approximately 45,120 articles and 105,915 working papers. The authors are particular
interested in citation distributions and find that power laws are violated at the upper end of
the distribution due to aging effects. Therefore the success-breeds-success effect,9 which is often
causal for the existence of power laws, shrinks since older articles are cited less, even if they
are fairly important. New research generations probably take insights developed by antecedent
scholars for granted and therefore stop citing them.
8PNAS is the abbreviation for ‘Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of
America’.
9This effect is also called Matthew effect or rich-get-richer effect.
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Bo¨rner et al. (2004) focus on the development of citations and ignore the interaction of authors.
Therefore, many network characteristics are not simulated. An improvement of this situation is
performed by Goldstein, Morris, and Yen (2005), who investigate a sample containing 900 articles
and 1354 authors taken from the Science Citation Index. They reproduce some scientometric
variables by a theoretical model explaining the behavior of research groups instead of single
authors. They argue that the success-breeds-success process is observable within each research
group and also across research groups. The structure described and the functions used are
able to mimic certain network characteristics such as the distribution of Lotka’s Law and the
clustering coefficient.
Some characteristics of the coauthor networks described so far are also found in economics data
bases. Goyal et al. (2006) wrote the most influential economic research article on coauthor
networks and showed that the coauthor network of economists has been developed from many
small components in the 1970s to a small-world network. The existence of a small world is caused
by interconnected stars who have short geodesic distances to each other and many coauthors
who just have links to them. A very central feature of such interconnected star networks, which
are illustrated by local networks of well-known researchers such as Dixit, Tirole and others, is
the high importance of a few links relative to the set of all links of an author. The different
importance of links was also observed in coauthor networks of physicists. Newman (2001b)
together with Strogatz coined the term “funneling” which captures the observation that all
geodesic paths from one author to all others in a network component typically go through a very
small number of coauthors of each researcher. Intuitively, it seems reasonable that interconnected
stars and the funneling property are mutually dependent.10 The observations described suggest
that deleting an interconnected star-author affects the complete network architecture. The giant
component could shrink, the number of components could increase and the average distance
might be significantly higher.11 Goyal et al. (2006) explain the presence of interconnected
stars using a theoretical model assuming productivity differences of researchers and increasing
marginal costs to form links with respect to the number of coauthors. These considerations
are confirmed in the sequel paper by Fafchamps, van der Leij, and Goyal (2006). Economists
who exhibit differences with respect to the number and the quality of published articles are
more likely to collaborate. They also find evidence for the existence of an acquaintance network
encompassing the coauthor network of economists which is important for the formation of new
collaboration links.
Digression: An interdisciplinary View on Coauthor Networks
Some stylized facts also imply that the whole global research industry is a small world, just
10A counter example for a no-funneling network is a regular one where the significance of each link is equally
important and no author is central.
11This might explain the differences in average distance in different disciplines which are reported by Newman
(2001b) and are mentioned above.
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as each individual research discipline is. This statement is underpinned by the analysis of
the collaboration network by Paul Erdo¨s (1913-1996). He is one of the most important
mathematicians and published more scientific articles than most researchers before him and
it has been proved that he had more different coauthors than anyone else. As a matter of fact,
Erdo¨s had 509 coauthors during his life time. Goffman (1969) asked, “And what is your Erdo¨s
number?”, thereby, stimulating further research on Erdo¨s and his network. The Erdo¨s number
measures the geodesic distance between Erdo¨s and any other direct or indirect coauthor. The
Erdo¨s number is one for researchers who were coauthors of Erdo¨s, two for researchers who were
coauthors of coauthors of Erdo¨s whereas no direct link exists, and so on.12
A graph-theoretic analysis of the Erdo¨s collaboration network was done by Batagelj and
Mrvar (2000). The data base of the American Mathematical Society (MathSciNet)13 is the
basis for a more in-depth investigation. It contains mathematicians as well as researchers from
many math-related disciplines and reveals that about 268K of approximately 401K researchers
in the data base have a finite Erdo¨s number. The distribution of the finite Erdo¨s numbers is
shown in Figure 5.1.14 It shows that the majority of researchers are connected to Erdo¨s via
three to six lines in the global coauthor network. Moreover, many Nobel prize winners have
low Erdo¨s numbers. There are 50 physicists, 15 economists, 14 chemists, and also 5 physicians
who won the Nobel prize and have finite Erdo¨s numbers.15 The mean average Erdo¨s number
for Nobel-prize winning physicists, economists, and chemists is between four and five while
Nobel-prize winning physicians have a geodesic distance about seven. Hence, Erdo¨s numbers
of Nobel-prize winners are similar to Erdo¨s numbers of the whole math community.16 It is
reasonable to assume that Nobel-prize winners are well connected within their own discipline,
such that the Erdo¨s number of many non-mathematicians is finite and small. These findings
suggest that at least the math-related global research world is tightly interconnected.17
12If there is neither a direct nor an indirect link then the Erdo¨s number is set to infinite.
13http://www.ams.org/msnmain/cgd/index.html
14Data source: http://www.oakland.edu/enp/trivia.html
15Downloaded on 10 March 2006
16Also, we have finite Erdo¨s numbers: Rupp (7) and Moebert (7). The shortest path is Erdo¨s-Moon-Sobel-
Arrow-Nerlove-Ko¨nig-Entorf-Moebert+Rupp. Marc Nerlove (4) a coauthor of nobel-prize winner Kenneth J.
Arrow contributed Montmarquette, Nerlove, Forest (1985) to the deterrence literature. In the Network Figures
Nerlove has No. 473. Horst Entorf (6), a former doctoral student of Heinz Ko¨nig, our supervisor has No. 394.
17The data is gathered by the “Erdo¨s Number Project” at the University of Oakland - see
http://www.oakland.edu/enp/
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Figure 5.1: The Distribution of Erdo¨s Finite Numbers in MathSciNet
Own Source: The abscissa evaluates the Erdo¨s number, i.e. the distance of the shortest
path between Erdo¨s and a researcher is shown. The ordinate counts the number
of researchers. Notice, not all 509 directly linked coauthors are contained in the
MathSciNet data base.
5.3 Hypotheses
Glaeser (2006) discusses incentives of researchers and biases in research findings resulting out
of them. He challenges the naive assumption that economists are impartial analysts and argues
“But while economists assiduously apply incentive theory to the outside world, we use research
methods that rely on the assumption that social scientists are saintly automatons.” Dismissing
the assumption of objective researchers introduces discretionary power which might be misused
by researchers and could lead to ‘initiative biases’.
There is only a small number of theoretical work tackling the incentives of econometricians.
However, empirical evidence corroborating the existence of those biases is not available. The
deterrence research as well as the unique data set constructed might be well-suited to test
whether these biases exist. The deterrence puzzle is unsolved for decades and still today a full
understanding of contradictory research results is out of reach. Hence, the discretionary power
of researchers delving into the deterrence matter might be large such that the potential for
‘initiative biases’ could be high.
To derive testable hypotheses it is assumed that researchers are objective observers striving for
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discovering true casual relationships. Therefore, the main hypothesis is: “Research findings
are independent of any other influences.” This independence assumption is operationalized in
different ways. The structure of the available data set allows to test the presence of three different
types of hypotheses being denoted author-specific, market-specific as well as network-specific
type.
First, the author-specific type is discussed. Researchers might have incentives to confirm
the results of their previous findings. Successful research careers often depend on the
construction of reputation. Hence, trying to publish papers with contradictory results might be
counterproductive with respect to the promotion of career opportunities of researchers. Second,
researchers might also be inclined to favor findings being in accord with the prevailing opinion
among leading researchers. Otherwise, the probability to publish in peer-reviewed journals
might be reduced due to referees which emphasize adverse arguments and prefer contributions
confirming their own findings. Third, researchers might be influenced by their research network
they are embedded in. Especially, co-authors may influence each other. However, also indirectly
connected researchers might impact on research results of authors such that also network-specific
effects might bias research output.
Due to this deliberations the arguments are operationalized via the following five hypotheses.
Author-specific hypotheses assume that research results regarding different crime categories
are independent of each other (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, it is assumed that the research
results in earlier studies are not related to the same variables in later studies (Hypothesis 2).
Market-specific effects are tested via the following hypothesis. Research results are independent
of results of other researchers in the same point of time. This statement is tested for all
deterrence researchers as well as for specific disciplines (Hypothesis 3). Finally, the network
approach enables us to test that authors are not influenced by their network they are embedded
in. Neither research results of authors being part of the same network component (Hypothesis 4)
nor research results of indirectly connected researchers are related to the findings of the author
(Hypothesis 5). All hypotheses are summarized before the inductive analysis in Table 5.5.
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5.4 Descriptive Analysis of the Meta Data Base
Our database contains 623 authors and 491 research articles.18 All articles surveyed are empirical
studies and their results and characteristics are used to construct author-specific variables.
5.4.1 Network Characteristics
The Coauthor Network, its Components, and Important Coauthors
To capture the dynamics of the coauthor network we calculated descriptive network statistics
shown in Table 5.1 for 1976, 1986, 1996, and 2006. The data is accumulated such that younger
networks contain older ones. All four networks are depicted in Network Figure 1 to 4. The
2006-network contains all authors who contributed to the deterrence issue. It consists of 623
vertices, where each vertex represents an author and between these vertices 664 undirected
non-multiple research links are formed.19 Each link represents either a loop if a researcher has
written a single-authored article or an edge if two researchers are coauthors.20 A link between
two vertices is established if at least two coauthors wrote at least one single research article.21 In
the 2006-network the number of all single-authored articles (loops) amounted to 145. Therefore,
in recent decades a stronger tendency towards coauthored work is observable. The share of
single-authored paper to all links declined from 0.464 in the period until 1976 to 0.174 in 2006.22
Due to the accumulation of networks this indicates that single-authored contributions have
been unlikely in the last few years. Hollis (2001) shows that the increased tendency towards
collaboration among economists might be favourable with respect to the length and the quality
18Meanwhile, the meta data base of the project “Metaanalysis of Empirical Studies on Deterrence” (the
German title is “Metaanalyse empirischer Abschreckungsstudien - ein quantitativer methodenkritischer Vergleich
kriminologischer und o¨konomischer Untersuchungen zur negativen Generalpra¨vention”) increased to exactly 700
studies. In the majority of cases we collected data from English written research articles since English search
words have been used. However, the author set includes researchers from many different countries.
19Yoshikane et al. (2006), in a study on computer scientists, built a “directed graph where links are oriented
from coauthors to the first author of each article.” However, due to the alphabetical order in economic journals
the identification of the first author and second author cannot be distinguished.
20Of course, many researchers have written more than one article with the same coauthors. The multiple-link
2006-network consists of 195 loops and 641 edges. However, the analysis of the multiple network is not continued
here.
21Note that the number of links increase exponentially to the number of authors involved in writing an article.
For instance, four authors writing a joint research paper produce six edges and if eight researchers collaborate 28
edges are formed.
22A similar decline is reported for many other disciplines (cf. Clarke 1964, Heffner 1981, Gla¨nzel and Schubert
2004, among others). Beaver and Rosen (1978) developed a theory of scientific collaboration and used it for a
long-term historical analysis of research success of large European nations. They conclude that French researchers
where much more productive than English or German ones due to their collaboration networks, while English
and German scientists preferred stand-alone research.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Network Statistics
1976 1986 1996 2006
Vertices 68 205 392 623
Links 56 206 405 664
Edges 30 136 305 519
Loops 26 70 100 145
#A Giant Component 4 7 16 16
Density 10−2 3.16 1.46 0.86 0.57
Components 42 108 182 275
#5-Components 0 8 13 19
#9-Components 0 0 3 7
#13-Components 0 0 1 2
Note: Measures are based on non-multiple network formation. ‘Loops’ count the number of
single-authored papers and ‘Edges’ the number of links formed through coauthored research. ‘#A
Giant Component’ counts the number of authors who are in the largest network component. ‘Density’
measures the number of available edges relative to all possible edges. ‘Components’ count the
number of disconnected network components and ‘#x-Component’ counts the number of disconnected
components which contain at least x researchers.
of research articles, whereas it lowers the number of articles by each researcher if each article is
weighted with the number of authors. Sutter and Kocher (2004) confirm Hollis’ (2001) results
with respect to the quality of articles.
The number of authors and links grew steadily through the decades. Yet, the network density
decreases because the number of possible links grows even faster. Due to the low network
density, several network components exist and it seems reasonable to call it “a collection of
islands” (cf. Goyal et al. 2006 who coined this term). Hence, the deterrence network might have
similar characteristics than the global 1970-coauthor network of economists.23
Table 5.2 shows the most central players measured by the degree of each vertex24 for each of
the four sub-networks. The degree has increased among the top twenty authors from decade
to decade. Unsurprisingly, well-known researchers such as Ehrlich, Witte, Saltzman, and others
are among the most central players. For instance, there are eight articles by Ehrlich in our
data base and six of them are single-authored research articles.25 This shows that he prefers
stand-alone research and, consequently, is only losely connected to others. The other extreme
23A collection of islands was also observed by Gossart and O¨zman (2007), who study the coauthor network of
Turkish social scientists and arts scholars.
24The degree of a vertex is defined by the number edges emanating from it.
25In Table 5.2 only seven are mentioned in the 1996-network. Of course, Ehrlich and Zhiqiang (1999) was
written beyond 1996. In the 2006-network he is no longer among top central researchers.
108
is observable in the 2006-network. Mann, Vingilis, Smart, Stoduto, Beirness, Lamble, and Adlaf
are among the top twenty central authors in Table 5.2. These researchers have a large degree due
to multi-authored work where eight researchers (cf. also Network Figure 7) have contributed to
Mann et al. (2003). This reveals a shortcoming of the Network Figures because it is impossible
to distinguish whether a link is the result of research done by two or more than two researchers.
However, in the descriptive analysis the term ‘main authors’ is defined to avoid multi-counting.
Instead of focussing on the top authors, the full distribution of the 2006-nework is shown in
Figure 5.2(a). Most researchers have only a small number of coauthors, whereas very few of
those reported in Table 5.2 have a large number. In Subfigure (b) only ‘main authors’ are defined
as the one or two researchers of each article who bore the burden of work. The definition of
this term is only important for multi-authored articles where more than two researchers are
involved.26 Obviously, the distribution in Subfigure (b) is less volatile and the highest number
of main coauthors is much smaller than the number of all coauthors in Subfigure (a). For the
interpretation of these figures it is important to note that axes are in logarithmic scale such that
the nearly straight lines indicate a power law distribution. These heavy-tail distributions are
recurrently observed in the network science.27
Another interesting feature of a network study is the investigation of network components instead
of the whole market or the individual author-specific characteristics. Components are chosen
which contain well-known researchers and are also interesting from a topological point of view.
For example, Levitt’s component is very centralized, the Mann-component has a high cluster
coefficient, and the Bailey-component is the largest network component and consists of many
directly and indirectly connected coauthors. All three networks are depicted in Network Figure 5
to 7.
Levitt has written twelve articles tackling the deterrence issue. Seven articles are single-authored,
four articles are written by him and a further researcher, and, of course, three collaborators wrote
Katz, Levitt, Shustorovich (2003). Given our data set, all coauthors of Levitt, except Lochner,
who also wrote three single-authored articles, have not contributed to the literature without
Levitt himself. Hence, the link between Katz and Shustorovich is the only existing direct link
between his coauthors. Due to this structure, we can conclude that Levitt is the (center of a)
star of his network component.
The sociologist Bailey has written four coauthored and seven single-authored articles. In his
component - which is the largest component in each decade (cf. Table 5.1) - he has written
26For a detailed definition of the term ‘main authors’ see the discussion below.
27Cf. Barabasi and Albert (1999), among many others.
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more articles than any other researcher. Hence, he has a centrality similar to Levitt in Network
Figure 5. However, in the Bailey-component there are other researchers such as Burkett, Gray,
and Ward, who also extensively contributed to the deterrence literature. Bailey and the other
sociologists mentioned are cut-vertices such that the removal of one of them would split the
Bailey-component into two separated components. Therefore, these researchers take up central
positions. Another difference between Levitt’s and Bailey’s network is the publication period.
All articles by Levitt were published in the last decade. However, the last research contributions
of authors contained in the Bailey-component were produced by Jensen and Metsger (1994)
and Bailey (1998). Therefore, both network components mainly describe different periods. This
observation is also underpinned by the fact that Levitt was two years old when the first paper
of the Bailey-component was published by Gray and Martin (1969).
The last component explored is that of the sociologist Mann. It is special because most
contributions are written by several researchers (as mentioned up to eight authors are involved).
Mann was involved in the production of all articles in his component. However, he might be not
as central as Levitt or Bailey because such multi-authored articles may express the high degree
of communication among researchers. Hence, other important researchers in this component are
Vingilis who coauthored four articles and Smart who contributed to three articles. The high
interconnectedness in the Mann-component is also underpinned by its high cluster coefficient
of 0.8.
A reason for the different network components of Levitt and Bailey on the one hand and Mann
on the other might be differences in productivity differences (cf. Goyal et al. 2006). The observed
star formations could be caused by high productivity differences between the central and the
peripheral co-workers. Probably, the difference between Mann and his collaborators is less
distinct than productivity differences in Levitt’s component. Another possible explanation is
the existence of different research customs as shown by Laband and Tollison (2000). Possibly,
different customs of disciplines contributing to the deterrence research also exist.
5.4.2 Meta Analysis on Empirical Deterrence Studies
Before the data set is described, some data problems and their solutions are addressed. Most
non-network variables in our data base capture features of the studies investigated. These
variables describe the deterrence variables such as probability of detection and severity of
punishment, whether the data of each study is obtained through experiments, the number
of pages, and many others. Since our goal is to investigate the findings and the behaviour
of researchers as well as the interdependencies among researchers, we have to condense the
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variable-related information to author-related variables.28 As shown in Network Figure 7 some
research articles are written by several coauthors. Hence, switching from the variable-level to the
author-level can lead to spurious statistical results. If each author is weighted equally, then all
variables are allocated to each author and the findings of coauthored or multi-authored articles
therefore lead to double or multi-counting.
To avoid multi-counting we define ‘main authors’. In many disciplines such as sociology, the
authors who are mentioned first have contributed a larger part than the subsequently named
coauthors. Accordingly, we define the first two authors of each article as the ‘main authors’
and set their weight to one. If more than two coauthors wrote an article the later mentioned
coauthors were allocated zero weights. In economic journals researchers are mostly mentioned in
alphabetical order29 such that the main authors are not identified by this definition.30 However
and fortunately, most economic articles are written by one or two researchers and, therefore, the
procedure seems reasonable.31
Another important aspect in managing our data set is the time dimension. The inclusion of the
publication year in the data base opens up additional estimation strategies. In the inductive
part in Chapter 5.5, we will test how the results of previous studies impact upon the findings
in later studies of each author. Similarly, we can estimate how the findings of an author in
a given year are influenced by his reference group. To tackle these issues, the time dimension
is exploited. However, to keep the amount of data tractable and to increase the number of
non-missing observations, the data is summarized to twelve ‘observation periods’ which are
named 1973, 1976, 1979,..., 2000, 2003, and 2006. The observation 1973 summarizes all studies
which are written in 1973 or before and all other observation periods summarize the current and
two precedent years, e.g. the observation 2000 includes for each author all studies published in
1998, 1999, and 2000.32
28Notice variable-related, study-related, and author-related variables are distinguished.
29That alphabetical ordering influences academic success is shown by Einav and Yariv (2006). Laband and
Tollison (2006) find that alphabetised coauthorship is cited more often than non-alphabetised.
30We have chosen not to allocate each study variable to the first-mentioned author only. If an economic article
has two authors, it is not easily possible to identify the more important one in the data base. Moreover, the
double-counting of variables seems not overly important and might produce only minor statistical imperfections.
31Newman (2001a,b,c) reports the same problem in his studies. Moreover, he mentioned that authors were not
always identifiable because some authors had the same names (homonym) and in different articles of the same
authors different initials were used (journal rules). The homonym problem decreases the number of authors,
whereas the journal-rule problem increases it. Due to both problems, the analysed network may differ from the
original coauthor network. In our data set both problems are solved. Moreover, the data preparation techniques
used to perform a network analysis automatically involves double-checking of the data and is helpful in improving
the quality of data sets.
32In the rest of this article we use the term ‘observation period’ to refer to these timeframes.
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Deterrence Variables
Existence of the Deterrence Puzzle
Before the data is described, the existence of the deterrence puzzle is documented. Table 5.3
shows the findings of all studies in our sample which try to explain the deterrence puzzle.
The variable-related estimates of the standard deterrence measures ‘probability of detection’
and ‘severity of punishment’ (subsequently, called probability-measures and severity-measure)
is available for three categories of crime ‘(Violent) Crimes against the person’, ‘Crime against
property’ (subsequently, called violence-category and property-category), and a third category
called ‘others’ which contains anything that cannot be allocated to one of the categories
mentioned. Offences such as murder, rape, and assault belongs to the violence category,
robbery33, burglary, and larceny belong to the property-category, and driving under the
influence, ecological crimes, and tax fraud, for example, are classed as ‘other Crimes’. Table 5.3
shows that for each of the two deterrence variables and each of the three categories five possible
values ranging from ‘Becker’s theory is (1) wholly applicable, (2) partly applicable, (3) neutral,
(4) more inapplicable, to (5) wholly inapplicable’ are defined. The interdisciplinary researchers
of this meta analysis selected several criteria such that the status of each article was classifiable
in the data base (for details cf. Rupp 2008).
Table 5.3 documents how often the rational choice theory is confirmed and rejected. For each of
the six variables #Obs indicates how often the corresponding variables have been tested in the
sample. Obviously, the probability-variable was tested more often than the severity-variable and
the probability-variable confirms the implications of the expected utility theory more often than
the severity-variable. However, the deterrence puzzle is present for each of the six variables.
The existence of the puzzle is also corroborated by considering the time dimension. For this
purpose, the following steps were conducted. First, and based on the information in Table 5.3,
a study-related variable was computed by averaging all six34 variable-related information of each
study. Second, all studies by each author within a given year are averaged. Third, findings are
summed up across all authors for each year. In Subfigure 5.3(a) the historical development
of this variable is shown and the number of confirmations and refutals of Becker’s theory is
indicated.
Economists’ interest in the empirical assessment of deterrence was mainly laid down by
Ehrlich’s (1973) work. Before his seminal contribution only a few articles were published
33Sometimes robbery also belongs to the property-category.
34Two rational choice variables, the probability of detection and severity of punishment, are available for three
crime categories.
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Table 5.2: Top20 Researchers with respect to Degree(Loops) after 4 Decades (upper half)
Figure 5.2: Number of Authors vs. Number of Coauthors (lower half)
1976 1986 1996 2006
Bailey Wil 4(0) Chiricos The 16(0) Patern. Ray 18(1) Mann Rob 22(0)
Ehrlich Isa 3(3) Waldo Gor 16(0) Chiricos The 16(0) Vingilis Eve 20(0)
Gray Lou 3(0) Patern. Ray 13(0) Waldo Gor 16(0) Patern. Ray 18(1)
Ross Lau 3(1) Saltzman Lin 12(0) Saltzman Lin 12(0) Chiricos The 16(0)
Campbell Don 3(1) Gray Lou 9(0) Grasmick Har 11(0) Waldo Gor 16(0)
Glass Gen 3(1) Bailey Wil 8(5) Gray Lou 10(0) Benson Bru 15(0)
Tittle Cha 3(2) Hakim Sim 7(1) Bailey Wil 10(6) Rasmussen Dav 15(0)
Martin Dav 3(0) Ehrlich Isa 6(6) Hakim Sim 9(1) Smart Reg 14(0)
Logan Cha 2(2) Erickson May 6(0) Ross Lau 8(2) Hakim Sim 13(1)
Chiricos The 2(0) Gibbs Jac 6(0) Cloninger Dal 8(6) Levitt Ste 13(7)
Waldo Gor 2(0) Stafford Mar 6(0) Alm Jam 8(0) Saltzman Lin 12(0)
Teevan Jam 2(2) Menke Ben 6(0) Ehrlich Isa 7(6) Stoduto Gin 12(0)
Swimmer Eug 2(2) Ward Dav 6(0) Ward Dav 7(0) Beirness Dou 12(0)
Antunes Geo 2(0) Votey Har 5(3) Kaulitzki Rei 7(0) Lamble Rob 12(0)
Hunt A. 2(0) Jensen Gar 5(1) Schumann Kar 7(0) Grasmick Har 11(0)
Greenwood Mic 2(0) Grasmick Har 5(0) Stafford Mar 6(0) Bailey Wil 11(7)
Wadycki Wal 2(0) Kirchner Rob 5(0) Menke Ben 6(0) Sloan Fra 11(0)
Chambers Lar 2(0) Schnelle Joh 5(0) Witte Ann 6(1) Adlaf Edw 11(0)
Roberts Rob 2(0) Domash Mic 5(0) Mann Rob 6(0) Gray Lou 10(0)
Voelker Cam 2(0) Larson Lyn 5(0) Bursik Rob 6(0) Cloninger Dal 9(6)
Own Source: The degree-centrality counts the number of loops and edges of each researcher in Network Figure 1
to 4. Loops are single-authored articles. ‘Paternoster’ is abbreviated to save space. In the case of ‘Hunt A.’, only
the first letter of the first name is available. Italic written researchers are mentioned in the text.
(a) All Edges of the 2006-Network (b) Main Edges of the 2006-Network
Sociologists Economists All Simulation
Own Source: Log-Log-Specification. The dashed line shows a power law function f(x) = x−γ . In Subfigure (a)
γ = 2.2 whereas in Subfigure (b) the exponent is γ = 2.6.
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Table 5.3: Two Deterrence Variables vs. Three Crime Categories
V A R I A B L E
Confirmation of Probability of Severity of Sum of
deterrence
hypothesis
in % being arrested Punishment #Obs
DETp DETs
(Violent) Crimes (1) 26.7 20.7 128
C against the (2) 24.8 22.8 126
Person (3) 18.2 24.9 108
A DET V (4) 18.5 20.2 100
(5) 11.8 11.4 61
T #Obs 330 193 523
Crimes against (1) 35.5 16.9 166
E the Property (2) 26.1 17.5 131
DET P (3) 10.3 23.0 81
G (4) 18.4 29.5 124
(5) 9.7 13.1 61
O #Obs 380 183 563
Other Crimes (1) 18.8 7.6 79
R (2) 31.8 32.3 185
(3) 16.6 20.5 106
Y (4) 21.3 22.1 125
(5) 11.5 17.5 82
#Obs 314 263 577
Sum of #Obs 1024 639 1663
Note: The scale means ‘Becker’s theory is (1) wholly applicable, (2) partly
applicable, (3) neutral, (4) more inapplicable, (5) wholly inapplicable’. The
researchers of the meta analysis selected several criteria such that the status of each
article was assignable in the data base. #Obs indicates the number of estimated
values of all evaluated studies of each author in our sample. Sum of #Obs adds up
the number of observations across variables, categories, or both. Overall our results
are based on an upper limit of 1663 estimates. Variable names DET V, DET P,
DETp, and DETs are used on in the analysis later.
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(cf. Figure 5.3b).35 Subsequently, the number of involved researchers mostly increased in time,
but was interfered by some erratic short-term fluctuations. In the recent past, at the turn
of the millennium a high number of authors who wrote research articles is observed. In 2004
and 2005 – in the last observation period – a reduced number of estimates is included. This
is a statistical artefact owing to the fact that the choice of sources and articles took place at
the project outset in 2004. Accordingly, the data base might be incomplete in the last years.
Regarding the existence of the deterrence puzzle, there is no year or time span in which the
theory is clearly confirmed or rejected. Therefore, we can argue that the deterrence puzzle is
continuously observable across the whole sample.
16 Deterrence Variables
Table 5.3 is the basis for the derivation of several deterrence variables which are used to test
the hypotheses constructed in Chapter 5.3. An important variable is DET mean indicating the
findings of each author with respect to Becker’s theory. First, to calculate this variable, the
variable-related information was averaged to study-related variable. Second, the study-related
variable of an author is summarized for each observation period and then averaged to an
author-related variable. The computation of DET 1own is similar. Instead of all articles, only
the first observation period in our sample of each author is considered to calculate the average
of all study-related variables.
The categorical variables DET V and DET P as well as deterrence variables DETs, and DETp
were calculated in the same way. Except in the first step, the probability and severity variable
of the violence-category were taken into account for the calculation of DET V whereas the
probability and severity variable of the property-category were used for DET P. These variables
allow us to test Hypothesis 1. The confirmation or refutal of Becker’s theory with respect to
one variable is not related to the other variable.
DETp and DETs are the averages of the probability and severity variables across all three crime
categories. These variables are used to calculate the variables DETp t1, DETp t2, DETs t1,
and DETs t2, where t1 and t2 abbreviate different observations periods. DETp t1 and DETs t1
were specified as the arithmetical mean of all but the last observation period for each author
and DETp t2 and DETs t2 is the value of the last available observation period of each author.
These variables allow us to test Hypotheses 2 that deterrence variables in previously performed
studies are not related to deterrence variables in articles published later.
DET mean is also used to compute scientific market variables. For each author the variable
DET meant is specified where study-related findings are not averaged across all studies but only
across studies within the same observation period. Subsequently, the market variable DET m1pti
of author i is the average of all DET meantj values of all other authors j 6= i of the same discipline
author i belongs to and finally, for each author the average across all observation periods t is
taken to get DET m1pi. DET m1p is used to test its influence on DET mean. Researchers who
35The oldest study in our sample, written by Karl F. Schuessler (1952), is not shown in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Chronological Analysis of Variables
(a) Refusal and Confirmation of Becker’s Theory
(b) Tested Theories – Traditional vs. Economic Approach
Own Source: Chronological Analysis of Deterrence Variables and tested Theories. Abscissas show the
year and the ordinates the fraction of articles refuting or confirming the deterrence hypothesis (Figure a)
or the absolute number of articles testing a specific theory (Figure b) within each year. The oldest study
in our sample written by Karl F. Schuessler (1952) is not shown in Figure 5.3.
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want to discover the structure of societies we are living in should be interested in the quality of
an article but not its results. Hence, this variable tests Hypothesis 3 whether individual results
of researchers are independent of its peer group.
DET m1p of an economist (sociologist) is the average of all other economist’s (sociologist’s)
DET mean variable in the same observation period. The DET m1p variable contains all
disciplines. To distinguish certain disciplines DET m1peco contains only economists and
DET m1pscl contains only sociologists, criminologists, and law researcher. In addition, the
variable DET m3p was also specified, which takes into account three instead of one observation
period for the construction of DET meant. However, the distributions of DET m3p and
DET m1p are very similar and both variables are nearly perfectly correlated such that the
evaluation of DET m3p is not continued.
The Pearson correlation between DET m1p and DET mean is 0.27. This is a rather small
correlation coefficient. However, as shown in the Appendix, if all observations are independent
of each other, the correlation coefficient between both variables is minus one and not zero. This
is also intuitively reasonable. If the observation x′i is large, then x¯
′
i defined as
Nx¯−xi
N−1 is small
relative to a situation where x′′i is small, since then x¯
′′
i increases because the small x
′′
i is not
included whereas the large x′i is included. Hence, the value of 0.27 indicates a rather positive
relationship.
Finally, deterrence variables are specified which are based on the network component an author is
part. DET iclu5i and DET iclu9i of author i is the average of all DET meanj values of all authors
j 6= i which are part of the same component in the 2006-network. To reduce the risk of spurious
results36 only components with at least five (nine) researchers for DET iclu5 (DET iclu9) are
taken into account. Additionally, the variable DET cludi2 is specified which is an average across
all DET meant values in the same component. However, for each observation period t only those
DET meant values of closely connected but not directly connected researchers and of observation
periods t ≤ t are considered. This variable enables us to test whether DET meantt of closely
connected but not directly connected researchers impact on DET 1own which is DET meant of
the first observation period in which a researcher has published an article contained in the meta
data base. Both types of variables are specified to test Hypothesis 4 and 5 whether authors are
influenced by direct coauthors as well as indirectly connected researchers.
Figure 5.4 shows box plots of all 16 deterrence variables. In all four subfigures, medians
lie between (2) partly applicable and (3) neutral. For the author-specific variables shown in
Subfigure (a) and (b), the boxes covering both medial quartiles mostly range from (2) to (4)
more inapplicable. For the market and network variables in Subfigure (c) and (d), the medial
quartiles are much smaller and are more in accordance with Becker’s theory. In Subfigure (a)
and (b), the upper and lower adjacent values are the maximal and minimal values or lie close to
36See the discussion above.
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them. Unsurprisingly, in (c) and (d) upper and lower adjacent values are smaller since for the
averages of market variables some network variables are calculated across a subset of researchers.
The 16 deterrence variables show well-known criminological research results. In Subfigure (a),
the median and the box of the property-category DET P exhibit smaller values than the
violence-category DET V. Similarly, and as expected, the distribution of DET m1peco is more
in favour of Becker’s theory than the distribution of DET m1pscl.
Moderator Variables
Almost any variable introduced in this subchapter is variable-related or study-related
information pieces in the data base. The information is summarized to author-related variables.
Many control variables are indicator variables. In some cases the reference category can be
directly taken out of context and is, therefore, omitted.
Vertex Variables
Most control variables in the meta data base describe the studies representing the links in the
network. However, two vertex variables containing characteristics of the authors themselves
are available. Each author is characterized by a country-variable, i.e. the country where the
place of work is located and each researcher also belongs to a scientific discipline. Most research
articles in our data base are written by economists (41.3%), the shares of the other researchers
are sociologists (17.0%), criminologists (8.6%), psychologists (5.7%), and law researcher (2.5%).
Researchers who are statisticians, work in the field of public administration or work in other
public institutions fall into the category ‘others’ (19.4%).37 From the point of view of an
economist, it is difficult to distinguish sociologists from criminologists and law researchers for
which reason the indicator variable DET scl is one for researcher who belongs to one of these
disciplines and zero otherwise. This simplifies the comparison with DET eco and DET psy, the
indicator variables for economists and psychologists, respectively.
The other vertex variable is the country of the institution in which a researcher is working.
U.S. research institutions dominate the deterrence market. In the 2006-network 69.1% of all
researcher are located in the U.S. Other important countries where researchers work on deterrent
effects are Canada 11.3%, UK 4.1%, Germany 2.9%, Israel 1.9%, Australia 1.4%, Brasil 1.1%,
Netherlands 1.1%, Irland 0.9%, Norway 0.8%, Switzerland 0.8%, Finland 0.6%, and South Korea
0.5%.38 The indicator variables COU can, COU uk, and COU usa are specified to capture the
influence of the country a researcher is located.
37The missing observations (5.5%) complete the data.
38Other countries below the 0.5% threshold are Argentina, Chile, France, Singapore, Turkey, Sweden, Italy,
Spain, Congo, Japan, New Zealand, Russia and Taiwan.
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Figure 5.4: Confirmation of Author, Market, and Network Deterrence Variables
(a) Author Variables (Overall, Categories, 1st) (b) Author Variables (Time Dimension)
(c) Market Variables (d) Network Variables
The scales on the ordinates mean ‘Becker’s theory is (1) wholly applicable, (2) partly applicable, (3) neutral, (4) more
inapplicable, (5) wholly inapplicable.’
Variable Brief Description (Details are explained in the text)
DET mean Information on two deterrence variables across three crime categories of all articles.
DET 1own DET mean of the first observation period of each author.
DET C Information of the categories ‘(violent) crime against the persons’ if C = V and of ‘crime against
the property’ if C = P .
DETv t1 Information of the probability (v = p) or severity (v = s) variable where DETv is averaged across
all except the last observation period of each researcher.
DETv t2 DETv of the last observation period of a researcher.
DET mτp Information of the market (discipline) a researcher is part of without her own work. τ accounts
for the number of observation periods which are taken into account for the calculation, τ = 1, 3.
DET m1pd Market variable which considers only research field d. The research field is the economic one if
d = eco and the field of sociologist, criminologists, and law researcher if d = scl.
DET iclun Average of DET mean of all authors belonging to the same component containing at least n
authors without the considered researcher herself.
DET cludi2 Average of DET mean of indirectly connected authors, i.e. a network distance of at least 2.
Definition of Boxplots: The line inside the box is the median. The box covers the area from the 25th to 75th percentile, i.e. the
medial quartiles. The horizontal lines above and below the box are the upper and lower adjacent values. Let A be the value
of the 25th and B the value of the 75th percentile. Then the upper adjacent value is argmin [B + 1.5(B −A),Maximum] and
the lower adjacent value is argmax [A− 1.5(B −A),Minimum]. Observations outside the upper and lower adjacent values
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The number of international and interdisciplinary research links is small. The mode of
multinational links was ten and was formed between researchers located in Israel and the U.S.
Only two international cooperations took place between two non-English speaking institutions -
an Israel-Netherland link and a Germany-Switzerland link.39 Similarly, only 18 interdisciplinary
research articles are contained in our data base where nearly half of the interdisciplinary articles
were written by criminologists and sociologists.
Link Variables
The low degree of interdisciplinarity especially between economists and non-economists is a result
of the different ways of thinking both groups evince. These different line of thoughts also result
in different theoretical assumptions. In general, two kinds of crime theories are distinguishable,
the traditional theory and the economic theory. The starting point for an empirical verification
of the economic theory is Ehrlich (1973), who wrote, “The basic thesis underlying our theory
of participation in illegitimate activities is that offenders, as a group, respond to incentives in
much the same way that those who engage in strictly legitimate activities do as a group.”
Before this incentive-driven economic theory was tested, the traditional approach of
criminologists was and still is that deviant behavior is to be explained by deviant characteristics
of criminals. Several different theories such as social disorganisation theory, inequality theory,
routine activities theory, differential association theory, social control theory, self-control theory,
strain theory, and others can be subsumed under the traditional approach.40 These sub-theories
of the traditional approach are distinguishable by different causes such as disrupted social
environments, the intensity of attachment to peer groups or families, the frustration felt when
someone is falling short of expectations, etc. These potential reasons might be the basis for
the development of characteristics being associated with personality disorders and, finally,
personality disorders can cause delinquent behavior. The indicator variables THEO trad and
THEO eco are constructed to measure their impact on the deterrence variables and Figure 5.3
shows how often each theory was tested within the last decades.
Different research approaches were applied to solve the deterrence puzzle. Three different
indicator variables are distinguished to measure the influence of the applied approach on findings.
ST crim is one for longitudinal, cross-section, and panel criminological studies. ST surv is
one for longitudinal as well as cross-sectional surveys. ST exp is one for field and laboratory
experiments. The vast majority of authors, 58.2%, invariably performed criminological studies.
These are often based on public data, such that the data preparation process is less expensive
than the collection of a unique data set. 24% of all authors invariably performed surveys and
9.5% experiments. Many authors - in particular those who were very active in the deterrence
research - applied several different methods.
39Similar international collaboration links are also reported in Gla¨nzel (2001), who investigated research fields
such as Clinical Medicine, Biomedical Research, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics, Engineering and
Earth and Space Sciences.
40See Entorf and Spengler (2002) or Pratt (2001) for a detailed overview.
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Another important piece of information is the quality of the surveyed articles. The variable
QLTY is specified to control for their impact on the deterrence variables. The variable is
specified such that high quality articles have lower values. QLTY measures several factors
which indicate the quality of an article. Table 5.4 elucidates each of the eight factors of the
index. The absolute weight of each component is shown in the last column and ranges from 0
to 6. Component 4 and 7 distinguish two quality levels. If requirements of significance tests are
only partly fulfilled the quality index increases by one point and if no requirements are fulfilled
it increases by two points. For example, the index rises when an author applied non-robust
standard errors although heteroscedasticity is apparent. Likewise, the quality index rises if an
article is published in a collected volume and rises by two points if it is published in neither a
journal nor a collected volume.
Factor 8 reports whether the author mentioned econometric or data problems and whether
additional problems are found during the meta project. The following check list was used. First,
the adequacy of the chosen statistical method was scrutinised. Second, endogeneity problems
such as simultaneity, measurement bias, or omitted variable bias were checked. Third, the
severity or probability variable and appropriate control variables are considered. Fourth, did
study-specific problems arise, e.g in the data assessment process? In the worst case where
“econometric/data problems are not mentioned by the author and major additional problems
are found” then factor 8 raises the quality index by six points. All points are weighted by 19 -
the worst value of the quality index - such that the values of QLTY lie in the unit interval.
Lastly, four miscellaneous control variables are introduced which are not related to any other
variable group. The content-related variable MISC dp indicates whether a study tackles the
death penalty issue. This variable is included to control for different results regarding the death
penalty and their deterrence effects. Many well-known deterrence researcher such as Bailey,
Ehrlich, Levitt, and Shepherd contribute to this branch of the deterrence literature.
The indicator variable MISC pro is specified to test whether prominent authors agree upon a
specific topic. An author is called prominent if she has strongly contributed to the literature
(cf. Rupp 2008). These researchers are Bailey, Benson, Bursik, Chiricos, Cloninger, Ehrlich,
Entorf, Erickson, Gibbs, Grasmick, Hakim, Levitt, Marvell, Nagin, Paternoster, Piquero,
Pogarsky, Rasmussen, Tittle, Vire´n, Waldo, and Witte.
The indicator variable MISC jour measures the effect of journals on the deterrence variables.
The reference category contains working and conference articles as well as books and edited
volumes. Around 85% of all contributions in the data base are published in journals.
Finally, two indicator variables show different sizes of the study population. MISC sml is one
for all studies with a small sample size equal to or below 500 observations and MISC lrg is
an indicator variable which is one for studies which include more than 500 observations. The
reference category includes the missing observations.
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Table 5.4: Factors and their Weights of the Quality Variable QLTY
Factor Variable Nominator
1 #pages<10 2
2 No representative sample 1
3 No error checking 2
4 Requirements of significance tests
◦ only partly fulfilled 1
◦ not fulfilled 2
5 No goodness-of-fit measures 2
6 No control variables 2
7 Type of publication (no journal article)
◦ collected edition 1
◦ other 2
8 Econometric/Data Problems are mentioned by the author
◦ and no additional problems found 0
◦ and minor additional problems found 1
◦ and major additional problems found 3
Econometric/Data Problems are not mentioned by the author
◦ and no additional problems found 2
◦ and minor additional problems found 4
◦ and major additional problems found 6
Worst Quality Index (=Denominator of each factor) 19
Own Source: The weight of each factor is calculated as nominator/denominator. # abbreviates
‘number of’.
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5.5 Inductive Analysis
The hypotheses stated above in Subchapter 5.3 are summarized in Table 5.5 and are tested
in this chapter. The following steps were performed to select appropriate control variables.
First, the appropriate control variables were chosen by two stepwise OLS regressions. An
automatic variable selection process is chosen to ensure objectivity. One stepwise regression
starts with the empty model and performs a forward-stepwise variable selection followed by
backward elimination, whereas the other regression starts with the complete model and performs
a backward-stepwise variable elimination followed by forward selection. For each stepwise
regression the chosen Wald tests were applied where a 10%-significance level for forward and
backward selection and elimination was chosen. Second, a variable was chosen as a control
variable in the final specification if it fulfilled three conditions. (a) it was significant in both
stepwise regressions, (b) the maximum of each correlation value with all other variables was
smaller than one half, and (c) in the case of an indicator variable at least 3% of all authors have
to be indexed. If condition (b) or (c) was unfulfilled in the appropriate subsample, then step
one was repeated by excluding the appropriate variables. Third, the hypotheses were tested and
results are shown in Table 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. Fourth, variables which became insignificant were
dropped in the final regression when the deterrence variable is included.
The regression results in Table 5.6 show that all author-specific hypotheses can be rejected. An
increase in DET P of one point comes along with a significant increase of around 0.5 of DET V.
Similarly, an increase of one point in previous studies results in an increase of around 0.2 for
the probability variable and around 0.4 for the severity variable in the last observation period of
each author. For the severity-variable a high significance level is found, whereas the probability
variable is only nearly significant at the 10% value. These results imply a strong relationship
between the findings of each author. Hence, if a deterrence effect is measured with respect to
one deterrence variable it is very likely that similar deterrence effects are found with respect to
other deterrence variables.
Hypotheses 3 of the complete deterrence research market can be rejected as shown in Table 5.7.
Similarly, the market variables significantly impact on the findings of economists and on
sociologists, criminologists, and law researchers as shown in specification (M2) and (M3). For
all three specifications in Table 5.7 the coefficient of the market variables DET m1p is around
0.5. Accordingly, if the value of the peer group rises by one point, the results of each author
increases in average by 0.5 points.
In the network analysis shown in Table 5.8 the results are mixed. Specification (N1) implies
that a higher value of DET iclu5 is accompanied by a higher DET mean value of each author.
However, if the number of components is decreased by increasing the limit from at least five
researchers to nine then the variable DET iclu9 is insignificant. This result may indicate that
the network effects are not very strong. Possibly, the positive coefficient in specification (N1)
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Table 5.5: Author-Specific, Market-Specific, and Network-Specific Hypotheses
No. Null Hypotheses Regressand Regressor Type
1 Authors confirming Becker’s theory with respect to DET V do
not confirm the theory with respect to DET P values.
DET V DET P A
2 Each author’s results regarding the probability (v = p) or severity
(v = s) variable from earlier studies have no explanatory power
for later studies.
DETv t2 DETv t1 A
3 Each author’s results are independent of the findings of other
authors working in the same research field d where d is total, eco
or scl.
DET mean DET m1pd M
4 Each author’s results are independent of the network component
containing at least n authors of whom she belongs to.
DET mean DET iclun N
5 The results of the 1st paper of each author are not influenced by
indirectly connected authors.
DET 1own DET cludi2 N
Variable Brief Description (Details are explained in the text)
DET mean Information on two deterrence variables across three crime categories of all articles.
DET 1own DET mean of the first observation period of each author.
DET C Information of the categories ‘(violent) crime against the persons’ if C = V and of ‘crime against
the property’ if C = P .
DETv t1 Information of the probability (v = p) or severity (v = s) variable where DETv is averaged across
all except the last observation period of each researcher.
DETv t2 DETv of the last observation period of a researcher.
DET mτp Information of the market (discipline) a researcher is part of without her own work. τ accounts
for the number of observation periods which are taken into account for the calculation, τ = 1, 3.
DET m1pd Market variable which considers only research field d. The research field is the economic one if
d = eco and the field of sociologist, criminologists, and law researcher if d = scl.
DET iclun Average of DET mean of all authors belonging to the same component containing at least n
authors without the considered researcher herself.
DET cludi2 Average of DET mean of indirectly connected authors, i.e. a network distance of at least 2.
Own Source. Three types of hypotheses are distinguished, A, M, and N are author-specific, market-specific, and
network-specific hypotheses. Each null hypothesis is specified such that the alternative hypothesis is in line with
our expectations.
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is a spurious result. In small samples the double-counting of coauthored articles might lead
to significant results since the same information is regressed on itself. Specification (N3) sheds
more light on the network effects. The results of the first observation period of the meta data
base summarized in DET 1own are regressed on DET cludi2. This regressor is the mean of
all indirectly connected authors who have contributed to the deterrence literature beforehand.
DET cludi2 excludes all possible double-counting processes since the variables of all direct
authors are not considered. As shown in specification (N3), a highly significant relation is
found.
Given these findings, one may conclude that authors are driven by three non-content-related
forces. First, each author might have incentives to report consistent results, as indicated by the
author-specific specifications in Table 5.6. A major goal of a researcher is the establishment of
a reputation. If results of each researcher steadily change, this goal may prove elusive. Second,
because each author is eager to publish in peer-reviewed journals, it seems fairly difficult to
publish an article if it is at odds with the findings of peers. Hence, the significant findings in
the market specifications are not surprising.
Third, network effects might be present, i.e. researchers might be affected by their coauthors and
members of research groups which are often met at workshops or conferences. It seems reasonable
to assume that the positive relationship of indirectly connected authors is greatly influenced by
central authors. For instance, Levitt has no indirect link to any author in his component, such
that he is automatically excluded in specification (N3), whereas all his coauthors are included.
If each author tends to produce similar results, then authors sharing the same coauthor might
also be influenced by each other. This interpretation is also in accordance with author-specific
results where authors tend to confirm previous results, as shown in Table 5.6.
As a matter of course, the question is whether the OLS coefficients and their standard errors
are reliable and multivariate relations measure causal effects? Endogeneity problems may flaw
our results. It might be the case that research ideas are proposed to the community via research
articles or at conferences. Several researcher might possibly seize these ideas and get similar
results since they have performed similar analyses. A simultaneity issue might be especially
important in the market specifications and network specifications (N1) and (N2). However,
a solution for the potentially existing simultaneity problem is out of reach. Appropriate
instruments should measure the behaviour and incentives of researchers and not only their
findings, methods and other content-related variables.
Another endogeneity problem likely to be present in our regressions is the omitted variable
problem. The political attitude of researchers, for instance, might impact on results. The
choice of major at university may be a proxy for the political attitude since it seems reasonable
to assume that more liberal thinking students choose economics whereas sociology students
are more left-wing oriented. Accordingly, DISC eco has a correlation of -0.55 with DET m1p.
However, DISC eco is very likely to be correlated with the error term since DET m1p contains
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Table 5.6: Author-specific Analysis: Crime Categories, Probability and Severity Variable
Specification (V) (P) (S)
Regressand DET V DETp t2 DETs t2
constant 0.526** constant 1.194** constant 3.536**
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
DET P 0.499** DETp t1 0.188 DETs t1 0.384**
(0.000) (0.109) (0.009)
COU can 1.084** COU usa 0.537+ COU uk -1.696*
(0.004) (0.070) (0.000)
COU uk 0.709+ THEO trad 1.434** DISC eco -1.003**
(0.051) (0.000) (0.009)
DISC scl 0.381** QLTY -5.539**
(0.014) (0.000)
MISC lrg 0.275* ST exp 1.164*
(0.033) (0.017)
ST crim 0.686**
(0.000)
THEO trad 0.522**
(0.003)
R2 0.420 0.256 0.476
#Obs 231 86 53
#Var 6 2 7
% Var 100% 100% 57%
Variable Brief Description (Details are explained above)
DET C Information of the categories ‘(violent) crime against the persons’ if C = V and of ‘crime against
the property’ if C = P .
DETv t1 Information of the probability (v = p) or severity (v = s) variable where DETv is averaged across
all except the last observation period of each researcher.
DETv t2 DETv of the last observation period of a researcher.
COU l Country a researcher is located where l=CAN, UK, USA indicates Canada, United Kingdom and
the United States.
DISC d Disciplines investigated where d=eco abbreviates economics, d=psy abbreviates psychology and
d=scl indicates the disciplines sociology, criminology and law researcher.
MISC lrg Studies with more than 500 observations.
ST t Type of study where t=crim indicates longitudinal, cross-section and panel criminological studies
and t=exp indicates experimental studies.
THEO trad Studies testing traditional theory.
QLTY Indicates the quality of a study due to the quality index shown in Table 5.4.
Own Source: p-values in parentheses. 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels are labelled by **, *, +. #Obs abbreviates
the number of observations. #Var indicates the number of control variables which are present in at least one of
both stepwise regressions. %Var indicates the number of control variables used in the final regression relative to
#Var.
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Table 5.7: Research Market Analysis
Specification (M1) (M2) (M3)
Regressand DET mean DET mean DET mean
constant 1.561** constant 1.057 constant 1.791**
(0.000) (0.128) (0.002)
DET m1p 0.427** DET m1peco 0.574+ DET m1pscl 0.522**
(0.000) (0.057) (0.003)
DISC eco -0.221+ MISC pro -0.555* MISC dp 0.790**
(0.052) (0.030) (0.006)
DISC psy 0.621* MISC jour -0.577*
(0.018) (0.032)
MISC dp 0.412*
(0.042)
R2 0.095 0.019 0.129
#Obs 558 268 159
#Var 3 1 6
% Var 100% 100% 33.3%
Variable Brief Description (Details are explained above)
DET mean Information on two deterrence variables across three crime categories of all articles.
DET m1p Information of the market (discipline) a researcher is part of without her own work where
researchers are compared within an observation period.
DET m1pd Market variable which considers only research field d. The research field is the economic one if
d = eco and the field of sociologist, criminologists, and law researcher if d = scl.
DISC d Disciplines investigated where d=eco abbreviates economics, d=psy abbreviates psychology and
d=scl indicates the disciplines sociology, criminology and law researcher.
MISC dp Studies tackling the death penalty issue.
MISC pro Indicates prominent authors.
MISC jour Indicates studies being published in refereed journals.
Own Source: p-values in parentheses. 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels are labelled by **, *, +. #Obs abbreviates
the number of observations. #Var indicates the number of control variables which are present in at least one of
both stepwise regressions. %Var indicates the number of control variables used in the final regression relative to
#Var.
Notice, a fourth variable MISC pro was significant after the stepwise regressions, although it turned insignificant
when we include DET m1p.
127
Table 5.8: Network Analysis
Specification (N1) (N2) (N3)
Regressand DET mean DET mean DET 1own
constant 2.413** constant 3.555** constant 3.785**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DET iclu5 0.514** DET iclu9 -0.029 DET cludi2 0.345**
(0.000) (0.902) (0.002)
MISC jour -0.808* COU uk -0.484* COU uk -1.119*
(0.013) (0.023) (0.019)
MISC lrg -0.587* ST exp -1.482** MISC jour -0.859**
(0.039) (0.000) (0.006)
MISC sml -0.451+ ST surv -0.899** MISC lrg -1.410**
(0.073) (0.000) (0.000)
THEO eco -1.469** MISC sml -0.748**
(0.000) (0.005)
QLTY -1.986**
(0.002)
R2 0.183 0.476 0.249
#Obs 150 79 115
#Var 4 6 5‡
% Var 100% 66.7% 100%
Variable Brief Description (Details are explained above)
DET mean Information on two deterrence variables across three crime categories of all articles.
DET 1own DET mean of the first observation period of each author.
DET iclun Average of DET mean of all authors belonging to the same component containing at least n
authors without the considered researcher herself.
DET cludi2 Average of DET mean of indirectly connected authors, i.e. a network distance of at least 2.
MISC jour Indicates studies being published in refereed journals.
MISC s Studies with s=lrg (sml) equal or more (less) than 500 observations.
COU uk Indicates researcher being located in United Kingdom.
ST t Type of study where t=exp indicates experimental studies and t=surv indicates surveys.
THEO eco Studies testing economic theory.
QLTY Indicates the quality of a study due to the quality index shown in Table 5.4.
Own Source: p-values in parentheses. 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels are labelled by **, *, +. #Obs abbreviates
the number of observations. #Var indicates the number of control variables which are present in at least one of
both stepwise regressions. %Var indicates the number of control variables used in the final regression relative to
#Var.
‡Notice, the variable COU can was also significant after the stepwise regressions. It turned insignificant when
we include DET cludi2.
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individual outcome variables DET mean. Therefore, the chosen approach again makes it very
difficult to find appropriate instruments.
5.6 Conclusion
This study descriptively evaluates the coauthor network among economists and other researchers
who work on deterrence effects. The descriptive network analysis is one basis to shed some
light on the interdependencies of research outcomes. The analysis implies that the findings of
researchers are positively related to findings in their previous work, to the findings of researchers
who work on similar research questions, and to the coauthor network in which a researcher is
embedded. The results presented might be flawed by endogeneity problems which, due to the
absence of appropriate instruments, are not solvable. If the results at least to some degree
represent causal relationships then this work challenges the value of deterrence research and the
following questions arise. First, has the research article of an established researcher anything
new to offer or do established researchers support each other and abuse their market power
in research environments involving a referee-system?41 Second, have researchers incentives to
discover the structure of societies in which we live? or do they promote their own carrier goals,
forcing the researcher to accept certain truths shared by the majority of researchers in the
same discipline because the publication probability in the referee-system is otherwise strongly
reduced? Third and finally, what is the optimal structure of a coauthor network? Research
networks are important for exchanging information which might increase the productivity of
researchers. However, research networks may also reduce the social welfare. If researchers react
on each other such that each research output is not a genuine source of information but rather
the result of misguided research incentives.
From a structural perspective, this article shows that the complete current deterrence network
is a ‘collection of islands’. Accordingly, not only network components of different disciplines
tackling the deterrence issue exist but many different components within each discipline are also
found. Such a collection of islands was also observed by Goyal et al. (2006) for the coauthor
network of economists in the 1970’s. Given the observation that today’s network of economists is
a small world and contemporaneously the productivity of researchers has increased, the question
arises whether the deterrence puzzle might be solvable if the deterrence network also turns into a
small world. Goyal et al. (2006) explain the existence of a small world network by the presence
of inter-connected highly productive star-authors. Possibly, the most important deterrence
researchers from within as well as across disciplines should work together to solve it.
41Some evidence for the abuse of market power was recently found by Combes, Linnemer, Visser (2006), who
showed that applicants for vacant professorships in France have a higher acceptance rate if jury members are
acquainted with the candidates.
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5.7 Appendix
Proposition 5.7.1 (Correlation of Market and Author Variables) Let xi ∈R {x1, . . . , xN}
be random and independent drawings from the set of all available observations. Furthermore,
let xi := (N − 1)−1
∑
j 6=i xj be the average of all observations without the ith element and
Var(xi) = σ2 ∀i. It follows42 that Corr(xi, xi) = −1.
Proof It is important to remember that randomness is introduced by the drawings - the set of
observations {x1, . . . , xN} is given. Therefore, x is an unknown but deterministic value which
has zero variance.
Corr(xi, xi) =
Cov(xi, xi)√
Var(xi)
√
Var(xi)
=
Cov(xi, Nx−xiN−1 )
σ
√
Var(Nx−xiN−1 )
=
1
N−1Cov(xi,−xi)
σ
√
1
(N−1)2Var(−xi)
=
− σ2N−1
σ σN−1
= −1

42Although xi and xi are based on disjoint sets, they are not independent.
130
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 1:
 19
76
H
in
t: 
Th
ic
kn
es
s o
f e
dg
es
 in
cr
ea
se
 w
ith
 n
um
be
r o
f p
ap
er
s. 
Lo
op
s, 
i.e
. s
in
gl
e-
au
th
or
ed
 p
ap
er
s, 
ar
e 
de
le
te
d.
?
? ??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
? ??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
13
1
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 2
: 1
98
6
H
in
t: 
Th
ic
kn
es
s o
f e
dg
es
 in
cr
ea
se
 w
ith
 n
um
be
r o
f p
ap
er
s. 
Lo
op
s, 
i.e
. s
in
gl
e-
au
th
or
ed
 p
ap
er
s, 
ar
e 
de
le
te
d.
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
? ??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
? ??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
? ??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
? ??
?
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
13
2
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 3
: 1
99
6
H
in
t: 
Th
ic
kn
es
s o
f e
dg
es
 in
cr
ea
se
 w
ith
 n
um
be
r o
f p
ap
er
s. 
Lo
op
s, 
i.e
. s
in
gl
e-
au
th
or
ed
 p
ap
er
s, 
ar
e 
de
le
te
d.
13
3
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 4
: 2
00
6
H
in
t: 
Th
ic
kn
es
s o
f e
dg
es
 in
cr
ea
se
 w
ith
 n
um
be
r o
f p
ap
er
s. 
Lo
op
s, 
i.e
. s
in
gl
e-
au
th
or
ed
 p
ap
er
s, 
ar
e 
de
le
te
d.
13
4
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
???
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
A
lp
ha
be
tic
al
 O
rd
er
 o
f A
ut
ho
rs
30
5
A
as
ne
ss
 J
or
33
3
B
al
bo
 M
ar
49
6
B
ry
ja
k 
G
eo
59
C
hr
es
sa
nt
hi
s G
eo
30
0
D
en
ny
 K
ev
26
1
A
dl
af
 E
dw
18
0
B
al
-il
an
 A
vn
20
0
B
ui
kh
ui
se
n 
W
. 
18
7
C
la
rk
 C
. 
23
1
D
es
ha
pr
iy
a 
E.
 
46
8
A
hm
ed
 E
hs
17
4
B
al
se
r D
av
13
1
B
un
n 
D
ou
21
C
la
rk
 D
av
43
5
D
es
im
on
e 
Je
f
18
3
A
itk
en
 C
. 
4
B
ar
on
 S
te
59
3
B
uo
na
nn
o 
Pa
o
73
C
la
rk
 Jo
h
20
1
D
ez
hb
ak
hs
h 
H
as
21
0
A
lb
re
ch
t H
an
25
0
B
ea
n 
Fr
a
33
4
B
ur
ke
tt 
St
e
27
1
C
la
rk
e 
A
la
49
0
D
ia
z 
Jo
a
17
5
A
lc
or
n 
D
av
23
3
B
ec
k 
W
il
40
2
B
ur
ne
ll 
Ja
m
61
2
C
la
rk
e 
R
on
39
8
D
ie
z-
Ti
ci
o 
A
m
o
47
6
A
li 
M
.M
12
7
B
ec
si
 Z
so
34
0
B
ur
si
k 
R
ob
96
C
lo
ni
ng
er
 D
al
74
D
ip
as
qu
al
e 
D
en
38
0
A
lle
n 
R
al
23
5
B
ei
rn
es
s D
ou
33
9
C
ah
lo
up
ka
 F
ra
49
7
C
oc
hr
an
 Jo
h
62
D
öl
lin
g 
D
ie
19
A
lle
n 
W
. 
11
8
B
en
ja
m
in
i Y
ae
21
1
C
al
la
ha
n 
C
hr
39
7
C
oh
en
 D
eb
53
1
D
om
as
h 
M
ic
23
4
A
lm
 Ja
m
44
3
B
en
ne
tt 
El
i
18
5
C
am
er
on
 S
am
48
8
C
oh
en
 L
ar
46
0
D
oy
le
 Jo
a
48
7
A
nd
er
so
n 
El
i
42
0
B
en
so
n 
B
ru
10
4
C
am
pb
el
l D
on
19
4
C
oh
en
 M
ar
62
1
Ea
rn
ha
rt
 D
ie
46
1
A
nd
er
so
n 
Er
i
52
5
B
er
ge
r D
al
70
C
ap
pe
l C
ha
16
8
C
on
tro
ne
a 
R
os
54
7
Eh
rli
ch
 Is
a
55
4
A
nd
er
so
n 
Li
n
29
8
B
er
lit
z 
C
la
49
5
C
ar
m
ic
ha
el
 F
io
37
0
C
oo
k 
Ph
i
30
8
Ei
de
 E
rl
58
8
A
nd
er
so
n 
Li
s
48
1
B
is
ho
p 
D
on
52
8
C
ar
r A
da
91
C
or
m
an
 H
op
16
1
El
ff
er
s H
en
36
4
A
nd
re
on
i J
am
40
B
la
ck
 T
he
55
8
C
ar
r-
H
ill
 R
. 
18
6
C
or
nw
el
l C
hr
38
9
En
so
r T
im
68
A
nd
rie
nk
o 
Y
ur
25
2
B
le
fg
en
 H
 N
34
3
C
ar
rit
he
rs
 W
il
24
C
os
gr
ov
e 
Ja
m
39
4
En
to
rf
 H
or
25
4
A
ng
lin
 L
is
53
B
od
m
an
 P
hi
13
6
C
au
di
ll 
B
ar
9
C
ov
er
 Ja
m
93
Ep
pl
e 
D
en
38
3
A
nt
un
es
 G
eo
38
8
B
ol
d 
Fr
e
13
7
C
au
di
ll 
St
e
12
0
C
ra
ig
 S
te
18
9
Er
ar
d 
B
ri
48
9
A
pp
le
to
n 
Ly
n
49
1
B
or
ac
k 
Ju
l
19
8
C
er
ro
 A
na
61
3
C
re
w
 R
.e
7
Er
ic
ks
on
 M
ay
17
7
A
re
an
 P
at
37
9
B
ow
er
s W
il
44
1
C
ha
ik
en
 Ja
n
16
0
C
ur
ti 
H
en
32
7
Er
ic
ks
on
 P
at
50
2
A
rv
an
ite
s T
ho
55
0
B
ra
ga
 A
nt
45
4
C
ha
lfa
nt
 H
. 
24
8
C
us
hi
ng
 R
ob
16
3
Es
to
re
s E
m
o
23
7
A
sb
rid
ge
 M
ar
60
9
B
ra
ith
w
ai
te
 Jo
h
51
2
C
ha
lo
up
ka
 F
ra
35
9
D
'a
le
ss
io
 S
te
38
Ev
an
s W
il
58
4
A
tk
in
s R
ay
32
5
B
ra
tto
n 
Ja
s
36
C
ha
m
be
rs
 L
ar
55
2
D
am
ph
ou
ss
e 
K
el
14
0
Fa
br
ik
an
t R
ic
19
1
A
vi
o 
K
en
41
6
B
ra
y 
Je
r
50
5
C
ha
m
bo
ul
ey
ro
n 
 A
nd
48
0
D
an
zi
ge
r S
he
43
2
Fa
jn
zy
lb
er
 P
ab
25
6
A
yr
es
 Ia
n
28
9
B
re
w
er
 V
ic
33
7
C
ha
m
lin
 M
it
43
9
D
av
ie
s H
es
39
6
Fa
rm
er
 C
ha
35
3
Ba
ch
m
an
n 
R
on
57
8
B
re
zi
na
 T
im
52
C
ha
pm
an
 Je
f
45
3
D
ea
dm
an
 D
er
42
4
Fa
rre
lly
 M
at
27
B
ac
on
 P
et
41
3
B
ro
na
rs
 S
te
19
9
C
he
at
w
oo
d 
D
er
31
5
D
ec
ke
r S
co
48
3
Fe
hr
 E
rn
16
4
B
ah
l R
oy
55
3
B
ro
w
er
 G
eo
57
6
C
he
rr
y 
To
d
20
7
D
ef
fe
nt
i C
as
40
0
Fe
ld
 L
ar
57
2
B
ai
le
y 
K
en
52
0
B
ro
w
n 
D
av
10
2
C
hi
lto
n 
R
ol
49
4
D
ef
in
a 
R
ob
32
1
Fe
ld
m
an
 A
m
y
35
2
B
ai
le
y 
W
il
24
2
B
ru
m
m
 H
ar
54
6
C
hi
ric
os
 T
he
22
1
D
em
er
s D
av
22
4
Fe
ll 
Ja
m
13
5
57
1
Fe
rn
án
de
z 
C
ar
10
0
G
ill
is
 A
.r
92
H
ag
an
 J
oh
30
6
Ih
la
nf
el
dt
 K
ei
29
0
K
es
sl
er
 R
on
17
6
Fe
rr
ar
i J
os
44
9
G
ith
en
s P
en
26
4
H
ak
im
 S
im
54
0
Io
va
nn
i L
ee
61
9
K
ill
ia
s M
ar
51
3
Fe
rr
ie
r G
ar
83
G
itt
in
gs
 K
aj
59
7
H
al
e 
C
hr
15
6
Is
ac
hs
en
 A
rn
34
5
K
im
 Il
j
28
1
Fi
el
di
ng
 N
ig
62
0
G
iu
s M
ar
38
4
H
am
ilt
on
 E
dw
22
9
Iw
as
e 
N
ob
53
7
K
irc
hn
er
 R
ob
12
Fi
sc
he
r J
us
77
G
la
es
er
 E
dw
60
H
an
se
n 
K
ir
15
7
Ja
ck
so
n 
B
et
12
9
K
le
m
ke
 L
lo
26
3
Fi
sh
m
an
 G
id
25
9
G
la
ss
 G
en
31
0
H
ar
m
on
 C
ol
50
6
Ja
co
b 
H
er
51
8
K
le
pp
er
 S
te
33
2
Fo
gl
ia
 W
an
10
6
G
ne
ez
y 
U
ri
14
9
H
ar
ry
 Jo
s
50
1
Ja
co
bs
 D
ar
10
5
K
le
tte
 H
an
51
6
Fo
rd
e 
D
av
38
7
G
od
fr
ey
 C
hr
43
3
H
at
ch
er
 A
ar
43
6
Ja
ffr
y 
Sh
a
52
9
K
oc
h 
St
e
47
1
Fo
re
st
 P
au
36
1
G
oe
l R
aj
28
0
H
au
se
 Ja
n
52
4
Ja
rr
el
l S
te
31
6
K
oh
fe
ld
 C
ar
62
2
Fo
rs
t B
ri
41
4
G
oo
d 
D
av
10
8
H
ec
ke
lm
an
 Ja
c
40
8
Ja
ya
ku
m
ar
 M
al
54
4
K
oo
pm
an
 S
ie
23
6
Fo
rti
n 
B
er
11
5
G
oo
dm
an
 D
ou
11
7
H
ei
kk
ila
 E
ri
33
1
Je
ns
en
 E
ri
50
K
os
ke
la
 E
rk
58
9
Fo
ss
 R
ob
42
5
G
ou
ld
 E
ri
51
H
ei
sl
er
 G
er
11
Je
ns
en
 G
ar
47
2
K
ov
an
dz
ic
 T
om
12
8
Fo
x 
Ja
m
31
4
G
ou
ld
 L
er
57
9
H
er
na
nd
ez
 A
nt
40
5
Jo
hn
so
n 
D
el
36
3
K
ug
le
r P
et
17
0
Fr
an
co
 M
ar
25
G
ov
e 
W
al
40
1
H
er
o 
R
od
31
2
Jo
hn
so
n 
W
el
23
9
La
cr
oi
x 
G
uy
39
9
Fr
ey
 B
ru
37
G
ra
ha
m
 Jo
h
16
5
H
es
si
ng
 D
ic
21
2
Jo
na
h 
B
ri
27
5
La
fre
e 
G
ar
11
9
Fr
ie
dl
an
d 
N
eh
49
3
G
ra
sm
ic
k 
H
ar
79
H
ex
te
r J
. 
44
5
Jo
ne
s T
er
23
8
La
m
bl
e 
R
ob
26
0
Fr
ie
dm
an
 Jo
s
22
7
G
ra
u 
M
on
32
3
H
ic
km
an
n 
C
ar
23
2
Jo
yc
e 
Th
e
26
9
La
ng
e 
Ja
m
13
Fu
ji 
Ed
w
34
9
G
ra
y 
Lo
u
16
7
H
ill
 W
il
20
8
K
ae
ne
 B
et
54
1
La
rs
on
 L
yn
36
0
Fu
nk
 P
at
51
7
G
re
at
ho
us
e 
Pe
r
56
1
H
oe
na
ck
 S
te
17
2
K
al
fu
s G
ra
44
2
La
w
le
ss
 M
ic
40
6
Fu
rlo
ng
 W
il
60
6
G
re
en
 D
on
5
H
oe
tin
g 
Je
n
98
K
am
in
sk
i R
ob
35
7
La
ys
on
 S
te
20
9
G
ab
or
 T
ho
21
5
G
re
en
 P
et
69
H
ol
lin
ge
r R
ic
14
4
K
an
to
r G
le
57
La
yt
on
 A
ll
61
4
G
äc
ht
er
 S
im
30
1
G
re
en
be
rg
 D
av
37
1
H
ol
tm
an
n 
A
. 
55
6
K
ap
la
n 
H
ow
72
Le
am
er
 E
dw
22
3
G
ai
ne
y 
R
an
11
0
G
re
en
w
oo
d 
M
ic
86
H
or
ai
 Jo
a
22
8
K
ar
st
ed
t-H
en
ke
 S
us
32
8
Le
bu
rn
 Ia
n
25
7
G
av
in
 D
ou
29
7
G
rie
si
ng
er
 H
ar
46
9
H
or
n 
R
ob
26
6
K
at
z 
La
w
44
8
Le
de
rm
an
 D
an
14
2
G
aw
an
de
 K
is
64
G
rim
es
 P
au
80
H
ou
st
on
 D
av
29
3
K
au
lit
zk
i R
ei
44
Le
gg
e 
Je
r
29
G
ee
rk
en
 M
ic
12
2
G
ro
gg
er
 Je
f
30
H
ou
st
on
 Jo
h
97
K
ea
ne
 C
ar
25
1
Le
i H
. 
56
G
el
au
 C
hr
13
4
G
ro
pp
er
 D
an
53
2
H
ow
se
n 
R
oy
53
4
K
el
lin
g 
G
eo
12
6
Le
un
g 
A
m
b
30
9
G
er
tz
 M
ar
27
8
G
ro
ss
 M
ei
37
6
H
si
ng
 B
y 
29
1
K
el
ly
 M
or
26
5
Le
vi
tt 
St
e
60
4
G
ër
xh
an
i K
la
34
1
G
ro
ss
m
an
n 
M
ic
95
H
uf
f R
on
53
3
K
en
ke
l D
on
57
0
Le
y 
Ed
u
15
8
G
ha
li 
M
oh
43
G
ro
sv
en
or
 D
av
39
0
H
ul
l B
ro
54
9
K
en
ne
dy
 D
av
15
0
Li
an
g 
Fa
m
50
7
G
ia
co
pa
ss
i D
av
42
2
G
ro
ve
s T
he
38
6
H
un
t A
. 
1
K
en
ne
dy
 L
es
44
7
Li
an
g 
La
n
8
G
ib
bs
 Ja
c
30
4
G
ut
h 
H
an
59
6
H
yu
n 
Ji
n
25
8
K
es
sl
er
 D
an
43
0
Li
sk
a 
A
ll
13
6
57
3
Li
st
 Jo
h
38
1
M
at
hu
r V
ij
35
1
M
ira
nn
e 
A
lf
58
1
Pa
rk
er
 Je
f
76
R
ee
s D
an
54
2
Li
u 
Zh
i
58
M
au
ltb
y 
C
am
61
M
iro
n 
Je
f
59
1
Pa
rk
er
 R
ob
43
8
R
ei
lly
 B
ri
43
7
Lo
ay
za
 N
or
33
8
M
au
se
r G
ar
17
8
M
ix
on
 D
ar
55
Pa
rs
le
y 
J. 
59
0
R
ei
nf
ur
t D
on
17
1
Lo
ch
ne
r L
an
61
6
M
c 
Fa
rla
nd
 S
am
17
9
M
ix
on
 F
ra
45
2
Pa
ss
el
l P
et
27
6
R
en
ge
rt 
G
eo
28
8
Lo
fti
n 
C
ol
82
M
cA
le
er
 M
ic
85
M
oc
an
 H
. 
38
5
Pa
te
 A
nt
21
4
R
es
ig
na
to
 A
nd
29
4
Lo
ga
n 
C
ha
27
7
M
cc
le
ar
y 
R
ic
46
2
M
on
tm
ar
qu
et
te
 C
la
53
5
Pa
te
rn
os
te
r R
ay
32
9
R
et
tin
g 
R
ic
41
9
Lo
tt 
Jo
h
14
8
M
cc
le
lla
nd
 G
ar
10
3
M
oo
dy
 C
ar
21
8
Pa
yn
e 
B
ri
50
8
R
ic
h 
M
ic
35
5
Lo
tt 
R
ut
50
3
M
cC
ol
lo
m
 C
ar
15
M
or
ris
 D
ou
45
6
Pe
ek
 C
ha
89
R
ic
ha
rd
so
n 
Li
l
90
Lo
vi
tc
h 
N
or
14
3
M
cc
or
m
ic
k 
R
ob
58
2
M
ui
 H
.w
22
2
Pe
st
el
lo
 F
ra
52
1
R
its
em
a 
C
hr
36
9
Lu
dw
ig
 Je
n
19
3
M
cC
ra
ry
 Ju
s
21
7
M
ul
la
hy
 Jo
h
50
4
Pe
te
e 
Th
o
35
R
ob
er
ts
 R
ob
22
5
Lu
nd
m
an
 R
ic
28
5
M
cd
ow
al
l D
av
24
3
M
ur
ra
y 
M
at
35
4
Pe
te
rs
on
 R
ut
34
R
og
er
s P
at
40
7
Lu
nd
st
ed
t S
. 
18
2
M
cG
eo
rg
e 
Ji
l
42
1
M
us
ta
rd
 D
av
54
Pf
ei
ffe
r M
an
26
8
R
os
s L
au
31
7
Ly
do
n 
R
ea
45
7
M
cg
ra
w
 K
at
75
M
ye
rs
 Jr
. S
am
20
3
Ph
ill
ip
s D
av
32
2
R
ow
e 
A
la
12
5
M
ac
do
na
ld
 J
oh
23
0
M
cK
ee
 M
ic
52
3
N
ag
in
 D
an
60
0
Ph
ill
ip
s L
la
19
7
R
ub
in
 P
au
63
M
ac
hi
n 
St
e
52
6
M
cN
ee
s P
at
36
2
N
el
so
n 
M
ic
55
7
Pi
eh
l A
nn
26
R
uh
m
 C
hr
3
M
ad
ig
an
 D
av
51
0
M
cP
he
te
rs
 L
ee
47
3
N
er
lo
ve
 M
ar
58
3
Pi
qu
er
o 
A
le
10
7
R
us
tic
hi
ni
 A
ld
39
1
M
ag
ad
di
no
 Jo
s
39
2
M
ed
of
f M
ar
57
5
N
eu
m
an
 C
ar
41
8
Pi
ro
g-
G
oo
d 
M
au
12
4
R
ut
en
be
rg
 A
ry
56
8
M
ag
at
 W
es
40
4
M
ee
ra
 A
ha
11
6
N
eu
st
ro
m
 M
ic
47
7
Pl
as
sm
an
n 
Fl
o
18
1
Sa
ce
rd
ot
e 
Br
u
51
5
M
ag
hs
oo
dl
oo
 S
ae
67
M
eg
hi
r C
os
39
N
ev
ill
e 
D
or
51
9
Po
ga
rs
ky
 G
re
34
6
Sa
ffe
r H
en
60
3
M
ag
ui
n 
Eu
g
41
0
M
eh
ay
 S
te
56
9
N
ils
so
n 
A
nn
13
0
Po
gu
e 
Th
o
25
3
Sa
gi
 E
li
12
1
M
ai
ta
l S
hl
32
0
M
ei
er
 R
ob
33
N
is
ka
ne
n 
W
il
17
Po
nt
el
l H
en
37
8
Sa
le
m
 R
ic
18
M
ak
 Ja
m
19
2
M
el
on
i O
sv
11
4
N
or
to
n 
W
il
17
3
Po
rte
r J
ac
53
8
Sa
ltz
m
an
 L
in
32
6
M
ak
i D
en
34
7
M
en
ke
 B
en
20
5
N
ot
t D
av
48
6
Po
sa
da
s J
os
14
5
Sa
m
ue
ls
on
 S
ve
24
9
M
an
n 
R
ob
13
5
M
er
rif
ie
ld
 Je
f
28
O
'd
on
og
hu
e 
M
. 
30
2
Pr
es
s S
. 
46
6
Sa
ru
c 
To
l
88
M
ar
ch
es
in
i R
ob
19
0
M
er
rim
an
 D
av
16
6
O
ka
no
 F
ra
45
8
Pu
dn
ey
 S
te
42
9
Sc
he
nz
le
r C
hr
51
4
M
ar
el
ic
h 
W
il
33
0
M
et
sg
er
 L
in
41
O
rs
ag
h 
Th
o
46
3
Py
le
 D
av
26
7
Sc
hm
id
t P
et
29
2
M
ar
qu
ar
t J
am
47
5
M
ic
ha
el
s R
ic
47
9
O
tte
rb
ei
n 
K
ei
58
0
R
ab
ow
 J
er
53
9
Sc
hn
el
le
 Jo
h
48
5
M
ar
se
lli
 R
ic
42
3
M
ik
es
el
l J
oh
24
7
O
va
di
a 
A
ri
2
R
af
te
ry
 A
dr
31
Sc
ho
en
ig
 S
te
35
0
M
ar
tin
 D
av
34
8
M
ild
er
 T
ru
41
5
Pa
cu
la
 R
os
49
8
R
al
st
on
 R
oy
46
4
Sc
ho
lz
 Jo
h
10
1
M
ar
ve
ll 
Th
o
44
6
M
ilt
on
 E
dw
56
6
Pa
pp
s K
er
56
5
R
an
ki
n 
Jo
s
60
7
Sc
hr
am
 A
rt
28
7
M
as
ih
 R
um
14
6
M
in
or
 W
il
59
2
Pa
rk
 C
ha
11
2
R
ap
ha
el
 S
te
56
7
Sc
hu
es
sl
er
 K
ar
33
5
M
as
t B
re
20
6
M
ira
nd
 A
m
y
48
Pa
rk
 Jo
o
33
6
R
as
m
us
se
n 
D
av
15
1
Sc
hu
lz
e 
W
il
13
7
28
6
Sc
hu
m
an
n 
K
ar
40
3
Sp
ic
er
 M
ic
61
5
Th
al
er
 R
ic
32
V
oe
lk
er
 C
am
28
3
W
ill
ia
m
s J
en
49
2
Sc
ot
t W
il
27
2
Sp
ie
ge
l U
ri
13
3
Th
am
 H
en
13
2
vo
n 
H
of
er
 H
an
38
2
W
ill
ia
m
s K
ir
21
9
Sc
rib
ne
r R
ic
22
Sp
ru
ill
 N
an
42
6
Th
éb
au
d 
O
li
59
8
V
ot
ey
 H
ar
50
0
W
ill
in
gt
on
 M
an
81
Se
sn
ow
itz
 M
ic
55
1
Sr
id
ha
ra
n 
Sa
n
6
Th
is
tle
 P
au
55
5
V
uj
ic
 S
un
29
5
W
ill
is
 K
. 
27
3
Sh
ac
hm
ur
ov
e 
Y
oc
10
St
ac
k 
St
e
52
2
Th
om
as
 D
eb
11
1
W
ad
yc
ki
 W
al
21
6
W
ils
on
 R
. 
60
1
Sh
ap
iro
 P
er
34
4
St
af
fo
rd
 M
ar
40
9
Th
om
as
 E
ve
45
W
ag
en
aa
r A
le
56
4
W
in
ke
lm
an
n 
R
ai
36
7
Sh
ef
fr
in
 S
te
59
5
St
af
fo
rd
 S
ar
60
5
Th
om
ps
on
 L
yk
54
8
W
al
do
 G
or
39
5
W
in
ke
r P
et
57
4
Sh
el
ey
 Jo
s
94
St
ah
ur
a 
Jo
h
36
8
Th
om
so
n 
Er
n
31
1
W
al
ke
r I
an
11
3
W
in
te
r-
Eb
m
er
 R
ud
19
5
Sh
ep
he
rd
 Jo
a
46
5
St
ee
l M
ar
18
4
Th
ur
m
an
 Q
ui
34
2
W
ar
d 
D
av
22
6
W
ith
er
s G
le
61
1
Sh
or
e 
El
s
45
9
St
ee
nb
er
ge
n 
M
ar
47
4
Ti
de
m
an
 N
ic
49
9
W
ar
d 
R
ob
27
9
W
itt
 R
ob
27
4
Sh
us
to
ro
vi
ch
 E
ll
55
9
St
er
n 
N
. 
26
2
Ti
pp
et
ts
 A
. 
52
7
W
ar
d 
Sa
l
28
4
W
itt
e 
A
nn
28
2
Si
ck
le
s R
ob
58
5
St
ev
an
s L
on
31
3
Ti
ttl
e 
C
ha
54
5
W
ar
in
g 
El
i
60
2
W
ol
pi
n 
K
en
47
8
Si
gm
an
 H
il
45
0
St
ev
en
so
n 
K
ei
13
9
To
lli
so
n 
R
ob
49
W
at
so
n 
R
oy
16
2
W
on
g 
W
in
65
Si
lb
er
m
an
 M
at
59
4
St
ew
ar
t J
. 
60
8
To
ni
 M
ak
57
7
W
at
ts
 R
on
56
0
W
on
g 
Y
ue
23
Si
lv
er
m
an
 L
es
24
5
St
od
ut
o 
G
in
42
To
om
ey
 T
ra
61
8
W
eb
er
 J.
m
30
3
W
rin
kl
e 
R
ob
21
3
Si
nd
el
ar
 Jo
d
35
8
St
ol
ze
nb
er
g 
Li
s
36
6
Tr
ie
st
 R
ob
15
5
W
ei
ge
l R
us
37
7
Y
ap
 L
. 
37
4
Si
ra
ka
ya
 E
rc
15
4
St
or
ey
 D
. 
18
8
Tr
um
bu
ll 
W
il
56
3
W
ei
le
r W
il
10
9
Y
at
es
 A
nd
31
9
Sk
je
rp
en
 T
er
43
4
St
ou
t E
m
i
15
2
Tr
uo
ng
 Y
ou
42
8
W
ei
nb
er
g 
B
ru
43
1
Y
u 
Ji
a
44
0
Sl
oa
n 
Fr
a
15
9
St
ro
m
 S
te
14
Tw
ee
te
n 
Lu
t
25
5
W
ei
nb
la
tt 
Ji
m
12
3
Y
un
ke
r J
am
46
7
Sl
oa
n 
Jo
h
51
1
St
ro
ng
e 
W
il
13
8
U
ng
er
le
id
er
 S
te
50
9
W
el
ch
 M
ic
36
5
Z
ad
or
 P
au
24
6
Sm
ar
t R
eg
20
2
Su
lli
va
n 
K
ar
37
2
U
ys
al
 M
uz
37
3
W
el
lfo
rd
 C
ha
41
2
Za
rk
in
 G
ar
53
0
Sm
ith
 D
ou
44
4
Sw
im
m
er
 E
ug
62
3
V
an
da
el
e 
W
al
56
2
W
el
ls
 L
. 
16
Ze
dl
ew
sk
i E
dw
66
Sm
ith
 K
ev
71
Sy
ke
s G
re
48
4
V
an
ni
ni
 M
ar
42
7
W
en
dl
in
g 
B
re
84
Zh
an
g 
Ju
n
58
6
Sm
ith
 M
. 
24
1
Sy
ko
ra
 K
. 
78
V
ea
ll 
M
ic
48
2
W
he
el
er
 D
av
37
5
Zi
m
m
er
m
an
 P
au
53
6
Sn
or
tu
m
 Jo
h
47
0
T
al
le
y 
W
ay
19
6
V
ic
to
r M
ic
14
1
W
he
el
er
 T
im
20
Zi
m
rin
g 
Fr
a
35
6
So
ar
es
 R
. 
15
3
Ta
na
ka
 R
an
24
0
V
ill
ev
al
 M
ar
45
1
W
he
tte
n-
41
1
Zu
eh
lk
e 
Th
o
32
4
So
lla
rs
 D
av
47
Ta
o 
H
un
24
4
V
in
gi
lis
 E
ve
G
ol
ds
te
in
 K
at
61
0
So
pe
r J
os
29
9
Ta
uc
he
n 
H
el
22
0
V
in
od
 H
.
41
7
W
hi
tle
y 
Jo
h
29
6
So
re
ns
en
 Jo
n
58
7
Ta
xm
an
 F
ay
46
V
iré
n 
M
at
20
4
W
ie
cz
or
ek
 W
il
54
3
So
us
a 
Jr
. W
il
45
5
Ta
yl
or
 Jo
h
59
9
V
is
cu
si
 W
. 
14
7
W
ilk
in
so
n 
Ja
m
61
7
Sp
en
ce
r D
e 
87
Te
de
sc
hi
 Ja
m
99
V
is
sc
he
r M
ic
31
8
W
ill
ia
m
s A
ll
39
3
Sp
en
gl
er
 H
an
30
7
Te
ev
an
 Ja
m
27
0
V
oa
s R
ob
16
9
W
ill
ia
m
s I
ii 
Fr
a
13
8
N
um
er
ic
al
 O
rd
er
 o
f A
ut
ho
rs
1
K
en
ne
dy
 L
es
31
Sc
ho
en
ig
 S
te
61
M
iro
n 
Je
f
91
Co
rm
an
 H
op
12
1
M
ai
ta
l S
hl
2
R
af
te
ry
 A
dr
32
V
oe
lk
er
 C
am
62
D
öl
lin
g 
D
ie
92
H
ag
an
 Jo
h
12
2
G
ro
gg
er
 Je
f
3
M
ad
ig
an
 D
av
33
N
isk
an
en
 W
il
63
M
ac
hi
n 
St
e
93
Ep
pl
e 
D
en
12
3
Y
un
ke
r J
am
4
Ba
ro
n 
St
e
34
R
og
er
s 
Pa
t
64
G
rim
es
 P
au
94
St
ah
ur
a 
Jo
h
12
4
R
ut
en
be
rg
 A
ry
5
H
oe
tin
g 
Je
n
35
Ro
be
rts
 R
ob
65
Si
lb
er
m
an
 M
at
95
H
uf
f R
on
12
5
M
ac
do
na
ld
 Jo
h
6
Th
ist
le
 P
au
36
C
ha
m
be
rs
 L
ar
66
Sm
ith
 K
ev
96
Cl
on
in
ge
r D
al
12
6
Le
un
g 
A
m
b
7
Er
ic
ks
on
 M
ay
37
G
ra
ha
m
 Jo
h
67
M
eg
hi
r C
os
97
K
ea
ne
 C
ar
12
7
B
ec
si
 Z
so
8
G
ib
bs
 Ja
c
38
Ev
an
s W
il
68
A
nd
rie
nk
o 
Y
ur
98
K
am
in
sk
i R
ob
12
8
Fo
x 
Ja
m
9
C
ov
er
 J
am
39
N
ev
ill
e 
D
or
69
H
ol
lin
ge
r R
ic
99
V
iss
ch
er
 M
ic
12
9
K
le
m
ke
 L
lo
10
St
ac
k 
St
e
40
Bl
ac
k 
Th
e
70
Ca
pp
el
 C
ha
10
0
G
ill
is 
A
.r
13
0
Po
gu
e 
Th
o
11
Je
ns
en
 G
ar
41
O
rs
ag
h 
Th
o
71
Sy
ke
s G
re
10
1
M
ar
ve
ll 
Th
o
13
1
Bu
nn
 D
ou
12
Fi
sc
he
r J
us
42
To
om
ey
 T
ra
72
Le
am
er
 E
dw
10
2
Ch
ilt
on
 R
ol
13
2
vo
n 
H
of
er
 H
an
13
Fu
ji 
Ed
w
43
G
ro
sv
en
or
 D
av
73
Cl
ar
k 
Jo
h
10
3
M
oo
dy
 C
ar
13
3
Th
am
 H
en
14
Tw
ee
te
n 
Lu
t
44
Le
gg
e 
Je
r
74
D
ip
as
qu
al
e 
D
en
10
4
Ca
m
pb
el
l D
on
13
4
G
ro
pp
er
 D
an
15
M
or
ris
 D
ou
45
W
ag
en
aa
r A
le
75
M
ye
rs
 J
r. 
Sa
m
10
5
K
le
tte
 H
an
13
5
M
er
rif
ie
ld
 Je
f
16
Ze
dl
ew
sk
i E
dw
46
V
iré
n 
M
at
76
R
ee
s 
D
an
10
6
G
ne
ez
y 
U
ri
13
6
Ca
ud
ill
 B
ar
17
Po
nt
el
l H
en
47
Ta
o 
H
un
77
G
la
es
er
 E
dw
10
7
Ru
sti
ch
in
i A
ld
13
7
Ca
ud
ill
 S
te
18
M
ak
 J
am
48
Pa
rk
 Jo
o
78
V
ea
ll 
M
ic
10
8
H
ec
ke
lm
an
 Ja
c
13
8
U
ng
er
le
id
er
 S
te
19
A
lle
n 
W
. 
49
W
at
so
n 
Ro
y
79
H
ex
te
r J
. 
10
9
Y
at
es
 A
nd
13
9
To
lli
so
n 
Ro
b
20
Zi
m
rin
g 
Fr
a
50
K
os
ke
la
 E
rk
80
H
ou
sto
n 
D
av
11
0
G
re
en
w
oo
d 
M
ic
14
0
Fa
br
ik
an
t R
ic
21
C
la
rk
 D
av
51
H
ei
sle
r G
er
81
Se
sn
ow
itz
 M
ic
11
1
W
ad
yc
ki
 W
al
14
1
W
he
el
er
 T
im
22
Sp
ru
ill
 N
an
52
C
ha
pm
an
 Je
f
82
M
cA
le
er
 M
ic
11
2
Ra
ph
ae
l S
te
14
2
G
aw
an
de
 K
is
23
Si
lv
er
m
an
 L
es
53
Bo
dm
an
 P
hi
83
G
itt
in
gs
 K
aj
11
3
W
in
te
r-E
bm
er
 R
ud
14
3
M
cc
or
m
ic
k 
Ro
b
24
C
os
gr
ov
e 
Ja
m
54
Pf
ei
ff
er
 M
an
84
Zh
an
g 
Ju
n
11
4
N
or
to
n 
W
il
14
4
K
an
to
r G
le
25
G
ov
e 
W
al
55
Pa
rs
le
y 
J. 
85
M
oc
an
 H
. 
11
5
G
oo
dm
an
 D
ou
14
5
Sa
m
ue
lso
n 
Sv
e
26
Ru
hm
 C
hr
56
G
el
au
 C
hr
86
H
or
ai
 Jo
a
11
6
N
eu
str
om
 M
ic
14
6
M
in
or
 W
il
27
B
ac
on
 P
et
57
La
yt
on
 A
ll
87
Te
de
sc
hi
 Ja
m
11
7
H
ei
kk
ila
 E
ri
14
7
W
ilk
in
so
n 
Ja
m
28
O
'do
no
gh
ue
 M
. 
58
M
au
ltb
y 
Ca
m
88
M
ar
ch
es
in
i R
ob
11
8
Be
nj
am
in
i Y
ae
14
8
M
cc
le
lla
nd
 G
ar
29
G
ee
rk
en
 M
ic
59
C
hr
es
sa
nt
hi
s G
eo
89
Ri
ch
ar
ds
on
 L
il
11
9
Fr
ie
dl
an
d 
N
eh
14
9
H
ar
ry
 Jo
s
13
9
30
H
ou
sto
n 
Jo
h
60
H
an
se
n 
K
ir
90
Lo
vi
tc
h 
N
or
12
0
Cr
ai
g 
St
e
15
0
Li
an
g 
Fa
m
15
1
Sc
hu
lze
 W
il
18
3
A
itk
en
 C
. 
21
5
G
re
en
 P
et
24
7
O
va
di
a 
A
ri
27
9
W
itt
 R
ob
15
2
Tr
uo
ng
 Y
ou
18
4
Th
ur
m
an
 Q
ui
21
6
W
ils
on
 R
. 
24
8
Cu
sh
in
g 
Ro
b
28
0
H
au
se
 J
an
15
3
Ta
na
ka
 R
an
18
5
C
am
er
on
 S
am
21
7
M
ul
la
hy
 Jo
h
24
9
M
an
n 
Ro
b
28
1
Fi
eld
in
g 
N
ig
15
4
St
or
ey
 D
. 
18
6
Co
rn
w
el
l C
hr
21
8
Pa
yn
e 
B
ri
25
0
B
ea
n 
Fr
a
28
2
Si
ck
le
s R
ob
15
5
W
ei
ge
l R
us
18
7
Cl
ar
k 
C.
 
21
9
Sc
rib
ne
r R
ic
25
1
Le
i H
. 
28
3
W
ill
ia
m
s J
en
15
6
Is
ac
hs
en
 A
rn
18
8
Tr
um
bu
ll 
W
il
22
0
V
in
od
 H
.
25
2
B
le
fg
en
 H
 N
28
4
W
itt
e 
A
nn
15
7
Ja
ck
so
n 
B
et
18
9
Er
ar
d 
B
ri
22
1
D
em
er
s 
D
av
25
3
Sa
gi
 E
li
28
5
M
cd
ow
al
l D
av
15
8
G
ha
li 
M
oh
19
0
M
er
rim
an
 D
av
22
2
Pe
ste
llo
 F
ra
25
4
A
ng
lin
 L
is
28
6
Sc
hu
m
an
n 
K
ar
15
9
St
ro
m
 S
te
19
1
A
vi
o 
K
en
22
3
G
ai
ne
y 
Ra
n
25
5
W
ei
nb
la
tt 
Jim
28
7
M
as
ih
 R
um
16
0
C
ur
ti 
H
en
19
2
M
el
on
i O
sv
22
4
Fe
ll 
Ja
m
25
6
A
yr
es
 Ia
n
28
8
Lo
fti
n 
Co
l
16
1
El
ff
er
s H
en
19
3
M
cC
ra
ry
 Ju
s
22
5
Lu
nd
m
an
 R
ic
25
7
G
av
in
 D
ou
28
9
Br
ew
er
 V
ic
16
2
W
on
g 
W
in
19
4
C
oh
en
 M
ar
22
6
W
ith
er
s G
le
25
8
K
es
sl
er
 D
an
29
0
K
es
sle
r R
on
16
3
Es
to
re
s E
m
o
19
5
Sh
ep
he
rd
 Jo
a
22
7
G
ra
u 
M
on
25
9
G
la
ss
 G
en
29
1
K
ell
y 
M
or
16
4
Ba
hl
 R
oy
19
6
V
ict
or
 M
ic
22
8
K
ar
ste
dt
-H
en
ke
 S
us
26
0
Fr
ie
dm
an
 Jo
s
29
2
M
ar
qu
ar
t J
am
16
5
H
es
sin
g 
D
ic
19
7
R
ub
in
 P
au
22
9
Iw
as
e 
N
ob
26
1
A
dl
af
 E
dw
29
3
K
au
lit
zk
i R
ei
16
6
O
ka
no
 F
ra
19
8
C
er
ro
 A
na
23
0
M
cK
ee
 M
ic
26
2
Ti
pp
et
ts 
A
. 
29
4
Lo
ga
n 
Ch
a
16
7
H
ill
 W
il
19
9
C
he
at
w
oo
d 
D
er
23
1
D
es
ha
pr
iy
a 
E.
 
26
3
Fi
sh
m
an
 G
id
29
5
W
ill
is 
K
. 
16
8
Co
nt
ro
ne
a 
Ro
s
20
0
Bu
ik
hu
ise
n 
W
. 
23
2
Jo
yc
e 
Th
e
26
4
H
ak
im
 S
im
29
6
So
re
ns
en
 Jo
n
16
9
W
ill
iam
s I
ii 
Fr
a
20
1
D
ez
hb
ak
hs
h 
H
as
23
3
Be
ck
 W
il
26
5
Le
vi
tt 
St
e
29
7
G
rie
sin
ge
r H
ar
17
0
Fr
an
co
 M
ar
20
2
Su
lli
va
n 
K
ar
23
4
A
lm
 Ja
m
26
6
K
at
z 
La
w
29
8
Be
rli
tz 
Cl
a
17
1
Lo
ch
ne
r L
an
20
3
Ph
ill
ip
s D
av
23
5
B
ei
rn
es
s D
ou
26
7
Sc
hm
id
t P
et
29
9
Ta
uc
he
n 
H
el
17
2
K
al
fu
s G
ra
20
4
W
ie
cz
or
ek
 W
il
23
6
Fo
rti
n 
Be
r
26
8
R
os
s 
La
u
30
0
D
en
ny
 K
ev
17
3
Po
rte
r J
ac
20
5
N
ot
t D
av
23
7
A
sb
rid
ge
 M
ar
26
9
La
ng
e 
Ja
m
30
1
G
re
en
be
rg
 D
av
17
4
B
al
se
r D
av
20
6
M
ira
nd
 A
m
y
23
8
La
m
bl
e 
Ro
b
27
0
V
oa
s R
ob
30
2
Pr
es
s 
S.
 
17
5
A
lc
or
n 
D
av
20
7
D
ef
fe
nt
i C
as
23
9
La
cr
oi
x 
G
uy
27
1
Cl
ar
ke
 A
la
30
3
W
rin
kl
e 
Ro
b
17
6
Fe
rra
ri 
Jo
s
20
8
K
ae
ne
 B
et
24
0
V
ill
ev
al
 M
ar
27
2
Sp
ie
ge
l U
ri
30
4
G
ut
h 
H
an
17
7
A
re
an
 P
at
20
9
G
ab
or
 T
ho
24
1
Sy
ko
ra
 K
. 
27
3
Sh
ac
hm
ur
ov
e 
Y
oc
30
5
A
as
ne
ss
 Jo
r
17
8
M
ix
on
 D
ar
21
0
A
lb
re
ch
t H
an
24
2
Br
um
m
 H
ar
27
4
Sh
us
to
ro
vi
ch
 E
ll
30
6
Ih
la
nf
el
dt
 K
ei
17
9
M
ix
on
 F
ra
21
1
Ca
lla
ha
n 
Ch
r
24
3
M
ur
ra
y 
M
at
27
5
La
fr
ee
 G
ar
30
7
Te
ev
an
 J
am
18
0
Ba
l-i
la
n 
A
vn
21
2
Jo
na
h 
B
ri
24
4
V
in
gi
lis
 E
ve
27
6
R
en
ge
rt 
G
eo
30
8
Ei
de
 E
rl
18
1
Sa
ce
rd
ot
e 
B
ru
21
3
Si
nd
el
ar
 Jo
d
24
5
St
od
ut
o 
G
in
27
7
M
cc
le
ar
y 
Ri
c
30
9
G
er
tz
 M
ar
18
2
M
cG
eo
rg
e 
Jil
21
4
Re
sig
na
to
 A
nd
24
6
Sm
ar
t R
eg
27
8
G
ro
ss
 M
ei
31
0
H
ar
m
on
 C
ol
14
0
31
1
W
al
ke
r I
an
34
3
Ca
rri
th
er
s W
il
37
5
Zi
m
m
er
m
an
 P
au
40
7
Lu
nd
ste
dt
 S
. 
43
9
D
av
ie
s H
es
31
2
Jo
hn
so
n 
W
el
34
4
St
af
fo
rd
 M
ar
37
6
H
sin
g 
By
 
40
8
Ja
ya
ku
m
ar
 M
al
44
0
Sl
oa
n 
Fr
a
31
3
Ti
ttl
e 
Ch
a
34
5
K
im
 Il
j
37
7
Y
ap
 L
. 
40
9
Th
om
as
 E
ve
44
1
C
ha
ik
en
 Ja
n
31
4
G
ou
ld
 L
er
34
6
Sa
ff
er
 H
en
37
8
Sa
lem
 R
ic
41
0
M
eh
ay
 S
te
44
2
La
w
le
ss
 M
ic
31
5
D
ec
ke
r S
co
34
7
M
en
ke
 B
en
37
9
Bo
w
er
s W
il
41
1
Zu
eh
lk
e 
Th
o
44
3
Be
nn
et
t E
li
31
6
K
oh
fe
ld
 C
ar
34
8
M
ild
er
 T
ru
38
0
A
lle
n 
R
al
41
2
Za
rk
in
 G
ar
44
4
Sw
im
m
er
 E
ug
31
7
Ly
do
n 
Re
a
34
9
G
ra
y 
Lo
u
38
1
M
at
hu
r V
ij
41
3
Br
on
ar
s S
te
44
5
Jo
ne
s T
er
31
8
W
ill
iam
s A
ll
35
0
M
ar
tin
 D
av
38
2
W
ill
iam
s K
ir
41
4
G
oo
d 
D
av
44
6
M
ilt
on
 E
dw
31
9
Sk
je
rp
en
 T
er
35
1
M
ira
nn
e 
A
lf
38
3
A
nt
un
es
 G
eo
41
5
Pa
cu
la
 R
os
44
7
Li
an
g 
La
n
32
0
M
ei
er
 R
ob
35
2
Ba
ile
y 
W
il
38
4
H
am
ilt
on
 E
dw
41
6
B
ra
y 
Je
r
44
8
Le
de
rm
an
 D
an
32
1
Fe
ld
m
an
 A
m
y
35
3
Ba
ch
m
an
n 
Ro
n
38
5
Pa
te
 A
nt
41
7
W
hi
tle
y 
Jo
h
44
9
G
ith
en
s P
en
32
2
Ro
w
e 
A
la
35
4
Pe
te
rs
on
 R
ut
38
6
H
un
t A
. 
41
8
Pi
ro
g-
G
oo
d 
M
au
45
0
St
ev
en
so
n 
K
ei
32
3
H
ic
km
an
n 
Ca
r
35
5
Lo
tt 
Ru
t
38
7
G
od
fre
y 
Ch
r
41
9
Lo
tt 
Jo
h
45
1
W
he
tte
n-
32
4
So
lla
rs
 D
av
35
6
So
ar
es
 R
. 
38
8
Bo
ld
 F
re
42
0
B
en
so
n 
B
ru
G
ol
ds
te
in
 K
at
32
5
B
ra
tto
n 
Ja
s
35
7
La
ys
on
 S
te
38
9
En
so
r T
im
42
1
M
us
ta
rd
 D
av
45
2
Pa
ss
el
l P
et
32
6
M
ak
i D
en
35
8
St
ol
ze
nb
er
g 
Li
s
39
0
H
ul
l B
ro
42
2
G
ro
ve
s T
he
45
3
D
ea
dm
an
 D
er
32
7
Er
ic
ks
on
 P
at
35
9
D
'al
es
sio
 S
te
39
1
M
ag
ad
di
no
 Jo
s
42
3
M
ik
es
el
l J
oh
45
4
C
ha
lfa
nt
 H
. 
32
8
Le
bu
rn
 Ia
n
36
0
Fu
nk
 P
at
39
2
M
ed
of
f M
ar
42
4
Fa
rre
lly
 M
at
45
5
Ta
yl
or
 Jo
h
32
9
Re
tti
ng
 R
ic
36
1
G
oe
l R
aj
39
3
Sp
en
gl
er
 H
an
42
5
G
ou
ld
 E
ri
45
6
Pe
ek
 C
ha
33
0
M
et
sg
er
 L
in
36
2
N
els
on
 M
ic
39
4
En
to
rf 
H
or
42
6
Th
éb
au
d 
O
li
45
7
M
cg
ra
w
 K
at
33
1
Je
ns
en
 E
ri
36
3
K
ug
le
r P
et
39
5
W
in
ke
r P
et
42
7
W
en
dl
in
g 
Br
e
45
8
Pu
dn
ey
 S
te
33
2
Fo
gl
ia
 W
an
36
4
A
nd
re
on
i J
am
39
6
Fa
rm
er
 C
ha
42
8
W
ei
nb
er
g 
B
ru
45
9
St
ee
nb
er
ge
n 
M
ar
33
3
Ba
lb
o 
M
ar
36
5
Za
do
r P
au
39
7
C
oh
en
 D
eb
42
9
Sc
he
nz
le
r C
hr
46
0
D
oy
le
 Jo
a
33
4
Bu
rk
et
t S
te
36
6
Tr
ie
st 
Ro
b
39
8
D
ie
z-
Ti
ci
o 
A
m
o
43
0
Li
sk
a 
A
ll
46
1
A
nd
er
so
n 
Er
i
33
5
M
as
t B
re
36
7
Sh
ef
fri
n 
St
e
39
9
Fr
ey
 B
ru
43
1
Y
u 
Jia
46
2
M
on
tm
ar
qu
et
te
 C
la
33
6
R
as
m
us
se
n 
D
av
36
8
Th
om
so
n 
Er
n
40
0
Fe
ld
 L
ar
43
2
Fa
jn
zy
lb
er
 P
ab
46
3
Py
le
 D
av
33
7
Ch
am
lin
 M
it
36
9
Lu
dw
ig
 Je
n
40
1
H
er
o 
R
od
43
3
H
at
ch
er
 A
ar
46
4
Sc
ho
lz
 Jo
h
33
8
M
au
se
r G
ar
37
0
Co
ok
 P
hi
40
2
Bu
rn
el
l J
am
43
4
St
ou
t E
m
i
46
5
St
ee
l M
ar
33
9
Ca
hl
ou
pk
a 
Fr
a
37
1
H
ol
tm
an
n 
A
. 
40
3
Sp
ice
r M
ic
43
5
D
es
im
on
e 
Je
f
46
6
Sa
ru
c 
To
l
34
0
Bu
rs
ik
 R
ob
37
2
U
ys
al
 M
uz
40
4
M
ee
ra
 A
ha
43
6
Ja
ffr
y 
Sh
a
46
7
Sl
oa
n 
Jo
h
34
1
G
ro
ss
m
an
n 
M
ic
37
3
W
el
lfo
rd
 C
ha
40
5
Jo
hn
so
n 
D
el
43
7
Lo
ay
za
 N
or
46
8
A
hm
ed
 E
hs
34
2
W
ar
d 
D
av
37
4
Si
ra
ka
ya
 E
rc
40
6
Fu
rlo
ng
 W
il
43
8
Re
ill
y 
Br
i
46
9
H
or
n 
Ro
b
47
0
Ta
lle
y 
W
ay
50
2
A
rv
an
ite
s T
ho
53
4
K
el
lin
g 
G
eo
56
6
Pa
pp
s 
K
er
59
8
V
ot
ey
 H
ar
14
1
47
1
Fo
re
st
 P
au
50
3
M
cC
ol
lo
m
 C
ar
53
5
Pa
te
rn
os
te
r R
ay
56
7
Sc
hu
es
sl
er
 K
ar
59
9
V
isc
us
i W
. 
47
2
K
ov
an
dz
ic
 T
om
50
4
Pe
te
e 
Th
o
53
6
Sn
or
tu
m
 Jo
h
56
8
M
ag
at
 W
es
60
0
Ph
ill
ip
s L
la
47
3
N
er
lo
ve
 M
ar
50
5
Ch
am
bo
ul
ey
ro
n 
 A
nd
53
7
K
irc
hn
er
 R
ob
56
9
N
ils
so
n 
A
nn
60
1
Sh
ap
iro
 P
er
47
4
Ti
de
m
an
 N
ic
50
6
Ja
co
b 
H
er
53
8
Sa
ltz
m
an
 L
in
57
0
Le
y 
Ed
u
60
2
W
ol
pi
n 
K
en
47
5
M
ic
ha
el
s R
ic
50
7
G
ia
co
pa
ss
i D
av
53
9
Sc
hn
el
le
 Jo
h
57
1
Fe
rn
án
de
z 
C
ar
60
3
M
ag
ui
n 
Eu
g
47
6
A
li 
M
.M
50
8
Ri
ch
 M
ic
54
0
Io
va
nn
i L
ee
57
2
B
ai
le
y 
K
en
60
4
G
ër
xh
an
i K
la
47
7
Pl
as
sm
an
n 
Fl
o
50
9
W
elc
h 
M
ic
54
1
La
rs
on
 L
yn
57
3
Li
st 
Jo
h
60
5
Th
om
ps
on
 L
yk
47
8
Si
gm
an
 H
il
51
0
M
cP
he
te
rs
 L
ee
54
2
Li
u 
Zh
i
57
4
Sh
el
ey
 Jo
s
60
6
G
re
en
 D
on
47
9
O
tte
rb
ei
n 
K
ei
51
1
St
ro
ng
e 
W
il
54
3
So
us
a 
Jr
. W
il
57
5
N
eu
m
an
 C
ar
60
7
Sc
hr
am
 A
rt
48
0
D
an
zi
ge
r S
he
51
2
Ch
al
ou
pk
a 
Fr
a
54
4
K
oo
pm
an
 S
ie
57
6
Ch
er
ry
 T
od
60
8
To
ni
 M
ak
48
1
Bi
sh
op
 D
on
51
3
Fe
rri
er
 G
ar
54
5
W
ar
in
g 
El
i
57
7
W
at
ts 
R
on
60
9
Br
ai
th
w
ai
te
 Jo
h
48
2
W
he
el
er
 D
av
51
4
M
ar
el
ic
h 
W
il
54
6
Ch
iri
co
s T
he
57
8
Br
ez
in
a 
Ti
m
61
0
So
pe
r J
os
48
3
Fe
hr
 E
rn
51
5
M
ag
hs
oo
dl
oo
 S
ae
54
7
Eh
rli
ch
 Is
a
57
9
H
er
na
nd
ez
 A
nt
61
1
Sh
or
e 
El
s
48
4
V
an
ni
ni
 M
ar
51
6
Fo
rd
e 
D
av
54
8
W
ald
o 
G
or
58
0
R
ab
ow
 Je
r
61
2
Cl
ar
ke
 R
on
48
5
M
ar
se
lli
 R
ic
51
7
G
re
at
ho
us
e 
Pe
r
54
9
K
en
ne
dy
 D
av
58
1
Pa
rk
er
 J
ef
61
3
C
re
w
 R
.e
48
6
Po
sa
da
s J
os
51
8
K
le
pp
er
 S
te
55
0
B
ra
ga
 A
nt
58
2
M
ui
 H
.w
61
4
G
äc
ht
er
 S
im
48
7
A
nd
er
so
n 
El
i
51
9
Po
ga
rs
ky
 G
re
55
1
Sr
id
ha
ra
n 
Sa
n
58
3
Pi
qu
er
o 
A
le
61
5
Th
al
er
 R
ic
48
8
C
oh
en
 L
ar
52
0
B
ro
w
n 
D
av
55
2
D
am
ph
ou
ss
e 
K
el
58
4
A
tk
in
s R
ay
61
6
M
c 
Fa
rla
nd
 S
am
48
9
A
pp
le
to
n 
Ly
n
52
1
Ri
tse
m
a 
Ch
r
55
3
B
ro
w
er
 G
eo
58
5
St
ev
an
s L
on
61
7
Sp
en
ce
r D
e 
49
0
D
ia
z 
Jo
a
52
2
Th
om
as
 D
eb
55
4
A
nd
er
so
n 
Li
n
58
6
Sm
ith
 M
. 
61
8
W
eb
er
 J
.m
49
1
B
or
ac
k 
Ju
l
52
3
N
ag
in
 D
an
55
5
V
uj
ic
 S
un
58
7
Ta
xm
an
 F
ay
61
9
K
ill
ia
s M
ar
49
2
Sc
ot
t W
il
52
4
Ja
rre
ll 
St
e
55
6
K
ap
la
n 
H
ow
58
8
A
nd
er
so
n 
Li
s
62
0
G
iu
s M
ar
49
3
G
ra
sm
ic
k 
H
ar
52
5
B
er
ge
r D
al
55
7
Pi
eh
l A
nn
58
9
Fo
ss
 R
ob
62
1
Ea
rn
ha
rt 
D
ie
49
4
D
ef
in
a 
Ro
b
52
6
M
cN
ee
s 
Pa
t
55
8
Ca
rr-
H
ill
 R
. 
59
0
Re
in
fu
rt 
D
on
62
2
Fo
rs
t B
ri
49
5
Ca
rm
ic
ha
el
 F
io
52
7
W
ar
d 
Sa
l
55
9
St
er
n 
N
. 
59
1
Pa
rk
er
 R
ob
62
3
V
an
da
el
e 
W
al
49
6
Br
yj
ak
 G
eo
52
8
C
ar
r A
da
56
0
W
on
g 
Y
ue
59
2
Pa
rk
 C
ha
49
7
Co
ch
ra
n 
Jo
h
52
9
K
oc
h 
St
e
56
1
H
oe
na
ck
 S
te
59
3
B
uo
na
nn
o 
Pa
o
49
8
Ra
lst
on
 R
oy
53
0
Sm
ith
 D
ou
56
2
W
el
ls 
L.
 
59
4
St
ew
ar
t J
. 
49
9
W
ar
d 
Ro
b
53
1
D
om
as
h 
M
ic
56
3
W
ei
le
r W
il
59
5
St
af
fo
rd
 S
ar
50
0
W
ill
in
gt
on
 M
an
53
2
H
ow
se
n 
R
oy
56
4
W
in
ke
lm
an
n 
Ra
i
59
6
H
yu
n 
Jin
14
2
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 5
: L
ev
itt
-C
om
po
ne
nt ??
???
???
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
???
??
??
???
???
??
??
???
??
? ?
??
???
??
???
???
??
H
in
t: 
Th
ic
kn
es
s o
f e
dg
es
 in
cr
ea
se
s w
ith
 n
um
be
r o
f p
ap
er
s.
14
3
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
??
???
???
??
??
???
??
?
??
???
???
?
??
??
??
???
??
???
???
??
??
??
??
??
???
?
??
??
???
??
?
???
??
??
??
???
??
???
?
??
???
???
?? ?
??
??
???
??
??
???
???
???
??
???
???
???
??
??
?
??
???
??
??
???
??
???
??
??
??
??
???
???
??
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 6
: B
ai
le
y-
Co
m
po
ne
nt
H
in
t: 
Th
ic
kn
es
s o
f e
dg
es
 in
cr
ea
se
s w
ith
 n
um
be
r o
f p
ap
er
s.
14
4
??
??
???
?
??
???
???
?
???
??
???
???
??
???
???
?
???
???
????
??
??
???
???
???
?
??
??
???
??
?
??
???
??
???
??
??
???
???
?
??
???
???
??
???
???
???
??
??
???
??
??
??
???
???
N
et
w
or
k 
Fi
gu
re
 7
: M
an
n-
Co
m
po
ne
nt
H
in
t: 
Th
ic
kn
es
s o
f e
dg
es
 in
cr
ea
se
s w
ith
 n
um
be
r o
f p
ap
er
s.
14
5
146
Chapter 6
Supplement
6.1 Glossary
This is a non-mathematical glossary of basic network notions. The list is sorted from simple to
more complex notions.
(1) Vertex, pl. Vertices Nodes in networks often represent players, companies,
authors or other economic units.
(2) Link A line in a network which directly (without involving other
vertices) connects two vertices and typically indicates a
relationship between them. Each link is either an arc, an
edge or a loop.
(3) Multiple Link If more than one direct link between two vertices exist than
a multiple link is formed. For instance, a multiple-link
in a coauthor network indicates that two researchers
collaborated several times.
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(4) Arc An arc is a directed link. In Chapter 3, an arc from vertex A
to vertex B indicates that company A is owned by company
B.
(5) Edge An edge is a non-directed link. Coauthor relationship can
be represented by edges since if author A has worked with
B then B has also worked with A.
(6) Loop A loop is a link which starts and ends at the same vertex.
(7) Network A network consists of vertices being connected by links.
(8) Bipartite Network A bipartite network consists of two partitions where links
are only formed between partitions but not within each
partition. For instance, research articles and researchers
are two partitions where links between a researcher and an
article indicate that the researcher is an author of the article.
(9) Component Each network can be partitioned in components where each
vertex within a component is directly or indirectly connected
to each other vertex within the same component whereas
no direct nor indirect connection exists between vertices of
different components.
(10) Giant Component The giant component contains a large number of vertices of
a network.
(11) Path A path consists of vertices and links such that vertices are
adjacent and links are incident to each other and each vertex
and link occurs only once.
(12) Geodesic The geodesic is the shortest path between two vertices.
(13) Distance The distance of two vertices within a network is defined as
the number of links on the geodesic.
(14) Small-World Milgram (1967) discovers that most humans on earth are
only separated by a few links within their acquaintance
network. Accordingly, this network characteristic is called
the small-world property.
(15) Degree The degree of a vertex is the number of links emanating from
it (also called Degree-Centrality).
(16) Indegree The indegree of a vertex is the number of incoming arcs of
the vertex.
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(17) Outdegree The outdegree of a vertex is the number of arcs emanating
from the vertex.
(18) Closeness-Centrality “The closeness centrality of a vertex is the number of all
other vertices divided by the sum of all distances between
the vertex and all others” (cf. de Nooy et al. 2005).
(19) Empty Network An empty network only consists of non-connected vertices,
i.e. no links exist at all.
(20) Star A star network consists of a centre vertex being connected to
each other vertex whereas each other vertex is only directly
connected to the centre.
(21) Regular Network In a regular network each vertex has the same number of
links. For example, the empty network and the complete
network are regular.
(22) Complete Network In a complete network each vertex is directly connected to
each other vertex.
(23) Network Density The number of existing links in a network relative to the
number of all possible links in the same network.
(24) Cluster Coefficient The number of existing links in a subset of vertices relative
to the number of all possible links in that subset.
(25) Dyad A pair of vertices in a network with or without links.
(26) Mutual Dyad A pair of vertices with two arcs or an edge.
(27) Asymmetric Dyad A pair of vertices with one arc.
(28) Null Dyad A pair of vertices with no links.
(29) Triad Three vertices in a network with or without links. A triad
consists of three dyads where each dyad is either a mutual,
asymmetric, or null dyad.
(30) MAN classification
scheme
16 possible existing triads where only the structural
information is important and not the position of single
vertices. Confer Figure 6.1.
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6.2 MAN Classification Scheme
The MAN classification scheme is a mean to describe a network in brief. In a network with N
vertices
(
N
3
)
triads exist. MAN abbreviates mutual, asymmetric and null and denotes different
links present or absent in dyads. Figure 6.1 shows all different triads which could exist in a
network. The MAN classification scheme simply counts the number of triads among the
(
N
3
)
existing triads. Table 6.1 shows corresponding probabilities for each triad if links are randomly
formed.
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Figure 6.1: All Triads in the MAN-Classification Scheme
Source: “The triad isomorphism classes (with standard MAN labeling)”, Wasserman and Faust (1994),
p. 566. The first three number counts the number of mutual dyads M, asymmetric dyads A, and null
dyads N. The letter behind the number distinguishes otherwise identical triad formations from each
other: D=Down, U=Up, C=Cycle, and T=Transitive.
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Table 6.1: Probabilities in a Random Network
Conditional Probabilities for each triad type
P (003|0L) = 1
P (012|1L) = 1
P (102|2L) = 0.2 P (021D|2L) = 0.2 P (021U |2L) = 0.2 P (021C|2L) = 0.4
P (111D|3L) = 0.3 P (111U |3L) = 0.3 P (030T |3L) = 0.3 P (030C|3L) = 0.1
P (201|4L) = 0.2 P (120D|4L) = 0.2 P (120U |4L) = 0.2 P (120C|4L) = 0.4
P (210|5L) = 1
P (300|6L) = 1
Probabilities that a certain number of links is formed in a triad.
P (0L) =
(
6
0
)
p0(1− p)6
P (1L) =
(
6
1
)
p1(1− p)5
P (2L) =
(
6
2
)
p2(1− p)4
P (3L) =
(
6
3
)
p3(1− p)3
P (4L) =
(
6
4
)
p4(1− p)2
P (5L) =
(
6
5
)
p5(1− p)1
P (6L) =
(
6
6
)
p6(1− p)0
Own Source: A random network is defined as a network where each link has the same formation probability p.
In our case p = Existing Links
Maximal Number of Links
= 3711
2784 2783
= 0.00047897. Therefore, the expected number of triads
which include many arcs in Table 3.3, for instance number of 300-triad, 210-triads, etc., is close to zero. 0L=zero
links are formed, 1L=one link is formed,. . . ,6L=six links are formed. It holds that P (2L) = P (102)+P (021D)+
P (021U) + P (021C) and similar for P (3L) and P (4L).
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